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Abstract
The subject of this thesis is to explore the philosophy of life that informs C.S. Lewis’s 
Cosmic Trilogy (Out o f the Silent Planet, Perelandra and That Hideous Strength). These 
texts are “spiritual adventures” which exemplify Lewis’s phenomenology of spiritual 
progress - the movement from self-centredness to Other-centredness. I perform a close 
reading of the trilogy and attempt to understand the way(s) in which the three major thematic 
threads -  Conflict, Love, and the relationship between Unity and Diversity -  all contribute to 
the proposed phenomenology of the spirit. In the final chapter, I use Kierkegaard’s “stages in 
life’s way” (the aesthetic, ethical and religious) as a structural frame for understanding the 
trilogy’s dialectical movement. I also take the unusual step of codifying the fruits of my 
exploration into what I call ‘the Cosmic Manifesto,’ which serves as my creative engagement 
with the results of the philosophical exploration. My research shows that the philosophy of 
life is expressed through a tripartite spiritual journey. The traveller firstly visits the sphere of 
Mars, which entails developing clear perception and overcoming fear of the Other. Next, the 
traveller must pass through the sphere of Venus, where -  through courageous action on 
behalf of the Other -  s/he learns the nature of self-sacrificial love. Successfully traversing 
these two stages, the traveller then apprehends the spirit of Harmonia, the love-child of Mars 
and Venus. As a result, the ideal relation between the self and the Other -  unity in diversity -  
is discovered. I conclude that the philosophy of life underlying the trilogy is both 
aesthetically, ethically and religiously rich, and is an insightful perspective on a “life worth 
living.”
Acknowledgements
The financial assistance from the Rhodes University Postgraduate Scholarship towards this 
research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at, are those 
of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to Rhodes University or the donor.
Jamie McGregor: for your encouragement and wonderful supervision. Thank you for offering 
the Modern British Fantasy course -  and saving me from committing arson.
Theo Coetzer and Gemma Barkhuizen: for your friendship, example and solidarity as I 
completed this project.
Jay Coetzee and Michael Hughes: for the much needed squash-breaks.
Camila Bennink: for knocking on my door by mistake.
My father, Patrick, and my sister, Jennifer: for all the familiar support.
Paul Walters: for friendship, prayer and encouragement.
Cambridge University: for spurring me on like a madman.
Shane Engelbrecht: for your wise words and political incorrectness.
Finally, I acknowledge Him who is “above and beyond all things.”
Abbreviations
Out of the Silent Planet___________________________________________________ OSP
Perelandra_____________________________________________________________ Per
That Hideous Strength____________________________________________________ THS
The Abolition of Man_____________________________________________________ AM
The Discarded Image______________________________________________________DI
An Experiment in Criticism_________________________________________________EC
The Four Loves__________________________________________________________ FL
The Last Battle___________________________________________________________LB
The Letters o f C. S. Lewis________________________________________________ LCSL
Collected Letters o f C.S. Lewis Vol. 2._________________________________________CL
The Problem o f Pain______________________________________________________ PP
Surprised By Joy_________________________________________________________ SBJ
On the Genealogy o f Morals________________________________________________GM
Beyond Good and Evil____________________________________________________BGE
Thus Spoke Zarathustra____________________________________________________TSZ
“Is Progress Possible?”______________________________________________ “Progress”
“A Reply to Professor Haldane”_______________________________________ “A Reply”
“Sometimes Fairy Stories May
Say Best What’s To Be Said”__________________________________ “Sometimes”
“It All Began with a Picture...”_____________________________________ “It All Began”
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 ~ Introducing the Cosmic Trilogy and a Philosophy of Life......................... 1
Chapter 2 ~ Conflict, Loving Conflict and Love in Out o f the Silent Planet...............12
Conflict in OSP......................................................................................................... 15
Loving Conflict.........................................................................................................27
Love in OSP..............................................................................................................30
Chapter 3 ~ Love, Conflict and the Great Dance in Perelandra................................. 37
Love in Perelandra.................................................................................................. 39
Conflict in Perelandra............................................................................................. 46
The Great Dance.......................................................................................................57
Chapter 4 ~ Conflict, Love and Harmony in That Hideous Strength..........................67
Conflict in THS.........................................................................................................70
Love in THS..............................................................................................................82
Harmony in THS.......................................................................................................93
Chapter 5 ~ The Cosmic Philosophy of Life............................................................... 96
Appendix ~ The Cosmic Manifesto of Unity and Diversity, Love and Conflict.....108
Bibliography............................................................................................................... 112
Chapter 1
Introducing the Cosmic Trilogy and a Philosophy of Life
All actual life is encounter. 
Martin Buber, I  and Thou1 2
Good philosophy must exist, if for no other reason, because bad philosophy needs to be
answered.
2
C.S. Lewis, “Learning in War-time”
Thesis Statement: Exploring the Cosmic Trilogy’s Philosophy of Life
The subject of my research is to explore the philosophy of life that informs C.S. Lewis’s 
Cosmic Trilogy, which is composed of Out of the Silent Planet, Perelandra and That Hideous 
Strength (hereafter referred to as OSP, Perelandra or Per, THS). These three texts contain in 
themselves an entire worldview -  at times made explicit, often only implied. In the Cosmic 
Trilogy, the encoded worldview is worth exploring both for its own sake (to the modern and 
postmodern mind it is a strange cosmos) and for the insights it gives for our own life-world 
and how one might approach living within it. I will argue that the texts’ inherent philosophy 
of life, which is encapsulated conceptually in the concepts of conflict, love, unity and 
diversity, is a good one -  and particularly insightful when attempting to develop a theory and 
practice of the good life.
For many readers, the Cosmic Trilogy is replete with epiphany and insight. When the 
authorial voice describes a situation, or reports the protagonist’s thoughts about a certain 
event, in each case the description ‘jumps out’ and prompts a mental response: “Yes -  that’s 
how it is! He’s captured the essence of that moment.”3 Tom Morris records a similar 
response, referring to Lewis’s work in general: “I recall finding in his books sentences of 
such insight, and unexpected phrases of such perfection, that I would just sit and stare at the
1 I  and Thou 62.
2 Fern Seed and Elephants 34.
3 Given my initial characterisation of reading the trilogy, it should not be a surprise that I view Lewis as a 
phenomenologist: someone seeking to uncover the essence, indeed, the quintessence of being-in-the-world. For 
he starts from the given, from an intuition, and then begins the dual process of stripping down his target even 
while building it up again, to arrive at, insofar as it is possible, a non-reductive understanding of the 
phenomenon of his study.
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words, thinking to myself, I  wish I  had been able to say it that way. It was all so wise, and yet 
at the same time so simple. I was astonished” (9). These epiphanies, as I call them, are like 
the external parts of a root vegetable; they are green signs of something deeper, an underlying 
source full of nourishment. This source is the philosophy of life that I explore in the coming 
chapters.
Scope and Method of Exploration
The core of this thesis is an exploration of those philosophical ideas informing the trilogy’s 
worldview. I use the term exploration for good reason: the word does not imply a systematic 
exegesis that attempts to cover all the relevant themes and fit them into a philosophical 
system. On the contrary, my analysis is impressionistic by nature, dependent on what is found 
-  and it therefore often relies upon those portions of the text that ‘jump out’: the epiphanic 
portions. On the relevant sections, I perform a close reading and attempt to understand the 
way(s) in which the three major thematic movements -  Conflict, Love, and the unity in 
diversity expressed by Harmony -  are illuminated thereby. The chapter divisions and sub­
divisions, as structured, allow me to treat each novel separately while also stressing the 
above-mentioned themes. Each chapter is basically divided into two sections: one on 
Conflict, and the other on Love. In addition to this, the chapter looking at OSP has a third 
section called ‘Loving Conflict,’ the Perelandra chapter has a section on ‘The Great Dance,’ 
and in my discussion of THS, I include a section on ‘Harmony. ’ These structural divisions 
preserve the distinct unity of each text while also positioning each one in thematic relation to 
the other two. In the final chapter, beyond concluding my exploration into the trilogy’s 
philosophy of life, I also take the unusual step of codifying the fruits of my exploration into 
what I call ‘the Cosmic Manifesto.’ Given Lewis’s usage of indirect communication4 to 
express the trilogy’s philosophy of life, I believe it to be a natural extension of my p roject to 
do the same, albeit in a distilled form. In the manifesto, I take certain stylistic liberties and 
depart from conventional academic prose. My intention is to give it an aesthetic timbre that 
corresponds to the trilogy itself. Indeed, one might call this final section my creative 
engagement with the fruits of philosophical exploration.
In the course of the exploration, I do not offer a history of Lewis’s ideas, 
philosophical or otherwise, as expressed in the Cosmic Trilogy. Of course, his ideological 
stance, religious faith, literary forebears and biography are all important factors in why he
4 See p. 10 for an explanation of this term.
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wrote what he wrote. Exploring this would be the task of a literary biographer, and does not 
correspond to my interest as a philosophical critic: the texts’ philosophy, primarily as 
abstracted from the author. I do not attempt to ignore Lewis’s literary or philosophical 
influences -  sometimes I will advert to them -  but these are not my main focus.
Philosophy, Wisdom and Life
I follow Adam Barkman5 in using Pierre Hadot’s description of “philosophy as a way of life,” 
in which philosophy, understood in its ancient sense, is defined as being “a method of 
spiritual progress which demanded radical conversion and transformation of the individual’s 
way of being” (Hadot 265). This definition of philosophy is particularly apposite given that it 
maps well on to the perspective which Lewis came to hold about the subject. As he relates in 
his autobiography:
Once, when [Dom Bede Griffiths] and [Owen] Barfield were lunching in 
my room, I happened to refer to philosophy as “a subject.”
“It wasn't a subject to Plato,” said Barfield, “it was a way.” The quiet but 
fervent agreement of Griffiths, and the quick glance of understanding 
between these two, revealed to me my own frivolity. (SBJ 225)
I see the etymology of philosophy as another useful point of departure from which to
elucidate a fuller account of what philosophy means. Thus an even simpler definition:
“[p]hilosophy is the love of wisdom” (Morris 10); doing philosophy means to commit
(passionately) to becoming wise. Not merely that, but as Morris says in his preface to C.S.
Lewis as Philosopher, it is also the “unending desire to find [wisdom], understand it, put it
into action and pass it on to others” (10). Wisdom is knowledge put into practise, knowledge
made meaningful. It is a movement from the abstract and propositional to the actual, the real;
wisdom implies change in the realm of human beliefs and behaviour. Philosophy, as a way of
life that aims towards wisdom, is concerned not only with asking questions, but also with
answering these questions -  the “quest for certainty” (qtd. in Evans 56) as John Dewey has
described it.6
5 Barkman is the author of C.S. Lewis and Philosophy as a Way o f Life, a historical analysis o f Lewis’s 
philosophical thought.
6It will be immediately obvious that I am ignoring any meta-narratives, often present in post-structuralist / 
postmodern perspectives, which de-legitimise the very idea of a “quest for certainty.” Although the 
epistemological scepticism and cynicism these lenses provoke is of interest, in the everyday world of our 
experience, certainty must be grasped and chosen, and whether articulated or not, a teleology is always 
presupposed. Given my desire to elucidate a philosophy of life, and not merely some niche philosophy 
(understood as an academic discipline), I therefore proceed from an imagined Lebenswelt in which certain
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Developing a Philosophy of Life
Sigmund Freud defines a worldview as follows:
an intellectual construction which gives a unified solution of all the 
problems of our existence in virtue of a comprehensive hypothesis, a 
construction, therefore, in which no question is left open and in which 
everything in which we are interested finds a place. [...] [T]he possession of 
such a Weltanschauung is one of the ideal wishes of mankind. When one 
believes in such a thing, one feels secure in life, one knows what one ought 
to strive after, and how one ought to organise one’s emotions and interests 
to the best purpose. (“Lecture XXXV”)
One might possess a certain worldview, a “unified solution,” and yet in practise not feel 
“secure in life” nor actually strive after the “best purpose.” This fact of this disconnect is 
central to my own idea of a philosophy of life, which I propose as a bridging concept, 
presupposing a world-view and ‘world-action’: the “intellectual construction” leads to telos- 
orientated, concrete behaviour. Thus, for the sake of clarity, I define a ‘philosophy of life’ as 
essentially a worldview (Weltanschauung) but with an emphasis on the corresponding 
outworking of that worldview.
In attempting to develop a philosophy of life, there are any number of ways in which 
one might proceed -  beginning, for instance, with the concept of freedom, over against 
determinism (or slavery). The discussion would then always return to this fundamental, and 
attempt to show how all other central or peripheral concepts relate to it (or do not relate). 
There is of course something slightly arbitrary, at an epistemological level, on deciding to 
view existence through a certain explanatory lens. Yet as I see it, the reason Heidegger (for 
example) chose ‘Being’ and ‘Time’ is because he wanted to emphasise these elements, and to 
show that they could be considered among the basic, prior, fundamental things: not 
necessarily assert their priority against other frames of viewing the world. S0ren Kierkegaard 
spoke of “the aesthetic, ethical, and religious as ‘spheres of existence’” (Evans 68) and such a 
tripartite categorisation informs the way I view and conclude my exploration of the Cosmic 
Trilogy’s philosophy of life. This draws together the diverse foci of each chapter into a 
whole, structured according to Kierkegaard’s three “stages in life’s way” (Evans 38), which 
in many ways maps onto the concepts of Conflict, Love and Harmony, and serves as a useful 
explanatory framework and means of ordering the phenomenology of the human spirit.
(fictional) persons must find certainties, act upon them, and do so for some end in mind. I will spend no time 
arguing for the “quest for certainty” and its corollaries; this exploration merely presupposes it.
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Unity and Diversity, Love and Conflict
The title of this thesis -  Unity and Diversity, Love and Conflict -  has been chosen to reflect 
the concerns of the trilogy and provide an important framework, in addition to Kierkegaard’s 
existential spheres, for exploring the trilogy’s philosophy of life. There are several reasons 
why I chose these concepts specifically. Firstly, upon reading the Cosmic Trilogy, these pairs 
commended themselves to me as appropriate lenses through which to view and understand 
the trilogy. This intuition grasped not only at the thematic instances of conflict, love, unity 
and diversity in the texts, but also mapped directly on to the planetary connotations of Mars 
and Venus -  and the product of their mythological union, Harmonia (which, as I argue, 
encompasses the idea of a ‘diverse unity’ or ‘unity in diversity’). Secondly, these ideas, 
combined with their astrological significance, are fundamental. Often used by philosophers, 
theologians and mystics to describe the interrelated nature of human experience and reality, 
this conceptual triad will help elucidate Lewis’s view that “every one of us is already a living 
dialectic, a psychomachia,7 containing striking opposites” (Holmer 16). As will become 
apparent, this “living dialectic” or “psychomachia” -  which leads to a harmonious, cosmic 
‘psychosynthesis,’ if you will -  is paramount if one is to understand the trilogy’s philosophy 
of life.
Literature as Philosophy?
Michael Ward, when discussing other literary critics’ attempts to define ‘the message’ of The 
Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe, claims that it “is the book itself in all its fullness. To 
extract religious or philosophical or moral ‘truths’ from the story is to misread it, according to 
Lewis’s critical principles” (67). He then quotes from The Personal Heresy in which Lewis 
asserts of poetry that “[w]hat it ‘says’ is the total, concrete experience it gives to the right 
reader [...]” (114). Ward’s (and Lewis’s) claims are bold ones, implying the idea that any 
reductive literary critique of a text (that seeks to extract ‘the message’) is a misreading.
I argue that it is appropriate to read literature, like Lewis’s trilogy, as philosophy -  
largely because my enterprise is primarily that of philosophical or ethical criticism, not 
literary criticism. Rather than attempting to elucidate the “total, concrete experience” which 
the “right reader” would receive by reading OSP, Per or THS for the first time, my task is to 
explore the philosophy of life underlying the events, symbols and narratives of the trilogy: all 
of which contribute to (but do not define) the reading experience. Lewis himself seems to
7Conflict of the soul.
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accept the legitimacy of reading his trilogy both “[a]s a philosophical critic” and “as a literary 
critic” (“A Reply” 98).
Furthermore, I would reject the overly sacred view of literature as presented by Ward. 
Attempting to mine a poem, or novel, for philosophical truths would not be to misread it. To 
do so, however, and assert that one has thereby captured the poem’s meaning or “what it 
‘says’” would be. Underlying my position is the idea that, in essence, there is a false 
dichotomy made by critics between literature (as an art) and other disciplines like philosophy. 
To define literature and philosophy in terms of language, the former tends towards the study 
of ambivalent, equivocal utterances, whereas the latter tends towards the study of certain, 
unequivocal utterances. I will illustrate this with two examples: James Joyce’s Ulysses 
(literature) on the one hand and John Rawls’s A Theory o f Justice (philosophy) on the other. 
In both texts, the reader encounters utterances about the individual’s place in society. While 
the latter attempts to treat this topic in a systematic, definite fashion, the former relies upon 
equivocation and a multitude of indefinite resonances. Both seek to describe reality (or a kind 
of reality) and offer a means of navigating it -  that is, a form; this much is necessary if they 
are to possess meaningful content for their audience. There is, thus, a continuum between 
philosophical and literary language; some utterances transgress the borders of certainty, 
impinging upon the realm of equivocation and speculation. One might think of Nietzsche’s 
ahistorical On the Genealogy o f Morals here, which for the most part presents itself as a 
philological study of moral concepts. Others appear equivocal, while actually pointing 
towards a singular meaning or sense (allegories like Lewis’s own The Pilgrim’s Regress 
would fit this category). And always -  in both philosophy and literature -  utterances are not 
solitary, but are gregarious in nature. By this fact they take on resonances and distinctions 
otherwise impossible, and are able to provide comprehensive descriptions of reality and 
accompanying systems to navigate it.
My point about these two types of utterance-collections, the philosophical and 
literary, is that both are made of the same substance. Literature, as an art, cannot be treated in 
a sacrosanct manner or viewed as something wholly different when it is compared to other 
written disciplines (be it philosophy, politics, or sociology). To read works of literature as if 
they were philosophy is thus not an “misreading”: on the contrary, reading literature as a 
philosophical critic is a way of reading past the style, the equivocation, the puns and the 
poetic for those utterances about reality that are concealed in the subtext. This way of reading 
does not demean the utterances’ presentation(s) (the formal, aesthetic aspects), nor the
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encountered “total, concrete experience,” but rather aims to better understand why the formal 
literary techniques might feel substantial and why the text has the effect it does.
Furthermore, there is a rich tradition in support of such a perspective. Take, for 
instance, works of literature that are read for their philosophical suggestiveness: Tolstoy’s 
Death o f Ivan Ilyich (which deals with the nature and meaning of death, and thus life),
Camus’ The Outsider (dealing with alienation, freedom, human personality), Sartre’s Nausea 
(existential dread), Kierkegaard’s Either/Or (the nature of the aesthetic and ethical). I would 
place the Cosmic Trilogy in a similar category insofar as it deals with the phenomenology of 
the spirit.
Transformative Power of Literature
Paul L. Holmer, an American theologian-philosopher whose scholarly focus was Kierkegaard 
and Wittgenstein, had a keen passion for Lewis’s work. The fruit of this passion is his C.S. 
Lewis: The Shape of His Faith and Thought, which Walter Hooper, one-time secretary and 
executor of Lewis’s literary estate, calls “the best book ever written about Lewis”
(Foreword). One element of what Holmer does so well is revealed in the facility with which 
he describes what literature, and Lewis’s brand of it in particular, succeeds in doing to the 
perceptive reader. He claims, firstly, that literature “communicates in such a way that, when 
successful, it creates new capabilities and capacities, powers and a kind of roominess in the 
human personality” (20). A second claim of interest is that “Lewis’s literature shows us 
something without quite arguing it. [...] Lewis would have it that literature actually creates 
thoughts in us; it is not only about thoughts, it causes them to exist” (20). Thirdly, he asserts 
that “Literature [...] gets us used to people; it presents them as subjects and not as objects” 
(41). Finally, he makes the point that “Literature [ . ]  brings one to a kind of objectivity and 
grip upon the world that is better than one’s idiosyncratic grip”; it leads one to “a logic that is 
cosmic [ . ]  what Ludwig Wittgenstein called a ‘grammar,’ a way that things fall together 
and the pattern of rules which articulate the way things are” (42). To make Holmer’s claims 
less abstract, I quote Lewis’s assertion that in stories,
we have seen how destiny and free will can be combined, even how free 
will is the modus operandi of destiny. The story does what no theorem can 
quite do. It may not be ‘like real life’ in the superficial sense: but it sets 
before us an image of what reality may well be like at some more central 
region. (“On Stories” 39)
Lewis makes even bolder claims than Holmer. He asserts that “good stories [of the 
mythopoeic variety, like Tolkien’s The Lord o f the Rings or Lindsay’s Voyage to Arcturus]
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are actual additions to life; they give, like certain rare dreams, sensations we never had 
before, and enlarge our conception of the range of possible experience” (“On Science-fiction” 
93). He also mentions that (successful) mythopoeic literature is able to “generalise while 
remaining concrete, to present in palpable form not concepts or even experiences but whole 
classes of experience, and to throw off irrelevancies” (“Sometimes” 74).
These are strong claims. They all express a movement of some sort, a transference or 
motivational force, which passes from the literary work into the reader. Holmer and Lewis 
believe that ideas have consequences; that literature can shape the behaviour and self­
understanding of readers. It simulates an encounter with what Buber calls a Thou, a 
subjectivity that can challenge one’s worldview and sometimes even convince the reader of 
his or her own deficiencies: so much so that one begins to see and act differently. To prove 
scientifically that literature is efficacious in this way is a task that goes beyond the scope of 
this thesis (and as science often regards ideas as epiphenomenal, I am not certain a proof is 
even possible). For this reason, I presuppose based on personal experience -  and the 
testimonial evidence of fellow readers -  that literature is transformative.
“Cosmic Romance”
Lewis’s Cosmic Trilogy is inspired largely by the science-fiction of writers like H.G. Wells, 
David Lindsay, Olaf Stapledon, J.B.S. Haldane and others. While Lewis does imply that his 
books are examples of science-fiction,8 in practice he did not respect conventional genre 
boundaries and used science-fiction tropes and motifs in ways which seem closer to fantasy 
or myth. For instance, David Downing notes that “Perelandra is more clearly a fantasy from 
the start” (142) and that in various places Lewis calls his stories “‘romances,’ ‘tall stories,’ 
and ‘fairy-tales’” (qtd. in Downing 142). Two of the largest influences on Lewis were H.G. 
Well’s The First Men in the Moon and David Lindsay’s science fiction classic, Voyage to 
Arcturus. The former provided something of a narrative model for Lewis to follow, as well as 
a statement of Wells’s characteristic scientism, to which Lewis writes back during the course 
of the trilogy.9 In the latter’s case, Lewis claims that Lindsay “is recording a lived dialectic” 
and is “the first writer to discover what ‘other planets’ are really good for in fiction,” namely, 
travel to “another dimension” -  the “region of the spirit” (“On Stories” 35). In a letter to the 
poet Ruth Pitter, Lewis tells her that it was “[f]rom Lindsay [he] first learned what other 
planets in fiction are really for; spiritual adventures” (qtd. in Hooper 17). The spiritualised
8 See “Unreal Estates”.
9 See pp. 24-26.
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science-fiction which Lewis writes is particularly suited to embody different philosophies of 
life, and is the ideal milieu for philosophical exploration. Not bound to genre expectations, 
Lewis can far more easily “deal with issues far more serious than those realistic fiction deals 
with; real problems about human destiny and so on” (“Unreal Estates” 183). As will become 
apparent, the trilogy becomes a means of undermining philosophies that, in Lewis’s view, 
were plaguing the genre and public imagination at that time. The depiction of “a 
confrontation of ideologies” (Sellin 108) in the trilogy serves to emphasise its science-fiction 
heritage (which tends to be concerned with spatial and moral liminality, and thus conflict), 
but Lewis also subverts this heritage through his emphasis on spiritual rather than material 
reality. This becomes apparent in Lewis’s explanation for why he uses differing modes of 
interplanetary transportation in OSP and Per: “I took a hero once to Mars in a space-ship, but 
when I knew better I had angels convey him to Venus” (“On Science-fiction” 91).
Central to the peculiar conflation of genre exhibited by the trilogy is a view of the 
cosmos which Lewis called “The Discarded Image” in his eponymously-titled book. Because 
it was both to his taste and the subject of his scholarly research, Lewis’s imagination was 
heavily influenced by medieval cosmology. The ‘phenomenology of the spirit’ exemplified in 
the seven spheres of the Ptolemaic cosmos (the Martial, Saturnine, Jovial, Lunar, Venereal, 
Mercurial, and Solar) have “permanent value as spiritual symbols” (“The Alliterative Metre” 
24) and for this reason Lewis puts them to use in the Cosmic Trilogy. Michael Ward’s 
ground-breaking study Planet Narnia examines how Lewis has done this in The Chronicles 
o f Narnia, and much of his research is also applicable to understanding what Lewis does in 
the Cosmic Trilogy.
On the surface, there seems to be a genre conflict between the first two novels and 
THS. The first two are clearly derived from a mixture of science-fiction and myth. THS, 
however, has dispensed with the planetary journeys and reads more like a novel of social 
realism. Nevertheless, even if there are no voyages to other planets in THS, the planets, as it 
were, all journey to Earth instead; Mars and Venus are very much present. As such, all three 
novels conform to Lewis’s revised view of science-fiction as “spiritual adventure.” Perhaps 
Ward says it best when he describes the trilogy as “cosmic romance” (152); by invoking the 
genre of romance (the precursor to modern fantasy), this denomination includes both the 
science-fiction setting (“cosmic”) and the more fantastic or mythopoeic elements 
(“romance”).
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Lewis’s Authorial Intentions and Indirect Communication
Lewis’s motivations for writing the trilogy are not straightforward. Brian Aldiss, in 
conversation with Lewis and Kingsley Amis, suggests that Lewis “constructed Perelandra for 
the didactic purpose.” Lewis replies: “Yes. Everyone thinks that. They are quite wrong [...] I 
never started from a message or a moral” (“Unreal Estates” 182). In reaction to ac cusations 
that The Chronicles o f Narnia were merely a way of saying “something about Christianity to 
children” and that he “drew up a list of basic Christian truths and hammered out ‘allegories’ 
to embody them,” he responds that “[t]his is all pure moonshine. I couldn’t write in that way 
at all” (“Sometimes” 72). Critics of both the Christian and non-Christian variety have tended 
to reduce Lewis’s fiction to merely stylised apologetics. Charles Moorman, for instance, 
writes that “Lewis's main aim in the creation of the silent-planet myth is to create and 
maintain a metaphor that will serve to carry in fictional form the basic tenets of Christianity 
and present them from a non-Christian point of view, but without reference to normal 
Christian symbols” (qtd. in Downing 39).
Lewis claims, rather, that “[a]ll my seven Narnian books, and my three science fiction 
books, began with seeing pictures in my head [...] not story, just pictures” (“It All Began”
79). “[S]omething must happen” (“Unreal Estates” 181) in the context of these pictures if 
they are to be fully realised, and because Lewis is “interested in [ . ]  particular ideas,” he is 
able to weave a narrative which makes those initial images the milieu in which “extraordinary 
things” (“Unreal Estates” 182) take place. While he denies didactic intent, Lewis is willing to 
accept, for instance, that “Perelandra [...] is mainly for my co-religionists” (“A Reply” 101). 
They would find Perelandra interesting, I suspect, because Lewis retells Eve’s temptation 
with a vastly different outcome. Nevertheless, Lewis’s qualification (“mainly”) indicates that 
it is not just for them; many non-Christians find the story poignant and imaginatively rich, 
irrespective of the deeper significance it has for Christians.
Moving onto the “particular ideas” which enabled his pictures to come to life, Lewis 
describes the Cosmic Trilogy “as imaginative hypotheses illustrating what I believe to be 
theological truths” (qtd. in Hilder 48). Lewis says elsewhere that “the characteristics of t he 
planets, as conceived by medieval astrology, seem to me to have a permanent value as 
spiritual symbols -  to provide a Phanomenologie des Geistes which is specifically 
worthwhile in our own generation” (“The Alliterative Metre” 24). The trilogy is thus “infused 
throughout with astrological symbolism” (Ward 245). Lewis disagreed with the
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“Saturnocentric” bias expressed in T.S. Eliot and other modernists’ gloomy imaginations, and 
“[p]art of [his] raison d ’etre as a writer” (Ward 206) was to rehabilitate the other planets’ 
influences. If one is to understand the “lived dialectic” (“On Stories” 36) which Lewis 
attempts to emulate in the trilogy, his commitment to these “spiritual symbols” cannot be 
overemphasised.
At this point, I briefly revisit the transformative aspect of Lewis’s literature. Lewis 
excelled in his fiction at “indirect communication” (Evans 22), an idea usually associated 
with Kierkegaard. This form of communication relies upon implication rather than 
explication, and thus expects from the reader (if the implications are to be grasped) an 
openness to being influenced and surprised by what s/he encounters -  rather than reading the 
text with mere comprehension in mind. Lewis’s interest in the “planetary characters” 
coincided with his belief that they “need to be seized in an intuition [...] we need to know 
them, not to know about them, connaitre not savoir” (DI 109). Later in DI he adds that they 
“need to be lived with imaginatively, not merely learned as concepts” (173).10
Lewis thus does not try to communicate propositional knowledge of the planets as he 
does in DI. He prefers to communicate it indirectly. Given this communicative strategy, the 
content of Lewis’s meta-narrative is not, for an open reader, the trilogy’s focus and if it 
appears to be a narrowly didactic, apologetic work for his own Christian worldview, it is 
because the reader will not accept otherwise. As Lee Rossi says, “[t]he stories do not simply 
act out, then, the familiar doctrines of Christian theology. Instead the doctrine, as myth and 
archetype, exists for the story, giving deeper suggestiveness and solemnity to the landscapes 
and the actions of the characters” (33). Rather than delineating his philosophical positions in 
a dry, to-the-point manner, Lewis incarnates his proposed philosophy of life through 
instantiating a “supposition” (Letters 283) within an inspired, imaginative context; this is 
what gives his cosmic vision the power to inform and transform the imaginations of his 
readers. In the same way that the person who practises what s/he preaches is a striking figure, 
so can a concrete exemplification of a certain theory, if well done, be very striking indeed. 
Without using indirect communication, the danger is that only the head will listen, but not the 
heart.
10Ward claims that in the Cosmic Trilogy Lewis “went some way toward helping his readers acquire a 
connaitre-like knowledge of the planets” such that “we know (savoir) what it is that we are expected to know 
(connaitre)” (229). Although I mostly agree with this claim, I do think that the trilogy occasionally captures the 
“Phanomenologie des Geistes” (“Alliterative Metre” 24) as fully as Ward claims Lewis does in The Chronicles 
o f  Narnia.
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Chapter 2
Conflict, Loving Conflict and Love in Out of the Silent Planet
At last it dawned upon him that it was not they, but his own species, that were the puzzle.
C.S. Lewis OSP1
Sanford Schwartz has described OSP as being an “exploration of our troubled reckonings 
with human, animal, and extraterrestrial Otherness” (22). These “troubled reckonings” are 
what I will focus on in the following chapter: the perceptual (or aesthetic) conflict with the 
Other, and how one may recognise and act appropriately towards it -  developing a love for 
the Other. Since the story is largely situated on Mars, a discussion of conflict is particularly 
apposite. Following Ward, I take seriously Lewis’s imaginative interest in the Ptolemaic 
cosmology and therefore treat the martial influence in Malacandra’s air as being central to a 
full understanding of the text’s philosophy.2 Although love is not the central concern of OSP 
(as it is in Per), it is nonetheless an important element of the Malacandrian world and 
Ransom’s story; in Ransom’s case, the resolution of every conflict leads to greater love. 
Moreover, the instances of love found in this text foreshadow the love encountered in 
Perelandra.
Lewis said in a letter that OSP is “Ransom's enfance” (qtd. in Downing 104). It is the 
beginning of a journey -  a stage of life -  that he must traverse if he is to transcend what 
Downing calls “his soul's childhood” (104). C. M. Manlove, in his study of Lewis’s fiction, 
concurs: “much of the book is taken up with sojourning and with learning [...] [Ransom] has 
to learn, learn about himself, learn to accept the alien, learn that life is far vaster than any 
previous categorization of his mind [...] This is a story of preparation” (30). The education 
and preparation Ransom undergoes stems from the fact that Ransom’s “one besetting sin is 
anxiety” (Walsh 119), and this ‘sin’ is what prompts a war of the soul in Ransom, a kind of 
psychomachia. In gradually overcoming his anxieties, Ransom’s openness to the Other 
increases -  which manifests itself in the courage required to embrace the Other, that is, to 
love.
1 OSP 75.
2 See overleaf.
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Beyond the primary narrative thread of Ransom’s journey, Lewis explains that it was 
against an “outlook on life” characterised by “the ‘metabiological’ heresy” that he wrote 
OSP, calling it a “satiric fantasy” (“A Reply” 101). Downing explains that the heresy is “a 
philosophy that projects Darwinism into the metaphysical sphere” (36). Lewis thought that 
the brand of scientism or evolutionism popularised by J.B.S. Haldane, H.G. Wells, Olaf 
Stapledon and others was “diabolical”; it gave up a belief in a qualitative view of human life 
in favour only of a quantitative one -  the idea that survival and utility trump ethics and 
immutable goodness. The anxiety underlying such a “philosophy of life” (OSP 23) -  the fear 
of death and an unknown future -  manifests itself in a kind of heroism which Monika Hilder 
calls “classical heroism” or “masculine heroism” (8). This is seen fully in the figure of 
Weston, but also partially in Ransom, who must learn “spiritual” or “feminine” heroism (13) 
in its stead. As such, the story may be understood as a “troubled reckoning” between two 
competing philosophies of life. Weston, as the personification of the metabiological heresy, is 
satirised and thus schooled in the infantile nature of his views. He is afforded the chance to 
repent (and does not). Ransom, who exhibits certain elements of Weston’s philosophy of life, 
must unlearn his anthropocentric tendencies and repent from his anxious unwillingness to 
grant rationality to anything other than his own species. In learning to be a hero of a different 
sort -  one defined by obedience and trust, rather than by disobedience and fear-based 
independence -  he exemplifies the moral and metaphysical victory of an Other-centred, 
logocentric perspective3 over Self-centred, anthropocentric “Westonism” (LCSL 166).
In The Discarded Image, Lewis explains how, in the “unfallen translunary world [ . ]  
there come to be such things as ‘bad’ or ‘malefical’ planets”. He says “they are bad only in 
relation to us” and later, “[t]he temperament derived from each planet can be turned either to 
a good or a bad use. Born under Mars, “you are qualified to become [ . ]  either an Attila or a 
martyr” (DI 116-7). Mars may be called InfortunaMinor -  but this is clearly a name used 
only from a sublunary perspective.4 Michael Ward in Planet Narnia (2008) discusses the 
development of Mars in classical thought, and elucidates possible resonances a depiction of 
Mars might contain:
3 This idea will be explained in further detail during the course of the chapter.
4 When I use the term ‘sublunary,’ it describes the influence of sinfulness or corruption, which in medieval 
astrology permeates the atmosphere beneath the nearest sphere to Earth, Luna (the moon). The term may be 
understood as shorthand for ‘fallen’ or ‘sinful.’ ‘Translunary’ thus amounts to ‘unfallen’ or ‘sinless’ -  for that 
which is beyond the moon is not subject to corruption.
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Mars was not always or only a god of war. Originally, he was a god of 
vegetation and fertility [...] and his functions were rustic. Under the name 
Mars Silvanus (who later became a god in his own right), he lived in forests 
and mountains and looked after the well-being of cattle [...] He was the 
spring-time divinity (the vernal month of March became consecrated to and 
named after him) and Mars Gradivus (‘to become big, to grow’) was 
another of his titles. His warrior functions only came later, but in the end 
they superseded his former roles, which then became the preserve of Liber 
and Ceres. When he became the god of battle, Mars retained his former title 
of Gradivus, but it had changed its meaning and was now connected with 
the verb gradi, ‘to march.’ (82-83)
Ward goes on to say that “this [Martial duality] helps to explain why Ransom’s visit to Mars 
is not the occasion for much fighting,” because “Lewis is drawing on [Mars’s] origin as a 
vegetation deity to supplement and balance the militaristic aspects” (83). Perhaps in the sense 
of physical fighting, this is true of the story. Other than the initial shooting of the hnakra after 
landing on Malacandra, the hnakra-hunt with Hyoi, and lastly Hyoi’s murder, physical 
conflict does not occur. This is surely because of Lewis’s recognition that his interplanetary 
stories were to be less science-fiction than ‘spirit-fiction.’ As Lewis wrote in a letter to Ruth 
Pitter, “[he] learned what other planets in fiction are really for; for spiritual adventures” (qtd. 
in Hooper 17). It thus makes sense that the fighting takes place within Ransom’s soul, and 
between the spirits of two opposing philosophies of life. In addition, perhaps the maturation 
which can result from psychomachia (assuming the right psychic elements win) better 
exemplifies a translunary understanding of Mars, taking into account both epithets Silvanus 
and Gradivus. This is because in the “spiritual adventure” of OSP, one finds the growth and 
straightening of Ransom’s character and personality such that he later personifies a 
courageous, upright warrior who “learned war” while battling the Un-man on Perelandra 
(THS 307). He is indeed “[b]orn under Mars,” becoming a kind of “martyr” (DI 117). 
Although Downing might say that “astrology plays only an incidental role in [OSP],” in fact 
what he calls “the reality of planetary ‘influences’” (78) permeates the entire trilogy.
The Plot of Out o f  the Silent Planet
Before continuing with my exploration of the text, a brief outline of OSP’s plot might be 
convenient. The story is a space-travel narrative that recounts the adventures of a man called 
Elwin Ransom. A philologist from Cambridge, he is kidnapped by two ill-intentioned men, 
Weston and Devine. He is taken on a voyage from Earth, which Ransom later comes to know 
as Thulcandra (the “silent planet” (OSP 97) of the title), towards Mars, known as Malacandra
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by its inhabitants. Upon his arrival, Ransom escapes from his captors and the alien creatures 
for whom he was brought. Thrown then into a strange and terrifying world, Ransom has a 
near mental breakdown: his fear is exacerbated by the fact that his captors had intended him 
as a blood sacrifice, a ‘ransom’ in order to curry favour with certain of the local 
Malacandrians5 whom they had met during their previous landing. In spite of his fear,
Ransom gradually comes to terms with what is described as the “extra-terrestrial Otherness” 
(33) of Malacandra and its inhabitants. He does this in various ways. He begins to understand 
the organising principle of the landscape (which he characterises as perpendicularity). He 
encounters and allows himself to trust a sentient, benevolent alien species called the hrossa; 
he goes on to learn their language and become part of their community for a time. He 
eventually confronts his fear of the sorns,6 the alien species who had -  according to his 
captors -  wanted a human sacrifice. Finally, riding on the back of a sorn (who turns out to be 
quite friendly), he travels to meet the angelic Oyarsa (ruler, presiding spirit) of Mars, who 
explains and clarifies the whole affair. At this point Ransom also acts as a translator between 
the Oyarsa and his former captors (who are themselves captured by the Malacandrians for 
shooting Hyoi, Ransom’s hross friend). The three humans are then returned to Earth: Ransom 
willingly, the other two forcibly.
Conflict in OSP
If OSP is indeed Ransom’s childhood, then it would follow that he must, like a young child, 
learn how to distinguish between the diversity of impressions that an initially alien world 
throws at him. As Wolfhart Pannenberg says, “[p]rimordially, and in fact repeatedly, men 
stand helpless before such diversity. That is man’s original situation in the world -  especially 
that of the child. Therefore, it is initially necessary to orient oneself and to obtain an 
overview” (15). And this is what occurs in Ransom’s case, but it is not straightforward or 
simple matter for him to “orient [him]self” correctly.
5Although others (e.g. Richard Purtill) have employed the forms “Malacandran”, “Perelandran”, I follow Lewis 
in the both adjectival and nominative “Malacandrian”, “Perelandrian” and “Thulcandrian” -  Cf. “the visible 
Malacandrians were but the smallest part of the silent consistory which surrounded him” (121) and “The 
Thulcandrians feared the sorns and were very unteachable” (124).
6 Both the form ‘sorns'’ and ‘seronf are used as the plural for sorn. I shall primarily use the former, as this is the 
term mostly used (the Oyarsa uses it too). I use the latter when referring to all three species together.
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Space and Deep Heaven
Part of what Lewis has achieved in the trilogy, and indeed elsewhere in his writings, is to 
revise the common-sense phenomenology of his readers, indeed, to subvert and overturn their 
presuppositions about the nature of the world. Perhaps one of the most striking re-definitions 
that Lewis offers his readers in OSP is ‘space’: the region between the planets and stars.
From a modern, earth-bound human perspective, space is often perceived as being the 
absence of matter (viewed in purely material terms). It is cold, dark, empty, and, if the 
circumstances are right, rather sinister. Ransom remarks to Weston “I always thought space 
was dark and cold” (OSP 26). In DI, Lewis writes how “[t]he ‘space’ of modern astronomy 
may arouse terror, or bewilderment [...]” (99). Yet in Lewis’s re-imagined Ptolemaic 
cosmology of the trilogy, space is presented in a manner “overwhelming in its greatness but 
satisfying in its harmony” (DI 99). Ransom’s experience is one of (to quote the Green Lady) 
“delight with terror in it” (Per 67). There is no fear or terror of the ‘void of space’ 
popularised by science-fiction -  for he involuntarily perceives that space is not a negative 
void, but instead a positive abundance. When Ransom first wakes up in the space-ship, he is 
struck by the excessive heat and light around him: a heat which, unlike the terrestrial form, 
“produced no tendency to drowsiness” (25). Soon thereafter, Ransom notes the “glory of the 
light” (32) filling what he calls, echoing Milton, “this heaven, these happy climes” (32). 
Ransom’s perception, from this point onwards, displays what Pannenberg calls “openness to 
the world” (15). He is open to having his former assumptions overturned or inverted -  and 
not only about space, as will be seen.
When Ransom finally returns from Malacandra in the space-ship, his perspective on 
space qua “happy climes” is reinforced. It is described as “the ocean of eternal noon” (151), a 
place “full of life in the most literal sense, full of living creatures” (152). Ransom encounters 
space as a region of the spirit -  appropriate given his belief that interplanetary travel makes 
for what Lewis calls “spiritual adventures” (qtd. in Hooper 17). In spite of the real possibility 
of the ship’s disintegration before reaching Earth, he believes that “life was waiting outside 
the little iron eggshell in which they rode, ready at any moment to break in, and that, if it 
killed them, it would kill them by excess of its vitality” (151-2). The term “Deep Heaven” 
(Per 211) best captures this revised understanding of space. Rather than being dark and cold, 
it is light and warm; rather than being empty, it is full; rather than being sinister, it is 
benevolent, rather than being endless, it is deep. Because of Ransom’s “receptivity to 
‘otherness’ that mitigates the terror of infinite space” (Schwartz 34), he is enabled to
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understand its true nature. It is the “marvellous” (OSP 28) stage of the Great Dance, which 
will be discussed in Chapter Three.
The Alien Environment
Ransom is initially struck dumb by the “unearthly strangeness [...] of the bright, still, 
sparkling, unintelligible landscape [of Malacandra] -  with needling shapes of pale green, 
thousands of feet high, with sheets of dazzling blue sodawater, and acres of rose-red 
soapsuds” (42). Yet he is far better prepared to navigate his conflict with the alien landscape 
than he is to navigate his confrontation with the alien creatures that inhabit it. As the narrator 
explains, “[t]he same peculiar twist of imagination which led [Ransom] to people the 
universe with monsters had somehow taught him to expect nothing on a strange planet except 
rocky desolation or else a network of nightmare machines” (39-40) -  and a desolate or 
nightmarish landscape is precisely what he does not find. Lewis does well to elucidate the 
complexity of perception: it is possible to perceive objects through one’s retinas -  but this is a 
very different thing to seeing, which presupposes a kind of knowledge. Beyond seeing 
colours, Ransom at first receives sense impressions of Malacandra quite indiscriminately:
He gazed about him, and the very intensity of his desire to take in the new 
world at a glance defeated itself. He saw nothing but colours -  colours that 
refused to form themselves into things. Moreover, he knew nothing yet 
well enough to see it: you cannot see things till you know roughly what 
they are. (39)
But this defeat does not last long, because “a moment later he recognised the flat belt of light 
blue as a sheet of water, [...] They were on the shore of a lake or river” (39). At this point, the 
nature of Ransom’s perceptual conflict with Malacandrian phenomena alters. Ransom begins 
interpreting his sense impressions through “a vague memory of earthly geography” (46); by 
this, he is able to re-order and understand the initially alien impressions that he receives. As 
his experiences and utilisations of the Malacandrian environment grow in number, the alien 
landscape becomes increasingly familiar, and less of a perceptual enemy; he makes sense of 
the “extra-terrestrial Otherness” which surrounds him. This process is, however, not 
automatic. It requires attentive commitment from Ransom. While running from his captors 
and the sorns, his eyes meet with a “wild confusion of blue, purple and red [...],” for which he 
does not stop “for a moment’s inspection” (44). Inspection would lead to understanding -  but, 
as this example shows, inspection is by no means a necessary action.
This implies the impossibility of understanding phenomena without some sort of
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dialectic between, firstly, the initial brute impressions of sense perception and secondly, the 
imaginative framing of a hypothetical structure for those perceptions -  an “inspection.” This 
dialectic process would eventually result in a confirmation, modification or rejection of one’s 
tentative understanding of the impressions -  a means by which “he can control the diversity 
of sensations that storm in upon him” (Pannenberg 15).7
I call the process described above the phenomenological dialectic: it is the basis of 
Ransom’s worldview formation, a process which starts from his self and proceeds 
dialectically to relate itself to alien phenomena based on the increasing quantities (and 
qualities) of these which he encounters -  until the alien Otherness is rendered familiar.8 
Ransom develops a capacity to recognise, instead of being dumbstruck by (putatively) 
incomprehensible phenomena: He is not paralysed by the initial aesthetic conflict. The 
phenomenological dialectic, once it produces sufficient constructs, means that Ransom’s 
“attention is set free for other things” (Pannenberg 17). Beyond rendering previously-alien 
phenomena familiar (with all the practical ease and know-how which familiarity provides), 
the ability to recognise phenomena allows the second-order perception of beauty in 
phenomena -  i.e. it enables appreciation. Once Ransom decides that his hypothesis about the 
Malacandrian equivalent of mountains is valid, the narrator adds that “the mere oddity of the 
prospect [that such strange physical configurations could be mountains] was swallowed up in 
the fantastic sublime” (OSP 51). As such, attributions of beauty follow from recognition; they 
do not take place prior to it. If there is to be recognition of phenomena, and thus, an 
appreciation of beauty, then a dialectic between brute perceptions and their imaginative 
framing is compulsory.
My claim is strengthened when one considers that Ransom comes to see that 
“Malacandra [is] beautiful” (39). To him, this is unexpected, as “this possibility had never 
entered into his speculations about it” (39-40). An explicit analogy is made to his ignorant 
assumptions about the nature of Martian alien creatures; they are supposed to be 
unimaginably awful, yet turn out to be sufficiently familiar to describe. The sorns are tall and 
spooky, while the hrossa are tall, furry, and otter-like. As such, the “perpendicular theme
7
Although I focus on visual perception, this dialectic process holds for developing any kind of perception.
When Ransom first sees the sorns, his initial impression of their nature is clearly incorrect, and it is modified 
radically during the course of the narrative as he breathes the Malacandrian air and has more, less terrifying 
encounters with the sorns. As a result, he decides to trust the sorns and this provides the means by which he 
meets the Oyarsa -  which is arguably the culmination of his quest to understand why he is on Malacandra.
8 Another conceivable result is that the alien is rendered absolutely alien (i.e. unable to become familiar) -  this 
happens to Weston and Devine in many ways, a fact made painfully obvious when Weston is giving an account 
of himself to the Oyarsa towards the end of the novel.
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which beast and plant and earth all played on Malacandra” (51), along with the unearthly riot 
of colours, are actually pleasing to Ransom’s earthly aesthetic. Richard Purtill claims that 
“[p]erhaps the outstanding impression” which the reader receives “is that Ransom is ‘open’ -  
able to appreciate and love. He delights in the beauty of Mars” (89). The fact that Ransom is 
open to seeing beauty is important; it is difficult to imagine either Weston or Devine 
attributing or finding beauty in a universe where only survival-aimed utility or self-seeking 
pleasure are important.
The Alien Creature
Ransom’s conflicted perception of the alien creatures of Malacandra is a more complex affair 
than that of the environment. Confronted with the possibility of alien sorns, he must either 
grasp a means of dealing with “extra-terrestrial Otherness” or he thinks that the only other 
plausible response “must be suicide” (33). The reason why Ransom would accept such an 
abhorrent solution is largely because of his ignorant view of the alien; having “read his H. G. 
Wells and others”, his imagination is “peopled with horrors such as ancient and mediaeval 
mythology could hardly rival” (32). As Manlove observes, “[Ransom’s] fears are barriers 
between himself and an understanding of the true nature of phenomena” (32). His prejudiced 
imagination apprehends
[...] various incompatible monstrosities -  bulbous eyes, grinning jaws, 
horns, stings, mandibles. Loathing of insects, loathing of snakes, loathing 
of things that squashed and squelched, all played their horrible symphonies 
over his nerves. But the reality would be worse: it would be an extra­
terrestrial Otherness -  something one had never thought of, never could 
have thought of. (32-3)
By appearances, Ransom is initially committed to the necessary monstrosity of any and all 
aliens he encounters. He believes that an alien’s essential nature is something which he, qua 
human, would be incapable of ever understanding. For him the alien creature is sublime in 
the worst way possible. This commitment is not entirely his fault. One cannot blame him for 
assuming the worst when overhearing Weston and Devine’s discussion of his intended fate: 
that he is to be “[g]iven, handed over, offered” (33) to “loathsome sexless monsters” for 
“human sacrifice” (32). This absolute conviction, derived from rather questionable epistemic 
sources, partially obstructs his ability to perceive the actual nature of the aliens he encounters, 
especially the sorns -  even once he has lived within the hross community and realised that at 
least one type of alien may not be as terrible as he originally believed.
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In spite of his imaginative prejudice, Ransom does gradually grow sympathetic to the 
sorns -  he develops what Lewis calls elsewhere “the taste for the other” (PP 125). It is clear 
that Mars, in his capacity of Mars Silvanus (who causes things ‘to grow’), exerts a good 
influence over Ransom’s life. Ransom is eventually enabled to overcome convictions of the 
sorns ’ fundamental “Otherness”, but he still suspects their integrity and explicability far 
longer than is warranted. When first encountering the sorns, Ransom realises that they are 
“quite unlike the horrors his imagination had conjured up” (45). Although he was earlier 
convinced that they would be something that one “never could have thought o f’ (33), he is 
“taken [...] off his guard” by the fact that they are comparable and thus conceivable: they are 
not so absolutely alien as he had originally thought. For they “appealed away from the 
Wellsian fantasies to an earlier, almost an infantile, complex of fears. Giants -  ogres -  ghosts 
-  skeletons: those were its key words” (45). There is sufficient comfort in this fact, such that 
“[t]he idea of suicide” goes “far from his mind” (46). Later, when he meets “face to face with 
the spectre which had haunted him ever since he had set foot on Malacandra,” he feels a 
“surprising indifference” (92). Following this indifference to a sorn’s physical presence, “[a] 
new conception of the sorns began to arise in his mind: the ideas of ‘giant’ and ‘ghost’ 
receded behind those of ‘goblin’ and ‘gawk’” (94). After being Augray’s9 guest for a time, 
“the creature he had been avoiding” turns out to be “as amicable as the hrossa” (99).
Manlove points out that “[t]he distance he puts between himself and the sorns is as much 
spiritual as material” (37). Ransom’s characterisation of the sorns’ physical appearance 
depends greatly on his apprehension of their peacefulness and benevolence. In the end, 
Ransom even repudiates his conception of the sorns’ gawkishness by recognising their 
beauty. It is explained how “the grace of [the sorns] movement, their lofty stature, and the 
softened glancing of the sunlight on their feathery sides, effected a final transformation in 
Ransom’s feelings towards their race” (103). From beings of incomprehensibility and 
awfulness to beautiful creatures of “lofty stature” -  Ransom is wholly won over by the 
“Otherness” which at first terrifies him.
This is powerfully illustrated later through Ransom’s solidarity with the 
Malacandrians: he repositions his sympathies and identity such that his own human kin, 
Weston and Devine, become aliens in his sight. Encountering them visibly for the first time 
since his escape, Ransom describes them as “two creatures which he did not recognize,” 
adding
9 Augray is the name of the sorn who leads Ransom to the Oyarsa of Malacandra.
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[t]hey were much shorter than any animal he had yet seen on Malacandra, 
and he gathered that they were bipeds, though the lower limbs were so 
thick and sausage-like that he hesitated to call them legs. The bodies were a 
little narrower at the top than at the bottom so as to be very slightly pear­
shaped, and the heads were neither round like those of hrossa nor long like 
those of sorns, but almost square. They stumped along on narrow, heavy­
looking feet which they seemed to press into the ground with unnecessary 
violence. And now their faces were becoming visible as masses of lumped 
and puckered flesh of variegated colour fringed in some bristly, dark 
substance [...] Suddenly, with an indescribable change of feeling, he 
realized that he was looking at men. The two prisoners were Weston and 
Devine and he, for one privileged moment, had seen the human form with 
almost Malacandrian eyes. (128)
This is perhaps the clearest refutation of the necessary strangeness of the alien, a notion 
initially assumed by Ransom. Manlove comments how this section is an example of Lewis’s 
“recurrent technique” of inversion, through which “[t]he alien becomes ‘natural,’ the human 
grotesque” (44). Ransom’s ability to view with “almost Malacandrian eyes” implies the 
contingency of familiarity; one can be alienated (legitimately or illegit imately) from one’s 
own species or one’s own people. This, indeed, is what Lewis shows: that anthropocentric 
(sublunary) perception -  or any kind of perception that assumes the centrality of the perceiver 
-  is simply the wrong perspective, because it leads to “narrowing of sympathies and even of 
thought” (OSP 105). As Lewis points out in conversation with Kingsley Amis and Brian 
Aldiss,
most of the earlier [science fiction] stories start from the [...] assumption 
that we, the human race, are in the right, and everything else is ogres. I may 
have done a little towards altering that, but the new point of view has come 
very much in. We’ve lost our confidence, so to speak. (“Unreal Estates” 
185)
Conflicted Rationality
The “confidence” Lewis speaks of is found in Ransom’s anthropocentric views of rationality. 
If there is any one particular idea that gets in Ransom’s way of understanding the 
Malacandrians, it is this. When Ransom speaks with the sorns, he reports that “[t]wo things 
about our world particularly stuck in their minds [...] the fact that we had only one kind of 
hnau: they thought this must have far-reaching effects in the narrowing of sympathies and 
even of thought” (OSP 105). At the beginning of the novel, he uses the word ‘rational’ 
coterminously with “man-like” (56) and assumes that, because “[the Malacandrians] build
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houses” (39) and produce “artefact[s]” (56), they are human. Ransom is forced to conclude, 
however, that the non-human hrossa are rational: they have “the charm of speech and reason” 
(56). Yet this confronts him with what he calls the “baffling enigma of reason in an inhuman 
form” (65). This enigma leads to “sudden losses of confidence” on his part whenever “the 
rationality of the hross tempted [him] to think of it as a man” (56-7). The idea of a man who 
is “seven feet high, with a snaky body, covered [...] with thick black animal hair, and 
whiskered like a cat” is “abominable” (56) to Ransom. He therefore finds a way of avoiding 
such a discomforting image -  he changes his “point of view” (56). He learns to see reason not 
as a faculty of man alone, but rather man as an instance of the Logos, divine reason,10 and 
thus makes space for Aristotle’s “[a]nimale rationale -  an animal, yet also a reasonable soul 
[...] the old definition of Man” (Per 212) to apply in practice beyond just the human animal.
It is thus a logocentric “point of view” that allows him to accept the hrossa’ s rationality. 
Downing agrees, noting that Lewis “resurrects the Aristotelian concept of personhood” (45) 
when Ransom is told by Hnohra (his hross language tutor) that “[y]ou are hnau. I am hnau. 
The seroni are hnau. Thepfifltriggi are hnau ” (OSP 68). In effect, the animality of a rational 
(but alien) hrossa need not conflict with the familiar humanity of the reason-endowed man -  
but each can be seen as a unique example of the cosmic Logos. Schwartz notes that by the 
time Ransom has met Augray and spent time with the sorns, he has come to accept his own 
animality: “he introduces himself to the sorns as ‘the animal [...] called Man’” (44).11
Ransom’s most troubling assumption, perhaps, is that rational creatures dominate by 
their very nature over less rational creatures. One instance of Ransom’s desire “to find out the 
political and economic framework of Malacandrian life” (OSP 100) reveals this: “On 
Malacandra, apparently, three distinct species had reached rationality, and none of them had 
yet exterminated the other two. It concerned him intensely to find out which was the real 
master” (69-70). Later, hearing descriptions of the sorns’ intelligence, he proceeds to name 
them “the intelligentsia” and thinks that “[t]hey must be the real rulers, however it is 
disguised” (70). This assumption can be attributed to a H.G. Wells-induced xenophobia and 
the cultural heritage of colonialism, but it also reveals the “the narrow and self-aggrandizing 
perspective of a single fallen species” (Schwartz 37). This is what causes his social paradigm 
to presuppose the existence of “real rulers” who would exterminate their apparent 
competitors. I quoted Manlove earlier, who says that the distance between Ransom and the 
alien sorns is “as much spiritual as material” (37). This distinction operates between Ransom
10In THS Lewis writes of the “goddess Reason, the divine clearness” (414).
11In this, he sets his own literary precedent: The Chronicles o f Narnia are replete with rational animals.
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and all the Malacandrian species: not merely the sorns. It seems as if he sometimes assumes 
that their benevolence is a fa9ade, that on the inside they are actually driven by a will to 
power and domination. Hilder would agree: “[Ransom] views all things in terms of power 
relations so that his perpetual question to the Malacandrians is, ‘who rules?’” (3 3). The extent 
to which there has been a “narrowing of sympathies” in his own spirit is unfortunately clear -  
the Martial influence brings it out into the open.
Ransom learns that on translunary Malacandra, rationality does not naturally lead to 
conflict with or domination over other species as it does on Thulcandra. On the contrary, his 
exclusive human paradigm is transcended by the concept of hnau.12 This, he discovers, is the 
more fundamental category of rational creature, and acts as a concept empty of his 
problematic anthropocentric, sublunary assumptions. Only after the trauma of Hyoi’s death 
and his time spent with the most intelligent of the three Malacandrian species -  the sorns 
(seroni) -  is he fully disabused of his “narrowness of perception” (Hilder 34) and ceases 
obsessing about power relations. He takes to heart “the need for a new and less self-centred 
‘cosmic’ or ‘corrective’ anthropology” (Schwartz 52) and realises, finally, that Malacandrian 
(and thus cosmic) rationality is a different thing to human rationality -  which is broken, 
because it has lost its moral sense. In the immediate aftermath of Hyoi’s shooting, Ransom 
calls his species “half hnau” because its moral perception is “bent” (OSP 83). As such, being 
a hnau -  a rational animal -  means being able to navigate reality, both material and spiritual, 
in a sensible way. It is “not merely the faculty to abstract and calculate, but the apprehension 
of values, the power to mean by ‘good’ something more than ‘good for me’ or ‘good for my 
species’” (qtd. in Downing 46). Lewis thus undermines an anthropocentric account of 
rationality just as he expands the concept to include ethical sensibility: a sensibility derived 
from the ability to apprehend, rather than arbitrate, values.
Philosophical Conflict: Weston and Devine versus Ransom
The several conflicts between Ransom and his kidnappers, Weston and Devine, are what 
drive the OSP’s narrative forward. The pair of men are his reason for going to Mars; they are 
indirectly the reason for his encounter and stay with the hrossa. As a result of their killing of 
Hyoi, they prompt Ransom’s willingness to visit the sorns and meet the Oyarsa. They are 
also, finally, the reason he leaves Malacandra. The first major instance of conflict is a scuffle
12 Ransom, arguably, only just qualifies for being considered a hnau. This is because he is open to developing a 
rational capacity, in the sense of being adept both aesthetically and ethically. Weston and Devine, however, are 
closed within their anthropocentric version of rationality, and are ethically blind -  therefore considered “bent” 
or “half hnau.”
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between Harry, who works “the furnace” at the Rise, and Weston and Devine. Ransom’s 
unwelcome entrance puts an end to this, but soon, engaged in a scuffle with the two men 
himself, he successfully ‘ransoms’ the boy and replaces him as scapegoat. As I mention 
earlier, Weston and Devine think they need a sacrificial victim to appease the sorns. The 
reader catches something of the ideological battle which is to occur when Weston argues with 
Devine over Ransom’s kidnapping; he sees more value in Ransom “[who] is, after all, 
human” (OSP 15), than he sees in Harry, whom he thinks is an imbecile. As such, Harry is a 
better candidate for sacrifice. Devine convinces Weston that Ransom will do, however, on 
more pragmatic grounds. This willingness to calculate the value of human life in scientific 
(and thus material) terms points towards the philosophical outlook(s) that both men hold.
Devine candidly summarises Weston’s views, the main “diabolical” (CL 753) 
philosophy against which Lewis takes aim in OSP, as being “all straight stuff -  the march of 
progress and the good of humanity and all that” (13). In “A Reply,” Lewis describes 
Weston’s views as ‘scientism’:
the belief that the supreme moral end is the perpetuation of our own 
species, and that this is to be pursued even if, in the process of being fitted 
for survival, our species has to be stripped of all those things for which we 
value it -  of pity, of happiness, and of freedom. (100)
Weston is thus committed to the expansion and evolution of the human species. He desires 
the good of humanity, which is to say, human thriving -  as he understands it. But, as 
Downing says, “Weston’s problem is that his abstract ideals about advancing his species are 
more real to him than actual beings or concrete ethical obligations” (86); he is closed off to 
reality, believing rather that his “metabiological heresy” represents the enlightened view, and 
unwilling to “inspect” with open eyes the Malacandrian phenomena as Ransom chooses to 
do.
While Weston believes that it “would be easier if [Ransom’s] philosophy of life were 
not so insufferably narrow and individualistic,” Ransom “consider[s] [Weston’s] philosophy 
of life [to be] raving lunacy” (OSP 24). A sentence later he summarises Weston’s ethical 
position: that one is “justified in doing anything -  absolutely anything -  here and now, on the 
off chance that some creatures or other descended from man as we know him may crawl 
about a few centuries longer in some part of the universe” (24).
Although Weston and Devine are both pragmatists, they have different reasons for 
being so. Weston believes in something beyond mere possessions and pleasure: his ideology
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projects beyond his own lifespan, towards future generations’ survival and civilisation.
Unlike Weston, whose idealism is misperceived, Devine has no such idealistic dreams. On 
the contrary, he reduces the good life to maximising material possession: of things, and 
importantly, of pleasure. He tells Ransom (with Weston out of earshot), “[b]etween 
ourselves, I am putting a little money into some experiments he has on hand. It’s all straight 
stuff -  the march of progress and the good of humanity and all that, but it has an industrial 
side” (13). Later, “Ransom realise[s] the meaning of Devine’s interest in Malacandra”: it is 
gold, or “Sun’s Blood” (69) as the hrossa call it. His striving is directed towards the 
accumulation of wealth, and from this his pragmatism springs.
Weston and Devine’s philosophy of life is perhaps best exemplified at the point where 
the two men murder Ransom’s hross friend, Hyoi, in cold blood. When the ruler of Mars asks 
why they did so, Weston responds in his pidgin Malacandrian, revealing another aspect to his 
philosophy, namely the idea that ‘might makes right’: “We kill him [...] show what we can 
do. Every one who no do all we say -  pouff! Bang! -  kill him same as that one. You do all we 
say and we give you much pretty things” (130). This response is deemed insufficient by the 
Martian ruler. When asked again, Weston revises his account of the murder: rather than being 
a means of inducing fear and servitude, he explains that they wanted to reach Ransom when 
they saw he was with a large, otter-like creature. Because they were afraid of Hyoi, they 
killed him. Weston and Devine see the alien Other as an expendable means to an end -  which 
is, strangely enough, just the way they see their fellow human, Ransom, when they forcibly 
bring him to Mars for sacrificial purposes. In fact, anyone who is not essential to their own 
purposes is thereby rendered alien. Unlike Ransom, who grows and learns under the Martial 
influence, Hilder observes that “Weston embodies the common -  and very worst -  view of 
what Mars, the god of war, represents: ruthless devastation of innocent life” (26). Their view 
of Malacandra is mediated through a wholly pragmatic, utilitarian lens. Schwartz comments 
that “Devine and Weston embody an imperial contempt for the Other” (30), and thus when 
they are confronted with the alien, their natural response is to dominate it, looking to their 
own anthropocentric interests.13 When this fails, they evade the truth of their ontological 
misapprehension by violence, attempted bribery and telling lies. Although they are physically 
beyond the sublunary, silent Thulcandra, they still receive the Martial spirit with an 
unfortunate and rather tragic dose of lunacy.
Ransom does not subscribe to Progress-aimed scientism like Weston, nor the greedy,
13 Similar to the way Ransom originally expects that the sorns dominate as “the real masters.”
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pragmatic materialism of Devine. His philosophy of life is still being formed. One crucial 
element, however, is suggested in what I have called his developing logocentric 
perspective.14 Ransom’s vocation15 as a philologist is important, for by its very nature it 
involves the study of words and their history. Manlove concurs, stating that “[i]t is not for 
nothing that Ransom is a philologist in the story” (34).16 Philology as a discipline is 
retrospective and often hypothetical in nature. Moreover, the imprecision of a philologist’s 
data precludes any absolute certainty of a word’s genealogy or pedigree. Ransom is therefore 
akin to a ‘word detective’: his vocation entails the attempt to negate himself, and insert 
himself in another linguistic Weltanschauung. Once there, he would decipher the relations 
between all the morphological suspects. This occupation requires a capacity to go outside of 
one’s own paradigm and enter the paradigm of another. Manlove remarks that Ransom’s 
“speed and interest in grasping the Malacandrian language and its dialects is an index to his 
desire to meet creatures outside himself’ (34). For as Lewis says in EC, “[i]n coming to 
understand anything, we are rejecting the facts as they are for us in favour of the facts as they 
are for someone else” (138). To humbly accept rather than merely impose one’s 
understanding of phenomena is far easier -  even preferred -  for someone whose job requires 
a kind of openness to error, a kind of epistemic humility.
The phenomenological dialectic that I described above17 extends beyond the 
straightforward processing of sense perception; it may be reformulated to describe the 
processing of ethical encounters too.18 To phrase my conception of the dialectic differently, 
one may talk of phenomenal integration; taking that which is at the periphery and resistant to 
comprehension, and then centring it, unifying it -  letting it express itself in a meaningful 
relation to other things. At a perceptual level, Ransom seeks the unifying thread amongst the 
diverse Malacandrian scenes he encounters. He succeeds in this, but his search for unity goes 
beyond rendering his environment functional; it goes beyond understanding the simple 
geological or ecological facts about what constitutes the Malacandrian landscape. Rather, 
Ransom wants fluency in the Old Solar language; he wants to know how the hrossa, seroni, 
andpfifltriggi relate, and to find out about their beliefs and arts. To use a term from science-
14 Not in Derrida’s deconstructionist sense; rather, in my own (more Platonic) sense of ‘Logos’, ‘Divine Reason’ 
or ‘The Word’ which acts as a cosmic scaffold for unity and diversity of Being.
15 I use this word in the sense of ‘calling. ’
16 Manlove here echoes “the Voice” in Perelandra that tells Ransom that “[i]t is not for nothing that you are 
named Ransom” (Per 147).
17 See p. 18.
18 By ethical, I mean ‘concerned with right action.’
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fiction, he becomes, not an anthropologist, but a xenologist.19
This is in stark contrast to both Weston and Devine. They exhibit a defective ability to 
modify their hypothetical structures beyond that which is pragmatic or in-line with their own 
agendas. For them, asking ‘Why?’ is irrelevant. Accordingly, their centring of peripheral 
elements is forced; the embrace of (possible) inherent structures in phenomena is never 
countenanced. This is best seen in the final judgement scene when the Oyarsa decides what 
to do with the pair. Weston has categorically misperceived the structures inherent in the data 
of Malacandra; his prejudiced, anthropocentric outlook forces itself incongruently upon all 
phenomena. Even after having been captured and baptised “in the cold water seven times” 
(OSP 137), the only result is that he loses his fur cap -  he obtains neither respect for the 
rationality of the Malacandrians, nor a sense of his immorality in having brought murder to 
the Oyarsa's planet. Devine is less closed off to the phenomenological data, but for the 
wrong reasons. He exhibits better linguistic skills and common-sense, yet his small measure 
of openness is the product of a worldliness and recognition that rigid ideologies like Weston’s 
can easily lead to monetary -  or mortal -  disasters. This is apparent when he tells Weston in 
their judgement scene, “Be careful what you say to them and don’t let’s have any of your 
bloody nonsense” (138).
The anthropocentrism displayed by all three of the main human characters in OSP is 
symptomatic of a profound misunderstanding of the centrality of human existence. This 
misunderstanding derives from the phenomenological conviction of humanity’s importance, 
but misinterprets the nature of this importance. Weston focuses on the importance of the 
collective, Devine on the individual (namely, himself). Only Ransom manages to alter his 
paradigm, and this is not into a hnau-centric worldview (although this would be an 
improvement), but rather a logocentric one: as a good philologist, he implicitly begins to 
appreciate the cosmic archetype of reason, the Logos, as the source and unifier of all rational 
creatures of Deep Heaven.
Loving Conflict
The Hnakra, the Hrossa and Ransom
Ransom’s attempt at an accusation, his attempt to find at least one defect in Malacandrian 
society, succeeds only in introducing one of the most interesting elements of the story. A 
major aspect of the hross culture is a large, shark-like creature called a hnakra. It is a
19 Alternatively, to coin a particularly horrible word, a ‘hnaulogist. ’
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predator of Malacandrian waters, and is described by Ransom’s friend Hyoi in the extract 
below:
I long to kill this hnakra as he also longs to kill me. I hope that my ship 
will be the first and I first in my ship with my straight spear when the black 
jaws snap. And if he kills me, my people will mourn and my brothers will 
desire still more to kill him. But they will not wish that there were no 
hneraki; nor do I. How can I make you understand, when you do not 
understand the poets? The hnakra is our enemy, but he is also our beloved.
We feel in our hearts his joy as he looks down from the mountain of water 
in the north where he was born; we leap with him when he jumps the falls; 
and when winter comes, and the lake smokes higher than our heads, it is 
with his eyes that we see it and know that his roaming time is come. We 
hang images of him in our houses, and the sign of all the hrossa is a 
hnakra. In him the spirit of the valley lives; and our young play at being 
hneraki as soon as they can splash in the shallows. (76)
A confrontation with a hnakra is an opportunity to face death; this existential conflict, this 
great risk, provides the hrossa with the bittersweet material for their poetry, and thus, for 
their self-identity. Hyoi says later that he does not think “the forest would be so bright, nor 
the water so warm, nor love so sweet, if there were no danger in the lakes” (76).
Mars’s pugnacious (Gradivus) influence is apparent here, but not in the way Weston 
and Devine receive it. The hrossa are not subject to sublunary interference like the humans of 
Thulcandra, and thus their battle with the hnakra never becomes a thing of hatred, 
competition or domination. There is respect and appreciation of the enemy, even while 
recognising the essential antithesis separating each species from the other. Hyoi later 
describes how “[he] drank life because death was in the pool [...] That was the best of drinks 
save one” (77). This leads to a profound inversion, for this singular drink is “[d]eath itself, 
when he “go[es] to Maleldil” (77). The hnakra and the hunt associated with it is not merely a 
source of poetry, excitement or self-understanding. It points to an ultimate reality; to echo the 
title of a piece by Clint Mansell, “Death is the Road to Awe”; it is one kind of threshold 
within the cosmic Great Dance.20 This helps elucidate exactly why the hnakra is “beloved”; 
in meting out death to the apparently unfortunate hunter, the hnakra opens his way into Deep 
Heaven. In this translunary realm, all conflict, even conflict ending in death, is rendered 
sweet.
20 See my discussion of the Great Dance on p. 57.
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The hnakra-hunt also “serves as the means through which Lewis’s hero restores his 
sense of physical well-being and prepares himself for the conflict that awaits his return to 
earth” (Schwartz 39). It is not merely preparation for his return to earth, for as Hilder 
mentions, “the bravery required in the hnakra-hunt may be thought of as preliminary training 
for his battle with the Un-man on Perelandra” (47). Viewing this episode as preparatory or 
restorative prima facie makes sense, but it is important to note that Ransom participates in the 
hunt only by obeying “something like conscience” (my italics) with a desire to “hold on to his 
new-found manhood” (OSP 81). He decides to ignore the eldiVs warning that “there will be 
evil” if he postpones going to the Oyarsa (81) -  at the expense of Hyoi’s death. His 
sublunary21 version of conscience wins out in this instance. The ambiguity of conflict -  of the 
Martial influence -  is hereby exemplified. He passes the test of hross heroism, and reaps 
courage as a reward -  but he also learns the bittersweet lesson that heroic conflict, pursued to 
the exclusion of less heroic (but more important) obedience, does not result in good.
Ransom’s Conflicted Mind and Self-love
Another instance of loving conflict appears when, on the “realisation of his position” (OSP 
49), Ransom is rendered schizophrenic.22 This lasts until he is able to come to terms with the 
deep terror of being in an “unbearable” (49) alien environment, far fr om anything familiar. 
This schizophrenia is not pure madness, however. It is at the very least symptomatic, at most 
something curative: an illustration of self-love and a will to survival. After his mad dash 
away from his kidnappers and the sorns, “[h]e felt a strange emotion of confidence and 
affection towards himself [...] saying, ‘We'll stick to one another’” (OSP 46). Soon afterward, 
his split mind manifests as he struggles to attribute a solid identity to himself:
Then he remembered [...] that there was a man wandering in the wood [...]
He would come up to him and say, “Hullo, Ransom,” -  he stopped, 
puzzled. No, it was only himself: he was Ransom. Or was he? Who was 
the man whom he had led to a hot stream and tucked up in bed, telling 
him not to drink the strange water? Obviously some newcomer who didn't 
know the Place as well as he. (49)
By disassociating himself from the paranoid, isolated Ransom, he embraces the risk-taking 
Ransom, who is willing to “drink the strange water” because of his imagined familiarity with 
“the Place” (49). Ransom must disassociate from himself, deny his own fearful identity in
21 See p.13 n4.
22 Not in the medical sense, but in the etymological sense of a ‘split mind.’
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order to act without succumbing to hysteria -  to act courageously. This split in his 
consciousness does not persist: once his bodily needs are quenched and he is able to 
understand more of his environment (through contact with the hrossa), the schizophrenia 
passes and he is restored to his former cognitive unity. His disunity is a means to the end of 
subjective unity.
The link between this episode and love becomes apparent when one considers how 
Lewis reveals (intentionally or not) the medicinal value of a split mind: how a mind at 
conflict with itself can actually be a very good thing. This is because a self that loves itself is 
sometimes willing to go against itself. Moreover, such a principle may be extended (I suspect 
more fruitfully than in the realm of mental health) to love, specifically in the sense of charity 
or agape. As a child should endure the loving discipline of his or her parents so as to develop 
a good character -  even though the discipline is painful to him/her -  in the same way a split 
mind which then achieves unity may be more firmly integrated than before. Such a process, 
althoughprima facie an indication of madness, is in fact a means of maturation and a 
function of love. This episode also points to the larger theme of Ransom having to transcend 
his childhood, with all the juvenile notions attached to it, and embrace a self that is willing to 
hunt hneraki and meet sorns; that is, to develop a love for the Other.
Love in OSP
Ransom and the Hnau of Malacandra
The love that develops between Ransom and the hnau of Malacandra is somewhat surprising 
if one recalls his original fear of the alien. Yet Ransom’s “openness to the world” coupled 
with what Lewis calls the “the shy, ineluctable fascination of unlike for unlike” (58) produces 
a situation wherein at least one of the four loves23 is suggested, and the other three are 
exhibited. Although eros love is absent -  Lewis is primarily saving it for That Hideous 
Strength -  the initial meeting of Ransom and Hyoi invokes imagery typically associated with 
love at first sight. In this scene, Lewis skilfully “evokes the complex of desire and mutual 
recognition that sometimes outweighs the suspicions that distance us from those we perceive 
as different from ourselves” (Schwartz 35):
23 In Lewis’s work The Four Loves (FL), he outlines four different kinds of love (storge, philia, eros and 
agape).
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“[The hross], too, was in the grip of curiosity. Neither dared let the other 
approach, yet each repeatedly felt the impulse to do so himself, and yielded 
to it. It was foolish, frightening, ecstatic and unbearable all in one moment.
It was more than curiosity. It was like a courtship -  like the meeting of the 
first man and the first woman in the world. (54)
This meeting with Hyoi is an integral moment, for it signals to the reader something 
important about Ransom. Here Ransom’s openness to the alien is displayed; it is an openness 
that eventually will overpower his prejudice against the sorns. Schwartz is right when he says 
that Ransom’s “relations to strangers are not entirely at the mercy of [his] fears” (36). The 
“prodigious adventure” inherent in the experience of meeting Hyoi results in Ransom’s 
attachment to Hyoi “by bonds stronger than he knew” (58-59). Friendship love, philia, grows 
between them. Hyoi goes on to help Ransom understand and integrate into the hross 
community; he enables Ransom to experience a wholly inhuman yet morally perfect,
‘humane’ society. Purtill emphasises how Ransom “grows to love the hross [sic] and 
especially Hyoi, his first friend among them” (89). His stay in this community soon 
engenders a storge (affection) love in Ransom for the hrossa generally, and an appreciation 
for their delight-filled way of life. He likewise becomes an object of their love; from the 
young hrossa's affectionate perspective, he is an avuncular, “hairless goblin” (65). Ransom 
learns their language, and as much about the culture, customs, art, and history of Hyoi’s 
people as he can. Later, he learns about Augray’s and Kanakaberaka’s24 people too. These 
studies require a kind of openness and love, something that Lewis explicitly characterises 
Ransom as having by the time of Hyoi’s funeral. The reader is told how “[t]hrough his 
knowledge of the creatures and his love for them he began, ever so little, to hear [the dirge for 
Hyoi] with their ears” (OSP 135). Lewis writes in EC that
[i]n coming to understand anything, we are rejecting the facts as they are 
for us in favour of the facts as they are for someone else. The primary 
impulse of each is to maintain and aggrandize himself. The secondary 
impulse is to go out of the self, to correct its provincialism, and heal its 
loneliness. In love, in virtue, in the pursuit of knowledge, and in the study 
of literature, history, and philosophy, we are doing this. (138)
Ransom’s “longing to learn [Malacandrian] language” (OSP 58) and his desire to explore 
their body of knowledge is an example of charity or agape love, albeit a rather weak 
example. For to accept the facts of another requires a sacrifice of the self, and the
24 Ransom meets thispffltrigg  after reaching the Oyarsa’s sanctuary. He sculpts Ransom’s likeness in the 
Malacandrian style.
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“provincialism” toward which the self inclines. Ransom is not forced to learn the Old Solar 
language, yet he does so to the extent that he can adequately interpret for Weston and Devine. 
They have no such competency, not even after their second visit. As a philologist (qua 
vocation, not qua profession), Ransom is a lover of language and knowledge. In this case, it 
helps him become a hnau-lover too.
Beyond enabling Ransom to enter into the hross community, Hyoi also directs 
Ransom’s gaze to the hnakra, which becomes the focal point of their friendship. This reaches 
its culmination once “[t]hey had stood shoulder to shoulder in the face of an enemy” 25 where 
“the shapes of their heads no longer mattered.” Ransom is of the conviction that “[h]e was 
one with them [...] They were all hnau” (82). The differences of appearance are transcended 
by an underlying unity of purpose and ‘being in the same boat’ (in this case, quite literally). 
Although successful in the hnakra-hunt, owing to Ransom’s disobedience Hyoi is tragically 
slain. But as Ransom notes, “Hyoi with his last breath had called him hnakra-slayer; that was 
forgiveness generous enough” (85). The absolution that Hyoi offers to Ransom reveals the 
extent to which their friendship has deepened into charity, an agape-love that “keeps no 
record of wrongs”.26
Malacandrian Society
At the outset, let me differentiate between intra-species and inter-species love on Malacandra. 
As for the former (using the hrossa as the primary source), once Ransom is told about the 
centrality of the hnakra in the hrossa’s imagination and tribal identity, he asks whether the 
hnakra ever kills young hrossa who innocently play-hunt in the lake’s shallows. He is told 
that this seldom occurs: “[t]he hrossa would be bent hrossa if they let [the hnakra] get so 
near” (OSP 76). Clearly, taking care of one another is of great importance to the hrossa; their 
ethic is one where neglect, a lack of care for one’s neighbour, is the measure of bentness -  as 
opposed to Ransom’s Thulcandra, where neglect is the norm and positive evils are the usual 
measure for bentness.
The hrossa can barely conceive of a bent hnau -  and would regard one more as an 
aberration to be rehabilitated, given that their translunary state admits of no (moral)
25 According to FL, a mutual interest in something or other is the necessary for philia love (96). Lewis also 
visualises friends as being “side by side or shoulder to shoulder” (104) rather than facing each other (as with
eros love).
26 1 Cor. 13:5 (NIV). I use the NIV here because the connection to the text is purely connotative in my own 
mind (i.e. Lewis himself would not have encountered a similar translation of the verse in question, but would 
likely agree with its meaning). In all other Bible references that follow, I use the KJV.
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corruption. Their philosophy of life follows from natural instinct. As far as they are 
concerned, there is no plausible conflict between instinct and moral principles. This is 
illustrated when Ransom asks Hyoi about “love in a bent life” (75). Hyoi responds with a 
question: “How could the life of a hnau be bent?” The best-imagined example of such a life 
Hyoi can produce is of a mythical hross who saw everything double -  including two mates, 
an unnatural anomaly that, if it actually occurred, does not necessarily entail bentness. The 
hrossa are “a species naturally continent, naturally monogamous” and, although they do see 
“the begetting of young” as a “very great [pleasure]” which “[they] call love” (73), this does 
not translate into behaviour similar to that of humans. For the hrossa, love is not just physical 
pleasure; it also takes into account societal concerns like overpopulation -  a reason why they 
do not breed whenever they wish, but only for a certain period and then never again. Clearly, 
hrossa do not take to sex for its own sake, but only as a pleasurable means to a limited end. 
Once this end is reached, the means -  and its pleasures -  are fulfilled and are not repeated, for 
that would lead to an ethical dilemma. Hyoi makes this point with a rhetorical question -  
“How could there ever be enough to eat if everyone had twenty young?” (76). The 
pleasurable aspects of love between hrossa and hressni27 do not overwhelm the other, less 
erotic aspects; and societal balance is preserved as a result.
With regard to inter-species love on Malacandra, the love that characterises the 
hrossa, seroni and pfifltriggis ’ interaction is best exemplified by the cooperation and the 
sibling-like sense of family exhibited by the three species. It reveals a deep affection, 
probably even a charity,27 8 which they hold for each other. In the first instance, they find each 
other attractive as we tend to find non-human animals attractive. Each species has a certain 
quiddity that the others find to be rather endearing and which makes possible the ironising of 
the other species. Using Lewis’s framework from FL, they have storge love for one another.29 
Ransom explains after his return to Earth that
[e]ach of them is to the others both what a man is to us and what an animal 
is to us. They can talk to each other, they can co-operate, they have the 
same ethics; to that extent a sorn and a hross meet like two men. But then
27Females of the hross species.
28Although there are no clear examples of this in the text, the closest example would be where the dying Hyoi 
forgives Ransom. Ransom, however, is a special case and the Malacandrian’s relations with him do not 
necessarily reflect their relations with each other. I think there are strong reasons to think so, however, given the 
timbre of their benevolence to each other. This is most clearly expressed when all three species are in the
presence of the Oyarsa together.29It is a love that “ignores even the barriers of species” and is characterised by a “warm comfortableness [...] 
satisfaction in being together” (FL 54).
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each finds the other different, funny, attractive as an animal is attractive.
(OSP 162)
Another function of their love is that the three species see each other as hnau possessing 
inalienable rights -  there is a respect for each other’s rights and autonomy, something the 
‘early’ Ransom finds difficult to comprehend. The unfallen Malacandrians are logocentric. 
Whin, Ransom’s other hnakra-hunt companion, states a fact when he says to Ransom that 
“[o]ne does not kill hnau” (83) -  only the Oyarsa, as the planet’s ruler and guardian, can 
legitimately do this (126). The Malacandrians know their moral limitations and recognise 
mutual equality before their Oyarsa. They thus complement each other through obedience to 
the eldila, the Oyarsa, and Maleldil above all. Schwartz summarises Malacandrian society, in 
contradistinction to Thulcandrian society, as follows:
[T]he peace and equality among the three Martian species, who live 
separately but never seek to subordinate one another, involve the 
transfiguration of the terrestrial vision of relentless evolutionary strife into a 
harmonious community that participates in the beneficent rationality of the 
cosmic order. (20)
Weston and Devine, and Ransom
Ransom exhibits a surprising solidarity with Weston and Devine when the Oyarsa decides to 
send them back to earth. He certainly recognises that they are evil men; after Hyoi’s murder 
he tells Whin that “if [the hrossa] are wise they will kill me and certainly they will kill the 
other two” (OSP 83). Earlier, I discuss the extent of alienation that he feels when seeing them 
again.30 Ransom nevertheless decides to “throw in his lot with Weston and Devine,” 
explaining “[l]ove of our own kind [ . ]  is not the greatest of laws, but you, Oyarsa, have said 
it is a law. If I cannot live in Thulcandra, it is better for me not to live at all” (147). 
Considering the fact that he is “given full liberty to remain in Malacandra” (147) and yet 
decides to risk death alongside his kidnappers -  his friend’s murderers, no less -  it is puzzling 
that he decides it must be ‘Thulcandra or death.’
One explanation for this seeming paradox is that the solidarity, the love “of [his] own 
kind” (147) is not primarily aimed at Weston and Devine themselves, but rather for the 
human race of which they are representative: a species besieged and silenced, in dire need of 
a champion. This indeed is the special task given to Ransom by the Oyarsa of Mars, who 
orders Ransom to “watch this Weston and this Devine in Thulcandra if ever you arrive there.
30 See pp. 20-21.
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They may yet do much evil in, and beyond, your world. [...] Watch those two bent ones. Be 
courageous. Fight them” (148). Still, Ransom’s willingness to have anything to do with them, 
and the many humans who would have acted just like this pair, reveals an undercurrent of 
agape love, a love willing to endure the presence of evil in order that good will come from it.
Conclusion
Given Lewis’s claim that “[t]he temperament derived from each planet can be turned either to 
a good or a bad use” (DI 116-7), it is clear that the ambiguous Martial influence can lead to a 
love-centred philosophy of life, as seen in Ransom and in his adopted Malacandrian kin. As 
such, Ransom -  guilty only of “a little fearfulness” (OSP 147) -  grows from the Martial 
spirit’s tutelage and overcomes his fear of the Other. This initial fear reveals “the distance of 
Ransom from true reality” (Manlove 38). In the process of lessening this distance, he 
develops “a readiness to see, a facility to size things up, a quickness to understand” (Holmer 
42). In Manlove’s words, “Ransom’s perspective literally expands” (39). He firstly perceives 
the true nature of space, then the nature of Malacandra’s landscape and geography, then the 
nature of its three alien species and the cosmic order that they inhabit. In this process Ransom 
also develops a personal anthropology that is “cognizant of [his] aptitude for misrecognition 
of the Other” (Schwartz 52), thereby obtaining an adequate xenology, free from 
anthropocentric assumptions. This results in “turning the extraterrestrial Other from an object 
of suspicion into a welcome rational copresence in a divinely ordered universe” (Schwartz 
34). Throughout all these strands, the perceptual humility or “openness to the world” that 
Ransom displays “leads to true courage” (Hilder 51).
The novel also shows that the Martial spirit, improperly received, produces a deeply 
flawed philosophy of life when bound by the sublunary tendencies of the “Silent Planet”: a 
symbol, if you will, for the realm of inwardness, self-centredness and selfishness. Weston and 
Devine clearly exhibit “narrow and self-aggrandizing perspective[s]” (Schwartz 37) by 
kidnapping Ransom, murdering Hyoi, and attempting to justify both actions according to 
their “diabolical” motivations. Martial conflict thus gives rise to a choice: either grow in 
perception, courage and love, or become ever more fearful, isolated and hateful. Ransom 
chooses the former, while Weston and Devine choose the latter.
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OSP provides the trilogy’s first treatment31 of Mars offering a translunary perspective. 
The reader is able to see how Infortuna Minor is rendered fortunate. This does not entail the 
neutralisation of any bellicose or pugnacious spirit (typified in the hnakra-hunt) or its 
replacement with a cowardly submission to the demands and challenges of life. Rather, this 
spirit is shown in its proper place, as an expression of life, a wilful desire to get ‘out o f the 
shackles that constrain one’s understanding of the world, and ‘into’ the appreciation of both 
the life-process and goal to which it leads. As Manlove perceptively notes, the “Out o f’ of the 
title effectively becomes ‘into’ (44). Ransom’s journey through conflict results in a radical re - 
orientation; his eyes are open and focused in the right direct ion: “he has [...] gone out of the 
‘silent’ world” (Manlove 28) and is poised to “become a member of the living cosmos [ . ]  as 
a spiritual hero ready to take his place in the celestial battle between good and evil” (Hilder
51).
31 Not the only treatment: Perelandra and especially That Hideous Strength build and clarify the image of a 
fortunate Mars.
36
Chapter 3
Love, Conflict and the Great Dance in Perelandra
In the prelapsarian world of Perelandra (Venus), where peace is an unknown concept by 
virtue of its ubiquity, Lewis explores a potentially devastating conflict between two 
competing views of love. For the most part “the action” of the novel “consists of 
confrontation of persons and intellectual or moral decisions” (Gibson 47) and thus Lewis 
reduces society on Perelandra to, effectively, only three people: an authorial decision which 
“reveals Lewis’s concentration on spiritual states” (Sellin 107). The first major spiritual 
confrontation takes place between a diabolical tempter (the Un-man) and the Eve of 
Perelandra (the Green Lady). Her temptation hinges upon the question of what it means to 
truly love the Other -  that is, what perfect, self-sacrificial charity really looks like. Unlike the 
Genesis account, however, “Perelandra is the story of ‘Paradise Retained,’ of an Eve who is 
able to resist the tempter long enough for Ransom to destroy him” (Downing 46).
Ransom is thus the third main character in this story, and unlike in OSP, his 
participation in a second inter-planetary journey is voluntary. He has lost his anthropocentric 
bias and developed a far more logocentric perspective in its stead. Ransom arrives on Venus 
without any fears of “loathsome sexless monsters” (OSP 32) or “extra-terrestrial Otherness” 
(33). This perspectival shift is apparent on Perelandra when Ransom sees mermen and 
mermaids, to whom, despite their “total absence of human expression” (Per 100), he no 
longer reacts negatively; his categories have broadened. Ransom explains that the mermen 
are “neither bestial nor diabolic, but merely elvish” (100). This acceptance of their 
ontological legitimacy is a major part of the logocentric outlook developed in the previous 
novel. Because of Ransom’s unique adventures on Malacandra and the benevolent influence 
of the Martial spirit, he is now prepared to “[b]e courageous” and “[f]ight” Weston and those 
like him (OSP 148). I agree with David Downing when he says
the opening pages of Perelandra show that Ransom has travelled far in 
his spiritual pilgrimage; but succeeding pages will show that he has far 
yet to go. If the great challenge of his first journey was to overcome his 
fears, the great challenge of his second journey will be to overcome his 
doubts. (111)
These doubts refer to two things. Firstly, there is the second major spiritual confrontation of 
Perelandra, in which Ransom doubts the role he has been given as the Lady’s protector. He
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is tempted to abandon the Green Lady and avoid combat with the Un-man. It becomes 
apparent that “Ransom’s real enemy is once again his own diseased subjectivity” (Rossi 42). 
Unlike in OSP, where his faculty of perception is faulty, the disease now reveals itself in 
Ransom’s will -  he fears doing what he perceives to be the right course of action. I argue that 
Ransom’s perceptual re-orientation is merely the precondition for ethical, loving action; for 
him to act rightly still requires “overcoming] his doubts,” taking a self-chosen leap into 
uncertainty and risking death in order to preserve innocence. The second set of doubts 
proceeds indirectly from his victory over the first set. They relate to the processes of cosmic 
history, and provide Lewis an opportunity to develop what he terms “the Great Dance” (Per 
219): it acts as the final inoculation against Ransom’s misgivings.
The Plot of Perelandra
In a coffin-like box, Ransom is propelled through the heavens by eldilic powers. Given what 
he now knows about the planets and their essential benevolence, his initial experience on 
Perelandra is one of peace and solitude (despite being uncertain of his purposes there). He 
enjoys the pleasures of the Venereal landscape: an ocean world of turquoise water, floating 
islands, and lush organic life. His solitude is broken by the Green Lady -  the Eve of 
Perelandra -  with whom he engages in lengthy discussions; while he attempts to understand 
her innocence, she likewise tries to understand his experience. It is not long, however, before 
Weston arrives, explains his new philosophical stance, and violently transforms into the Un­
man: a diabolical figure with the sole intention of corrupting the Green Lady. Ransom strives 
to prevent this by battling against the Un-man’s half-truths, but he eventually realises that he 
must physically destroy Weston’s body so that the Un-man, speaking through the physicist, 
will cease his inexorable temptation. This physical conflict is long and painful -  but 
eventually Ransom emerges as the victor, and vanquishes Weston’s body and the Un-man 
with him. He ascends a mountain to find himself standing before the Oyeresu (planetary 
spirits) of both Perelandra and the already-familiar Malacandra. The Green Lady and her 
King arrive, each having endured their respective temptations, and are given the rule and care 
of the planet by the Oyarsa of Perelandra. All the gathered characters participate in a so- 
called “conversation” (Per 219) about the Great Dance, a grand vision of the unfolding of 
cosmic history. Finally, after more than a year’s absence from Earth, Ransom re-enters his 
coffin-like vessel and returns home.
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Love in Perelandra
Perelandra's alternate title, Voyage to Venus, immediately suggests concerns with the nature 
of love and the way the Venereal spirit influences those who travel within its sphere. On 
Perelandra, Lewis generates a landscape dominated by Venereal archetypes and motifs. There 
is the ‘womb’ of his coffin-like space vessel; the warmth of the climate; the characters’ 
nakedness; the profusion of water and wetness; the verdurous flora and multitudinous fauna; 
the general dynamism of the landscape. Lewis claims in DI “we find no difficulty in grasping 
the character of [...] Venus” (109). By “we”, he means those who have a ‘modern’ outlook as 
opposed to a medieval one. He adds that certain “[c]hanges of outlook, which have left 
almost intact [ . ]  the character of Venus, have almost annihilated Jupiter” (DI 109). By this, 
Lewis is possibly alluding to modern tendencies -  since the Romantics, and later, Freud -  to 
frame human striving in terms of Venus and the sexual drives she most often now represents.1 
A voyage to Venus thus resonates with a modern readership, and allows Lewis to re-present 
her, much as he does Mars in OSP, in a way that emphasises charity (agape love) rather than 
lust. In the following sections, I explore the character of the Green Lady as an embodiment of 
love. Her identity, innocence, attitudes and actions all disclose Lewis’s attempt to capture a 
“condition of mind to which terrestrial experience offer[s] no clue at all” (Per 54).
Encountering the Green Lady
Ransom’s nakedness -  and the shame often attributed to such a state on Thulcandra -  are 
inconsequential in the holy air of Perelandra. He has overcome his sublunary anxiety, and the 
Perelandrian society -  the Green Lady -  knows nothing of them. The reader is told that the 
“cord of longing” infecting Ransom “in any world where men’s nerves have ceased to obey 
their central desires would doubtless have been aphrodisiac too, but not in Perelandra” (101). 
Perelandra is clearly a world, like Malacandra, in which incontinence and unbridled instinct 
go against the natural order. When Ransom sees the naked Green Lady for the first time, his 
distraction does not therefore stem from the fact of their mutual nakedness or any experiences 
of lust. The reader is told that “[e]mbarrassment and desire were both a thousand miles awa y 
from his experience” -  his unnerving comes more from “the fact that he knew his body to be 
a little ugly and a little ridiculous” (57) and, I suspect, the experience of not being “prepared 
for a goddess carved apparently out of green stone, yet alive” (52). Ransom explains that
1 Take, for instance, contemporary connotations of the ‘Venereal.’
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[t]here was no category in the terrestrial mind which would fit her.
Opposites met in her and were fused in a fashion for which we have no 
images. One way of putting it would be to say that neither our sacred nor 
our profane art could make her portrait. Beautiful, naked, shameless, young 
-  she was obviously a goddess: but then the face, the face so calm it 
escaped insipidity by the very concentration of its mildness, the face that 
was like the sudden coldness and stillness of a church when we enter it 
from a hot street -  that made her a Madonna. (61-2)
Ransom’s devotion to the Lady is due to his appreciation for her goddess-like beauty and 
innocence, as well as his identifying her as “a Madonna,” thereby invoking associations with 
Mary who in Christian tradition has been called the Nova Eva and Holy Mother. By 
characterising the Lady as predominantly hallowed and maternal, Lewis is not desexualising 
her, but rather is stressing her beauty, purity, and spiritual fertility over her sexuality. Ward 
tells how Lewis discovered that his quest for Joy, often mediated through an experience of 
“[S]ehnsucht,” would not be satisfied by sexual desire: “[n]othing on earth, no appetite of 
flesh and blood, could satisfy the longing for beauty symbolised by Venus” (168, my italics). 
Lewis thus makes the Green Lady into an embodiment of that towards which Sehnsucht aims 
-  “unselfconscious radiance, the frolic sanctity, the depth of stillness” (Per 127) -  and does 
not stress the Green Lady’s sexuality.
The Character of the Green Lady
The Green Lady is a type of Venus who is unfallen, holy, and innocent. A personification of 
charity, she visibly exhibits its various aspects as outlined in I Corinthians, chapter 13, verses 
4 to 8.2 She is long-suffering both with Ransom, who still experiences moments of self­
alienation and therefore dismay, as well as with the Un-man; she is oblivious to its ill-intent, 
and treats it with patience just as she does Ransom. She is kind and fair to all the animals as 
well as the two men. She does not envy -  the Un-man tries to develop this vice in her -  and 
she has no conception of ownership that enables boasting. She lacks vanity (again, the Un­
man tries to develop this in her). She is obviously not self-seeking; her thoughts are either for 
her future children, the King or Maleldil -  never for herself (133). She is not easily provoked; 
it is arguable if she displays anger at all. She “thinketh no evil”; for example, she is protected 
from registering the Un-man’s sins against her animal devotees.3 She certainly does not 
delight in evil though she does, unknowingly, flirt with it. She is better described as rejoicing
2 In this case, I follow the KJV. See p. 32 n26.
3 One assumes that she is necessarily blind to the Un-man’s obscene desecration of the frogs (and birds), since 
she knows no evil and cannot recognise it.
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in the truth, which she gleans from both Ransom and the Un-man (in spite of the latter’s 
attempts to misuse it). She always believes the best of her interlocutors, always hopes (for her 
King), and she endures her temptation without disobeying the will of Maleldil. Finally, she 
does not fail. Altogether, she overwhelmingly displays charitable qualities.
The Nature of Innocence
Perhaps inspired by Lewis’s reading of Milton’s Eve, the Green Lady is similarly not a 
creature who can easily be patronised, and is by no means “primitive,” “unsophisticated,” or 
“naif’ in the usual senses (PPL 116). One particularly endearing trait of the Green Lady is 
her literal conflation of age and knowledge; statements such as “I was young yesterday” (Per 
56) seem like an obvious fact out of context. For the Lady, however, knowledge entails 
wisdom; she immediately sees the relation between Ransom and the Un-man’s statements 
and her own philosophy of life. Her innocence is preserved, but not at the cost of her growing 
maturity; Lewis’s treatment of innocence is not without nuance. Some, like William Blake 
(and more recently Philip Pullman in his Dark Materials trilogy), set up innocence and 
maturity as mutually exclusive -  to have one truly, you must sacrifice the other. Lewis 
circumvents this apparent dilemma and introduces a plausible synthesis. Hilder explains how 
“Lewis attempts to portray in [the Green Lady] how an innocent being with full intellectual 
capacity negotiates knowledge that is conveyed by fallen human beings -  an education that 
could but need not corrupt her” (67).
There are a few elements of this innocence which I will examine in more depth, most 
of which stem from a series of concepts lacking in the Green Lady’s worldview. The first is 
the concept of peace. Ransom, still cautious despite his experiences on Malacandra, 
approaches the Green Lady as follows:
Speaking slowly in that ancient language, he cried out to her, “I am a 
stranger. I come in peace. Is it your will that I swim over to your land?”
The Green Lady looked quickly at him with an expression of curiosity.
“What is ‘peace’?” she asked. (54)
In a world hitherto unfamiliar with war or conflict, peace is the status quo; Ransom’s words, 
as far as the Lady would be concerned, are meaningless. This conceptual lack helps the 
reader understand her total trust of Ransom, the “Piebald Man” (57), and the Un-man. Her 
blind trust, as we might call it, illuminates the risky combination of innocence and curiosity. 
Driven by a desire to grow ‘older,’ she invites her own temptation.
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In conversation about what will happen to the older (non-human) races of 
Malacandra, Ransom asks if they will be “swept away” like “rubbish.” The Lady tells him 
that “[she does] not know what rubbish means” (Per 60). This second conceptual lack 
suggests that without any intimate knowledge of evil, the Green Lady does not have the 
conceptual apparatus to comprehend how there could be anything without purpose or use in 
the universe. Sanford Schwartz’s summation of her reply to Ransom -  that “cosmic 
progression entails no loss” (Schwartz 70) -  shows her complete trust in the purposefulness 
of every existing thing.
The third element of her innocence is her inability to grasp being ‘alone.’ Ransom, 
upon his first sighting of the Green Lady, realises how alone he has been before that point. 
She does not, in spite of her separation from the King, whom she is trying to find. Ransom 
asks “Do you live here alone?” and she responds with another question: “What is alone?” 
(Per 63). Ransom discovers “the Lady’s almost Enoch-like walk with Maleldil” (Gibson 50) 
and the perpetual communion she has with her creator. As a result, to borrow a distinction 
later used in relation to Ransom, she has her privacy, but is never truly alone 4 Unlike those 
born beneath the moon, she cannot comprehend the state of what Heidegger calls 
‘thrownness’ (Geworfenheit),5 which I parse as the apprehension of a profound ontological 
disconnection -  something which might enable a feeling of loneliness. In her unfallen state, 
the Green Lady knows -  not only theoretically, but also via constant phenomenological 
warrant6 -  that she has not been thrown (geworfen) into an indifferent cosmos.
Fourthly, she lacks the concept of ownership or possession. During the Green Lady’s 
temptation, the Un-man asks if she might like to keep the mirror that he has brought to her. 
As with the previous examples, she replies with a question: what does it mean to “[k]eep it?” 
(139). Upon immediate reflection, such ignorance is in her case natural -  for she has never 
dealt with the conundrums of (in increasing complexity) the barter system, colonialism, or 
modern banking. I do not suggest that if she accepted the Un-man’s offer, she would have 
fallen. Nonetheless, the idea of ontological ownership or possession by a contingent being 
would make a mockery of the necessary being, namely Maleldil, because it involves the 
creation of a right (ownership) by a creature without the authority or potency to do so.
4 Because of “the sense of being in Someone’s Presence [...] [The Green Lady’s] absence left him not to 
solitude but to a more formidable kind of privacy” (Per 69).
5 See Macquarrie 191 for a more in-depth discussion of Geworfenheit.
6 By which I mean her spiritual communion with Maleldil.
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A fifth feature of her innocence is an altered conception of time. Hers is closer to a 
theory of time that approaches time as tenseless rather than possessing an objective past, 
present or future.7 The Green Lady understands that Ransom looks “backward and forward 
along the line” in which “a day has one appearance as it comes to you, and another when you 
are in it, and a third when it has gone past. Like the waves” (Per 57). Yet as a being who does 
not know death, this tripartite separation is clearly foreign to her: an unnecessary division on 
a world such as hers, where the usual reasons for invoking tense -  change, deterioration or 
privation -  are either approached very differently or do not mean anything. She does not 
“think times have lengths” (57) although she grants that if one is “stepping out of life into the 
Alongside and looking at oneself living as if one were not alive,” it would be “true in a way” 
(58). Schwartz comments that “even as she learns to take account of past and future within 
the unfolding present, [she] also reveals what it would be like to possess a mind at peace with 
the progression of time” (69). She finds a way to preserve the eternal present e ven as she 
learns from the Thulcandrians the tensed technique of self-reflexivity.
Sixth, the Green Lady’s understanding of joy and love are s imilar, and reveal her 
innocent ignorance with regard to the (unfortunate) possibilities of sublunary love. Because 
she does not divide time into past, present or future but rather lives in and for the eternal 
present, this means that she perceives joys and pleasures in qualitative and superlative terms, 
never in quantitative or comparative terms. As she says, “[e]very joy is beyond all others. The 
fruit we are eating is always the best fruit of all” (Per 80). Schwartz also notes this 
distinction, explaining how the Green Lady is “[u]ntouched by our impulse to transform the 
qualitative into the quantitative and measure one moment against another.” Rather, she 
“rejoices in the distinctive character of each phase of the creation as it unfolds in time” (70). 
Similarly, in a state of innocence, her love admits of no comparison: she does not love 
Maleldil more than the King, but she loves each in a different way (i.e. qualitatively). For her, 
the ability to love something ‘more’ and ‘less’ (i.e. in quantitative terms) is paradoxical: “[i]t 
is like saying a thing could be bigger than itself’ (104). One either wholly assents to love, or 
one wholly denies it.
Finally, when Ransom asks her whether she is “happy without the King” and if she 
“want[s] the King?” She responds typically: “Want him? [ . ]  How could there be anything I 
did not want?” (68). She does want to be reunited with him, yet there is no causal link
7 Similar to a B-theory of time, in which time is understood not as a succession of moments but more as a 
construct of human consciousness.
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between being deprived of his presence and her happiness. The Green Lady’s will does not 
distinguish between desiring something and desiring everything -  after all, “rubbish” does 
not make any sense to her. Instead, she wants everything that she receives, because 
everything has its own peculiar sort of goodness -  “a strange and great good” (103). This all­
embracing will certainly does raise the question of why she would strive for anything to be 
different from her given facticity, but I think the reason is due to the nature of her rationality 
and her natural curiosity. Her faculty of will is also orientated towards transcendence: 
discovering new states of affairs, new gifts to receive, and returning to remembered (but not 
current) joys like being with the King. In her innocent state, however, this openness to the 
future does not distract her to the extent that she loses her ‘animal’ satisfaction in living in the 
present.
The Green Lady, Ransom, and Weston / the Un-man
The Green Lady, quite ignorant of the danger Weston represents, treats him (possessed by the 
Un-man) just as she treats Ransom. In spite of Ransom’s warning that “[t]his man [...] is a 
friend of that eldil of whom I told you -  one of those who cling to the wrong good,” the Lady 
thinks the appropriate course of action is to “explain it to him” and “go and make him older 
[...]” (82). Because she instinctively desires to “guide all natures to perfection” (211) and 
immediately recognises that “clinging to the wrong good” is not good for Weston, the Lady 
feels a duty towards him. Although her mission to “explain it to him” is doomed from the 
start, she still (even in the midst of his temptation) is respectful and willing to correct his 
apparent ignorance. Ransom -  in spite of OSP’s events -  is cordial to Weston when they 
meet again on Perelandrian soil. Though he is certain that Weston’s arrival signifies nothing 
good, he nevertheless treats him with respect -  reminding the reader of his willingness to 
return with Weston and Devine at the conclusion of his Malacandrian adventures. Later, 
when Weston appears to regain a semblance of agency from the Un-man, Ransom is 
unwilling to discount it immediately as a ploy to gain the advantage in their physical battle. 
Rather, he listens, and responds, and feels pity for the ‘nothing’ that Weston has become. 
Evan K. Gibson agrees, describing how Weston’s “role is only tragic, and Ransom shows 
nothing but concern and compassion for him” (Gibson 55).
The Green Lady and the Animals
As we have seen in OSP, one of Lewis’s aims seems to be re-situating ‘the human’ or ‘the 
rational’ within the animal kingdom. In Lewis’s framework, it is important to note that
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humans, possessing rationality like other hnau, have not graduated into a separate category of 
being or made an irrevocable jump past their less rational neighbours. Although Ransom 
learns a good deal about such things on Malacandra, his encounter with the Green Lady 
reveals ideal hnau-animal relations in sharper relief.
The Lady exhibits “a primordial intimacy with species other than our own” (Schwartz 
44). This is clarified when Ransom wonders why “[t]he beasts in [Perelandra] seem almost 
rational”; the Green Lady responds that “[w]e make them older every day” (Per 62). This, 
she thinks, is what “it means to be a beast” (62). There are at least three implications in her 
statement: firstly, being a beast is characterised by its relation to hnau; secondly, hnau like 
the Green Lady or Ransom are responsible for the beasts’ development; thirdly, getting 
“older” -  maturation -  is a good thing. Animals are thus like children in need of parenting.
Far from the rhetoric of having unqualified rights to do with animals what one wills, Lewis 
has given them a kind of ontological right to being made “older” and an intrinsic value which 
goes beyond mere utility. This is an example of a central pattern in Lewis’s imagination: on 
the one hand an obedient submission, and on the other, a loving authority. In the Great 
Dance, he describes this as “the unions of a kneeling with a sceptred love” (222). One 
example of the “sceptred love” would be an emphasis on (and therefore training in) fairness 
and impartiality. After Ransom and the Green Lady travel by means of the dolphin-like fish, 
Ransom asks why she “took so long to choose the two fish” which had carried them. Her 
response is that she tries “not to choose the same fish too often” (75), consequently varying 
her choices.
There are, however, limits to the pattern where the higher should look after the lower 
and raise them up (as the higher are themselves being raised). This is suggested firstly by 
Ransom’s judgement that “by taking seriously the inferiority of her adorers,” the Green Lady 
“made them somehow less inferior -  raised them from the status of pets to that of slaves”
(62). One immediately notes the seeming necessity of “her adorers” inferiority (which I take 
to be in an ontological sense, not axiological or moral) -  and this inferiority is not demeaning 
in any way, as becomes apparent.8 Lewis’s usage of the word “slaves” here is more akin to 
associations with committed servant-hood: the kind of slavery of which St. Paul speaks -  one 
is either a servant of “sin unto death” or “obedience unto righteousness”.9 While the former
8 Note also the ontological limitations inherent in the Green Lady’s claim that “[h]owever I teach the beasts they 
will never be better than I” (Per 80). She echoes Jesus, who claims “[t]he disciple is not above his master, nor a 
servant above his lord” (Matt. 10:24; Luke 6:40 [KJV]).
9 Rom. 6:16; 1 Cor. 7:22 (KJV).
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denotes a lack of freedom, the latter, seen in terms of discipleship, paradoxically contains the 
idea of ultimate freedom. Lewis echoes this when he says “[discipline, while the world is yet 
unfallen, exists for the sake of what seems its very opposite -  for freedom, almost for 
extravagance” (PPL 81). In other words, freedom needs a form: an appropriate configuration 
in which it may flourish.10 Quoting Roland M. Kawano, Downing claims “a central element 
in the image of the [Great Dance] is ‘the reconciliation of order and freedom’” (73); the 
relationship between the Lady and her animals illustrates such a reconciliation.
The Green Lady tells Ransom that teaching the beasts “is a joy beyond all” (Per 80). 
Her avowal of joy emphasises the love with which she approaches the task, a love primarily 
for Maleldil, and as a result, for that which he has made and the tasks that he has given. In a 
similar vein, the Oyarsa of Perelandra echoes the original injunction given to Adam when she 
instructs the Green Lady and the King to “[g]ive names to all creatures, guide all natures to 
perfection. Strengthen the feebler, lighten the darker, love all” (211). The couple reveal one 
specific way in which they will “guide all natures to perfection; they “will make the nobler of 
the beasts so wise that they will become hnau and speak: their lives shall awake to a new life 
in us as we awake in Maleldil” (217).11 Lewis is suggesting that the beasts’ so-called 
‘slavery’ (or servant-hood) is the sort which allows them maximal thriving, both physically 
and spiritually (which includes the sense of ‘rationally’), under the nourishing, but firm, 
direction of loving authority.
Conflict in Perelandra
Repeating and Arresting Pleasure
Lewis is unequivocal in his rejection of ascetic tendencies with regard to the body and 
pleasure, and displays this throughout Perelandra. Ransom’s initial experience on the planet 
is one of “excessive pleasure” (33), “unearthly pleasures” (38), an experience “filled with all 
delights” (101) -  ranging from the “orgiastic and almost alarming pleasure of the gourds [a 
kind of fruit]” to the “specific pleasure of plain food” (47). Beyond food, however, “[t]here 
was an exuberance or prodigality of sweetness about the mere act of living which our race 
finds it difficult not to associate with forbidden and extravagant actions” (34). Lewis 
emphasises that Ransom is “haunted, not by a feeling of guilt, but by surprise that he had no
10 I credit the idea that freedom needs a form to Ellis Potter, who makes this distinction in one of his podcasts -  
which I unfortunately can no longer find.
11 Lewis expands on this idea in Chapter 9 of PP, where he discusses the topic of ‘Animal Pain.’
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such feeling” (33). In Ransom’s dealings with pleasure on Perelandra, the essential goodness 
of bodily pleasure is never called into question. The trilogy’s metaphysic is predicated upon 
the Augustinian idea that “[n]o Nature (i.e. no positive reality) is bad and the word Bad 
denotes merely privation of good” (PPL 66). Lewis’s focus is rather the way one should 
navigate these intrinsically good pleasures so as not to ruin them.
Although Ransom “was [...] neither hungry nor thirsty” after having experienced the 
“alarming pleasure of the gourds [...] [h]is reason, or what we commonly take to be reason in 
our own world, was all in favour of tasting this miracle again.” Nevertheless, there is 
“something” which “seemed opposed to this ‘reason,’” and consequently, “it appeared to him 
better not to taste again” (Per 39). This new faculty -  appreciative restraint, one might call it 
-  exerts its influence on Ransom because of who he has become, and because of where he 
is.12 The internal battle between overindulgence and restraint prompts Ransom to articulate a 
central life-principle of the trilogy. He decides that repeating “a pleasure so intense” would 
be “a vulgarity -  like asking to hear the same symphony twice in a day” (39). This hearkens 
back to OSP, in which the hrossa express a similar aversion to the inappropriate repetition of 
pleasurable experiences. Ransom is told there “a pleasure is full grown only when it is 
remembered” (OSP 74) -  not when it is repeated.
After the incident with the gourds, Ransom goes on to speculate that “the root of all 
evil” is found in “[t]his itch to have things over again, as if life were a film that could be 
unrolled twice or even made to work backwards” (Per 44). Here he is outlining the fact that 
“reason in our own world” easily supports a hedonistic attitude. Ransom understands that, as 
Downing says, his species “long[s] for a godlike sovereignty over their lives, to maximize 
pleasure and security” (89). On Thulcandra, which is in constant flux and subject to a variety 
of variables and uncertainties, it can seem wise to take the pleasures one can, when available. 
Moreover, depending on how pleasurable they are, earthly wisdom might possibly even 
exhaust them as a kind of “security for being able to have things over again, a means of 
arresting the unrolling of the film” (Per 44).
The Expected Good versus the Given Good
The Green Lady exhibits a kind of regret when she realises that the figure -  whom she 
initially hopes is her King -  is actually Ransom instead. She “finds a different fruit and not 
the fruit [she] thought o f’ (66). She expands on this as follows:
12 He has changed from the Ransom who gives in to “something like conscience” in OSP (81). See p. 29.
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[o]ne joy was expected and another is given [ . ]  at the very moment of the 
finding there is in the mind a kind of thrusting back, or a setting aside. The 
picture of the fruit you have not found is still, for a moment, before you.
And if you wished -  if it were possible to wish -  you could keep it there.
You could send your soul after the good you had expected, instead of 
turning it to the good you had got. You could refuse the real good; you 
could make the real fruit taste insipid by thinking of the other. (66)
Even in her innocence, she recognises at a conceptual level how one might “make the real
fruit insipid.” Her qualification, however, is crucial: that this would occur only “if it were
possible to wish” at the expense of the given good to keep the expected good in focus. For
her, this condition is unfulfilled when she sees that Ransom is not the King; she embraces the
“different fruit” and does not “send [her] soul” after the expected good. The Lady explains to
Ransom that
[t]he joy of finding [the King] again and the joy of all the new knowledge I 
have had from you are more unlike than two tastes; and when the difference is 
as great as that, and each of the two things so great, then the first picture does 
stay in the mind quite a long time [ . ]  after the other good has come. (67)
Beyond this, she also learns something useful in the context of her coming temptation. She
exclaims “it is I, I myself, who turns from the good expected to the given good. Out of my
own heart I do it. One can conceive a heart which did not: which clung to the good it had first
thought of and turned the good which was given it into no good” (67). This episode concludes
with an interesting passage in which the Green Lady seems to discover the radical nature of
her freedom. She has been under the impression until this point that everything is divinely
ordered by Maleldil in his sovereignty; that he is in control of every detail of her existence.
She now apprehends an important distinction, however; there is no necessity in her reception
of “the good things He sent” (67). She is the one who chooses to accept the good -  and if she
wanted to, she could also say No. She becomes conscious of free-will in a libertarian sense,
and the “delight with terror in it!” (67) -  a central intuition of existentialist thought (it tends
to focus on the terror of such freedom more than the delight, however). A little while later,
she reformulates her understanding of the nature of freedom; telling Ransom that she had
“thought we went along paths -  but it seems there are no paths. The going itself is the path”
(67). This is Lewis’s succinct answer to the problem of Maleldil’s sovereignty and the Green
Lady’s freedom. For a free creature, united with its creator, the intended path is established
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through the creature’s exercise of its own freedom: never is it forced or compelled. T he 
pathfinders create their own paths with Maleldil’s official pen. 13
In her state of innocence, she recognises both a fact about herself and a governing 
norm of her coming maturity. She turns towards the given good and does not begrudge the 
entrance of anything unexpected. In other words, she is not condemned by the shadow side of 
fallen humanity’s drive to transcendence, characterised as it is by a constant projection of 
oneself into the future (in an attempt to escape the present).14 The Green Lady reframes her 
existence in different terms. First and foremost, the given good is to be received joyously. 
Desired but absent goods never corrupt the phenomenological value of the present moment. 
As she later asserts: “[t]he fruit we are eating is always the best fruit of all” (80).
The Temptation of the Green Lady
The central spiritual conflict in Perelandra is the Green Lady’s temptation. After Weston’s 
metamorphosis into the Un-man, his mission is unambiguous -  to teach the Lady the pride 
which ‘comes before the fall.’ He uses various approaches -  and considerable repetition -  in 
attempting to reach this goal. Two points differ from his previous success in Eden, however: 
firstly, Ransom is there to defend the Lady, first verbally, and later physically. Secondly, the 
Un-man is dealing with an unfallen creature of a sort he does not fully understand. The Green 
Lady is not a carbon copy of Eve, rather, she is a hnau created after Maleldil’s redeeming 
work on Thulcandra and into a universe where “[a]ll is new” (60).
The Un-man’s attempt focuses on inducing the Green Lady to disobey Maleldil and 
stay overnight on the Fixed Land; an action which is explicitly forbidden to her. The tempter 
encourages her to imagine what it would be like to dwell on the Fixed Land -  after all, 
“[Maleldil] has not forbidden [the Green Lady] to think about dwelling on the fixed land” 
(102, italics mine). She tells the Un-man that it is “a strange thing -  to think about what will 
never happen” (102). He responds as follows:
Nay, in our world we do it all the time. We put words together to mean 
things that have never happened and places that never were: beautiful
In the course of her dialogues with the Un-man and Ransom, she further concludes that “[w]e cannot walk 
out of Maleldil’s will: but He has given us a way to walk out of our will” (Per 118), meaning that ultimately 
Maleldil’s plans will be accomplished. Disobedience is ultimately against oneself and one’s own natural bias 
towards the Creator.
14 Unlike Satan, who Gibson calls “the eldil who clung to the fruit desired and turned from the fruit given” 
(Gibson 66).
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words, well put together. And then tell them to one another. We call it 
stories or poetry. (102)
The Un-man cleverly defends the validity of this speculation or “Story” (103) by stressing the 
artistic elements in the process, alluding to its potential beauty, and thus, implying the beauty 
of disobedience. Perhaps the hope is that such an emphasis would overwhelm the reasons 
against such fantasising, especially fantasising about forbidden things. Speculation, however, 
is strange for the Green Lady. In her world of immediateness, beauty corresponds to reality, 
to actuality, and thus truth. Schwartz explains how Henri Bergson’s life-force philosophy, 
which stresses “the actual over ‘what might be’ or ‘what might have been,’” particularly 
appealed to Lewis (65).15 Although she finds the Un-man’s speculations quite alien, her 
faculty of imagination has not developed far. This puts her in danger, for she does not realise 
that the imagination can be powerful shaper of reality. When the Un-man suggests that “one 
of the reasons why you are forbidden to [dwell on the Fixed Land]” is “so you may have a 
Might Be to think about, to make Story about” (Per 103), she tentatively accedes to the point, 
but responds that she will “get the King to make [her] older about it” (103). She thus closes 
their discussion with an appeal to authority.
When the Green Lady attributes to the King so much epistemic authority, this is 
because of her belief that those who are lower in the chain of hierarchy should submit to 
those who are higher -  a hierarchical idea which also underpins her unwillingness to disobey 
Maleldil.16 The Un-man attempts to undermine this hierarchy of authority, epistemic or 
otherwise, which for the Green Lady is an a priori fact of her existence. He does this by 
introducing “the women of [his] world” (104) who represent the “classical feminine heroic 
image -  that of a self-reliant, pioneering, tragedy queen superior to weaker and would-be 
domineering males” (Hilder 72). They are described as being “of great spirit” (Per 104); they 
reach “for the new and unexpected good, and see that it is good long before the men 
understand it” (104). Furthermore, they do not need Maleldil to “tell them what is good, but 
know it for themselves as He does” (104) -  they are epistemologically independent, and 
would not want anyone else “to make [them] older” (103).17 Like a playwright-cum-director 
who “had already written the play” (139), the Un-man expects the Green Lady to become 
“[t]he heroine of a very great tragedy” (127) and to embody what Ward calls “the spirit of
15“Almost he felt that the words ‘would have happened’ were meaningless -  mere invitations to wander in what 
the Lady would have called an ‘alongside world’ which had no reality. Only the actual was real” (Per 146).
16I discuss this hierarchism fully in the Great Dance section (p. 57) as well as in Chapter Four.
17 This is of course what the serpent offers Eve in her temptation. See Gen. 3:3 onwards.
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Venus Infernal” (170). The Un-man wants her to become a woman, defined by “the nobility 
of self-sacrifice” (Per 132), who disobeys her Creator in order that her husband and offspring 
might reap the rewards of greater wisdom; wisdom that she, “stepping forth fearless and 
friendless into the dark” (126), would give to them. The Un-man also promises that her 
innocent request to know more about “Death” would be realised “in abundance.” He explains 
to her that “with Death” she will enter into “the real oldness and the strong beauty and the 
uttermost branching out” (114) -  and so she has a great many reasons to disobey. Having 
introduced a “swell of indistinctly splendid images” which fill “half her imagination [...] with 
bright, poisonous shapes (134), the disobedient act of staying on the Fixed Land overnight 
becomes an act of individuation, loving self-sacrifice, beautification, the command of greater 
wisdom, and, of course, the demystification and apprehension of Death. Owing to the 
unceasing repetition of the Un-man’s temptation and the Green Lady’s wavering defence, it is 
not clear to either the reader or Ransom whether the Green Lady will successfully avoid what 
Lewis elsewhere calls “the Satanic island” (PPL 103).
Ransom’s Temptation
Ransom’s temptation, the second major spiritual conflict of Perelandra, does not consist in 
whether to commit a positive act of disobedience or not. On the contrary, he is tempted to 
withhold the sacrificial agape love required by the Lady’s deteriorating situation. He finds 
“the suggestion that he had been brought there not to do anything” to be very appea ling; it is 
much easier to be “a spectator or a witness” (Per 106) than to intervene in the Un-man’s 
plans at personal risk. Initially Ransom fights the Un-man in a battle of word and concept, but 
his verbal defence soon falters. His conscience (as the voice of Maleldil) suggests the only 
alternative: a physical defence. This is not to Ransom’s liking, and he “shrinks from the 
divine commission to destroy the Un-man” (Gibson 48), trying to find any means possible to 
justify his pacifism. Thus begins “the night of Ransom’s personal Gethsemane” (Downing 
52).
Ransom firstly comes to realise the gravity of his freedom on Perelandra, which is to 
say “the preposterous truth that all really depended on [his and the Green Lady’s] actions” 
(Per 142). A single action -  or inaction -  would change everything. He knows that “his 
journey to Perelandra was not a moral exercise, nor a sham fight. If the issue lay in Maleldil's 
hands, Ransom and the Lady were those hands” (142). In this, he recognises a truth that the
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Green Lady had articulated earlier: “there are no paths. The going itself is a path” (67). 
Nothing is preordained in a sense of ‘determined’:
Either something or nothing must depend on individual choices. And if 
something, who could set bounds to it? A stone may determine the course 
of a river. [Ransom] was that stone at this horrible moment which had 
become the centre of the whole universe. (142-3)
With an awareness of something analogous to ‘the butterfly effect,’ Ransom recognises the 
cosmic centrality of his choice. The extent of this responsibility is staggering: for if 
“Maleldil’s creatures are to be allowed meaningful choices at all, then those choices must be 
allowed to determine even whether worlds are to be saved or lost” (Downing 115).
Once Ransom unwillingly apprehends the gravity of his situation, he then probes why 
he is in such a situation at all -  for “[w]hat would it prove” if the Green Lady “were to be 
kept in obedience only by the forcible removal of the Tempter?” (Per 144). Lewis, I believe, 
is getting his idea for Ransom’s intervention from I Corinthians, chapter ten, verse 13 (KJV): 
“but God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that ye are able; but will 
with the temptation also make a way to escape, that ye may be able to bear it.” Gibson 
concludes that, given that the Green Lady “had stood the test,” Ransom’s “job is to remove 
the personified malice” and be “the ‘way of escape’ promised to those who are tempted” (52). 
Ransom condemns his own attempted retreat into theo logical dilemmas, for as “the 
Darkness” or “the Voice” whispers to him, he is only “wasting time” (Per 145). It tells him 
that “[i]t is not for nothing that you are named Ransom” (147). Ransom’s earlier desire to 
find out “[w]hat had he been brought here to do” (47) now has its most clear-cut, unavoidable 
answer. Distanced from his initial desire to be a “spectator,” his conscience asserts itself and 
leads him to make a decision. The reader is told that Ransom “bowed his head and groaned 
and repined against his fate -  to be still a man and yet to be forced up into the metaphysical 
world, to enact what philosophy only thinks (148). Ransom’s love and devotion for the Green 
Lady is stronger than his desire for self-preservation. For this reason, Ransom accepts being 
Maleldil’s Hand rather than a “spectator or witness” (106). He receives the “the translunary 
virtue” of Venus, becoming “ready to kill, ready to die” (THS 359).
At the conclusion of Ransom’s temptation and beginning of his obedience, Lewis 
elucidates Ransom’s thoughts on the ‘fixity of the future,’ and in doing so, captures the 
phenomenology of decisive commitment. We are told how “there had arisen before 
[Ransom], with perfect certitude, the knowledge ‘about this time tomorrow you will have
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done the impossible’” (Per 149). Faced with a “sheer impossibility” (149), Ransom embraces 
this knowledge as a psychological coping mechanism. There is, of course, no inevitability 
that it will take place, but through abandoning himself mentally to the “future act” as if it 
“stood there fixed and unalterable,” the hurdle of his will-faculty is overcome. As the reader 
is told, “[i]t was a mere irrelevant detail that [the action] happened to occupy the position we 
call future instead of that which we call past” (150). This may be interpreted in two ways: 
either “the power of choice had been simply set aside and an inflexible destiny substituted for 
it,” or “he had been delivered from the rhetoric of his passions and had emerged into 
unassailable freedom” (150). Both hypotheses fit the data. For Ransom is set free by his 
determination, thereby exemplifying one way in which “[p]redestination and freedom” (150) 
may amount to the same thing.
The Maturity of Conquered Temptations
Both the Green Lady and Ransom’s temptations result in the increased maturation of their 
characters, and proceed from the idea that “temptations might be good for us” (“Letters”
332). Once the Un-man is defeated and Ransom meets the Green Lady again, she explains 
that the only reason she would have wanted to disobey and stay on the Fixed Land were if she 
had wanted “to be able [...] to command where I should be [...] and what should happen to 
me” (Per 213). Staying on the Fixed Land would entail stability, and in her immaturity, 
stability is not what would have matured her into the being she was made to be. It would have 
enabled her to claim autonomy before it was given, “to draw [her] hands out of Maleldil’s, to 
say to Him, ‘Not thus, but thus’” (213). Paul S. Fiddes calls this the desire “to seize security 
for oneself, rather than welcoming the next wave that Maleldil sends. It is, in the language of 
a modern theologian, ‘trying to make absolute a finite certainty’” (142).18 With this in mind, 
the Un-man’s temptations all tried to satisfy (in shortcut fashion) the Green Lady’s own 
“quest for certainty” (qtd. in Evans 56). Consenting to this, she concludes, “would have been 
cold love and feeble trust” (Per 214). The King supplements his wife’s view, explaining that 
the pair “have learned of evil, though not as the Evil One wished us to learn” (214). Rather 
than partaking in Evil, and being taught Death by the Un-man, the whole temptation is shown 
to be a planned path, by which Maleldil “brought [them] out of the one ignorance,” i.e. a 
savoir, propositional knowledge of evil, without allowing them to “enter the other,” a 
connaitre, participatory knowledge (214). Lewis explains in PPL that “the presence of evil as
18 Fiddes here quotes Paul Tillich’s Systematic Theology.
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an object of thought does not [make a mind evil],” but that only “the approval of the will” can 
do so (84). The irony, which the King notices, is that “[i]t was by the Evil One himself that he 
brought [them] out of the first [ignorance of evil]. Little did that dark mind know the errand 
on which he really came to Perelandra” (Per 214).
Downing rightly claims that “[t]he destruction of the Un-man resolves the major 
external conflict of the story, but it also betokens the end of the conflict that has been raging 
within Ransom’s own mind and heart” (51). He also observes that “o n the morning [Ransom] 
awakens resolved to do battle with the Un-man, he discovers that the piebaldness of his body 
has largely faded away” (151). Ransom’s decision has set in motion the resolution of his 
“inner discord [ . ]  the conflict between [his] sanctified self and [his] natural self’ (113), 
symbolised by his piebald skin. In rightly perceiving what he must do, and obeying his 
conscience through courageous battle with the Un-man, Ransom successfully “heal[s] the 
dangerous split in his nature” (Rossi 42) and denies, categorically, any re-emergence of the 
fearful, initially-imperceptive Ransom encounters at the beginning of OSP. His new integrity 
means, in practical terms, an experience of peace and contentment. Following the Un-man’s 
fiery death and what he later remembers as a “long struggle in the caves of Perelandra” (THS 
360), Ransom ascends toward the holy mountain “unwearied,” “not lonely nor afraid,” with 
“no desires” -  he experiences a “state of life” in which “he was content” (Per 197).
Philosophical Conflict #1: Weston and the Spirit of Emergent Evolution
Looking now at the philosophical conflicts in Perelandra, Weston’s “raving lunacy” (OSP 
24) has changed to a certain degree. Weston was previously committed to a heavily 
anthropocentric understanding of the universe. Upon reaching Perelandra, however, he 
reveals a new loyalty to what he calls “Spirit” (Per 89), which amounts to a “belief in a single 
pervading spirit which inhabits all things” (Gibson 53). Claiming that he has been making “a 
wholly unscientific dichotomy or antithesis between Man and Nature” (Per 88), he decides 
that he “could admit no break, no discontinuity” and becomes “a convinced believer in 
emergent evolution,” with its slogan that “[a]ll is one” (89).
A major implication is his abandonment of the idea of the intrinsic value of man -  
from an extreme anthropocentric view of the universe, he moves to the other extreme where 
man is meaningless except insofar as he carries the impulse of “Spirit” (89). Weston 
describes this as an “unconsciously purposive dynamism” aiming at “an ever-increasing 
complexity of organisation, towards spontaneity and spirituality” (89). The reader is told that,
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through Weston, the “Spirit itself is at this moment pushing on to its goal” (91). Given his 
new belief that “[m]an in himself is nothing” (89), Weston’s new emphasis on “Spirit” is 
theoretically a useful replacement for his previous axiomatic standard; it is one which he can 
still embrace rather than accepting the universe’s indifferent, inarticulate purposelessness (as 
he does later).
His view is essentially monistic. As such, “heaven and hell” and “God and Devil” are 
to Weston’s mind mere products of an interesting tendency “in popular religion” to divide 
reality into parts (92). He declares that dualisms “are really portraits of Spirit [ . ]  cosmic 
energy-self-portraits” (92), an idea consistent with the monism he professes. The focus on 
synthesising dichotomies is also integral to Weston’s current view because it neatly fits with 
his pragmatic notion of Progress. Since amoral Spirit cares little for how it comes to flourish 
(caring only that it does flourish) -  pragmatism rules. Intrinsic moral values must be 
dispensed with if they get in the way of Life. Ransom asks Weston whether “the thing s the 
Force wants you to do are what ordinary people call diabolical?” (94). The response is 
simple: “The two things [evil and good] and are only moments in the single, unique reality” 
(94). An overtly Nietzschean ethic is made explicit:
The world leaps forward through great men and greatness always 
transcends mere moralism. When the leap has been made our ‘diabolism’ 
as you would call it becomes the morality of the next stage; but while we 
are making it, we are called criminals, heretics, blasphemers... (94)
In effect, Weston’s answer is Yes. It is at this point that the conflict is most apparent between 
Ransom and Weston’s philosophies of life, because Ransom would attest to an objective 
morality and ethical standard. Weston becomes “a sort of missionary for the life force” 
(Gibson 54) and embraces diabolism because he believes it is, currently, the vehicle of Life. 
In the end, Weston’s Bergson-inspired “theory of ‘creative’ or ‘emergent’ evolution is 
ultimately an expression of [his] desire to usurp control over the conditions of [his] 
existence” (Schwartz 74) -  a desire which undermines itself. For Weston is, in fact, “a dupe, 
a victim of the forces not of life but of death” (Gibson 54).
Philosophical Conflict #2: Pseudo-Weston, the Un-man and the Grotesque Dance
The Un-man’s conquest of Weston’s body is peripheral given the centrality of the Green 
Lady’s temptation, but it is something that introduces an important philosophy of life, one 
which acts as a nihilistic counter to the Great Dance and Lewis’s overall philosophical thrust.
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Soon after Weston concludes telling Ransom about his philosophy of Spirit, he “call[s] that 
Force into [himself] completely” (95). This invitation results in his initial incapacitation, and 
soon, his transformation into the Un-man. Hilder writes that “[e]very human soul is a 
‘receptacle’ for a greater force: either the demonic that destroys the soul or the divine that 
fulfills the soul” (59). Weston, unfortunately, has become a receptacle for the former. When 
the Un-man is attacked by Ransom, there is a period in which Weston apparently rallies 
against the Un-man’s control and regains a measure of mental control. The reader is told, 
though, that “[i]f the remains of Weston were, at such moments, speaking through the lips of 
the Un-man, then Weston was not now a man at all [...] Only a ghost was left -  an 
everlasting unrest, a crumbling, a ruin, an odour of decay” (Per 130-1). It is striking that 
Weston uses the Un-man’s lips, not his own: such is the completeness of his possession.19 
This ghost, who I follow Gibson in calling “Pseudo-Weston” (Gibson 51), offers a grotesque 
philosophy of life premised upon the dominant, victorious reality of the Un-man’s evil 
(which I examine first).
The reader is told “[t]he extremity of [the Un-man’s] evil had passed beyond all 
struggle into some state which bore a horrible similarity to innocence” (Per 110). The irony is 
that ‘innocent’ contains etymologically within itself the idea of being ‘harm-less’ or ‘free 
from moral wrong.’ To apply such a word to the Un-man hardly seems appropriate. Yet in 
more modern senses of the word -  i.e. ‘purity’, ‘blamelessness’ or ‘childishness’ -  there is a 
certain appropriateness for such a description.20 Lewis’s evaluation of Milton’s Satan is 
pertinent: the Un-man is similarly “a personified self-contradiction” (PPL 97). This becomes 
apparent through the Un-man’s “petty, indefatigable nagging” (Per 123) by which he irritates 
Ransom. He constantly calls out Ransom’s name, followed by the retort “Nothing” (122) 
when asked for explanation. Childishly aiming to provoke frustration in an elder, he tests 
Ransom’s patience. This episode reveals a good deal about Lewis’s conception of evil -  that 
at core, it is a repetitive “Nothing” acting as if it were actually ‘Something.’ In this 
conception, Lewis follows the “Augustinian view that grants ontological status only to the 
Good and relegates evil to a privative notion that is parasitic upon it” (Schwartz 65). Lewis 
quotes Augustine, for instance, in PPL: “No Nature (i.e. no positive reality) is bad and the 
word Bad denotes merely privation of good” (61). This becomes explicit when Ransom 
intuits that, although it might be irritating to be addressed so repetitively, at least his name
19 I credit Jamie McGregor for this insight.
20 Moreover (though not for lack of trying), by the novel’s end the Un -man is rendered ‘harmlessly’ evil, at least 
with regard to his primary aim of corrupting the Green Lady. The only real harm one might say he inflicts is the 
enduring wound on Ransom’s heel. See p. 54.
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has substance. The reader is told that “if he must hear either the word Ransom or the word 
Nothing a million times, he would prefer the word Ransom” (Per 123) -  he has no desire for 
Nothing, in any sense of the word. Moreover, he is told later that “[i]t is not for nothing that 
you are named Ransom” (147). This is in stark contrast to the Un-man’s name, which is a 
negation of a positive reality, man -  and therefore something essentially good. ‘Nothing’ is 
an excellent word for encapsulating the nature of its evil.
With this conception of evil (as nothing or ‘no thing’) in complete possession of his 
body, Pseudo-Weston no longer dwells upon “Spirit” or “emergent evolution” (89), but rather 
concedes that he has “been stuffing [him]self up with a lot of nonsense” in an effort to “make 
the universe bearable” (169) -  to replace “Nothing” with something. Having ceased “trying to 
persuade [him]self” (169), Pseudo-Weston now accepts that the cosmos is basically evil. He 
expresses this to Ransom by saying that a child “knows something about the universe which 
all science and all religion is trying to hide,” namely that the ground of being is the stuff of 
“bad dreams” (170). Men of religion may “think there is a way of escape [ . ]  There isn’t” 
(170). The Un-man would never despair at such a ghastly vision. Being an expression of 
“bad dreams” himself, this would undoubtedly seem like a very good thing indeed. Pseudo- 
Weston, however, embraces despair in the face of the Un-man’s “Nothing.” He sees cosmic 
history as a horrible tendency towards non-being, and now perceives that the “unconsciously 
purposive dynamism” (89) which he previously advertised is in fact an insidious movement 
from order to an “essential disorder” (167). Pseudo-Weston’s cosmos eschews anything 
Heavenly in favour of anarchic Hellishness; like his own psyche, it will regress until there is 
“Nothing” (122) left.
The Great Dance
Although most of Perelandra may be understood broadly in terms of love and the conflict 
prompted by Weston’s arrival, the final chapters of the novel bring both the Martial and 
Venereal undertones into a consonant, resonant harmony. Having completed the task set for 
him, some doubts have arisen in Ransom’s mind about the goo dness of Maleldil’s cosmic 
plan. He questions whether the unfolding cosmic process is anything more than ‘a Great 
Disappointment.’
Ransom’s questioning prepares the way for a sensual rendition (primarily verbal and 
visual) of the Great Dance as a response. In OSP, Lewis had already emphasised certain 
aspects of the Dance’s stage and lighting by re-introducing the glorious nature of the heavens
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and expressing it in terms very different to the “nightmare perspective” of Deep Heaven (Per 
167).21 This is a necessary revision, as the Great Dance is cosmic in nature and scope: it 
cannot take place in a dark vacuity or in a “remote corner” (218). Though the Great Dance 
may refer to the masque-like interplay of planets and stars -  as the Green Lady says, one can 
“see the great dance with [one’s] own eyes” (58) -  in a deeper sense, it refers to the 
interrelations between every creature and creation inhabiting Maleldil’s cosmos. Understood 
as such, the movements of the Great Dance are not solely expressed in the Oyeresu’s twenty 
or so verses, each of which conclude with the refrain: “Blessed be He!” (220), but are 
scattered throughout Perelandra and the other two texts of the trilogy. Philip Tallon has 
described the Dance as a kind of theodicy, asserting that in it, “Lewis uses creation’s beauty 
to point to [Maleldil’s] goodness” (200). Lewis is thus emphasising how Maleldil’s beautiful 
goodness might be reconciled with the unfortunate conflicts that cause pervasive suffering, 
pain and evil in the universe. Seen on another level, the Great Dance is a re-mythologisation 
of the substance of history. It injects into history, both past, present and future, a new (or very 
old) beauty and morality: a mixture which provides the background for the Cosmic 
philosophy of life. Over against all competing philosophies -  Weston’s anthropocentric 
scientism and emergent evolutionism, Devine’s Mammon-worship, the Totentanz-like 
nihilism of Pseudo-Weston/the Un-man -  stands the Great Dance, which expresses in full the 
creative and created vision of reality underlying the Cosmic Trilogy.
The Enemy’s Challenge
Ransom is told by the King that Maleldil’s22 incarnation and the redemption of the human 
race is not “the central happening of all that happens” as he had thought -  it is merely a 
“failure to begin” and the “wiping out of a false start” before the true beginning of cosmic 
history (Per 218). He receives the King’s words as a summary dismissal of all Thulcandrian 
history, not understanding the point of the King’s analogies and his talk about the “morning 
at hand” (218). The King’s statements amount to a repetition of something said earlier -  
although one presumes that it is Lewis as the implied author, not Ransom qua focaliser, who 
says it:
[y]ou might look upon the Perelandrian story as merely an indirect 
consequence of the Incarnation on earth: or you might look on the Earth
21 See p. 16.
22 Maleldil is the archetypal Christic character of the trilogy.
58
story as mere preparation for the new worlds of which Perelandra was the 
first. (145)
As a result of not apprehending this levelling perspective, Ransom’s mind hearkens back to 
Pseudo-Weston’s account of reality, bringing to bear the accusation (as one may see it) that 
“all is without plan or meaning” (218). For some readers, this turnabout might be a 
surprising. Such doubts are unexpected, given that Ransom has just triumphed over the Un­
man and ascended the Holy Mountain in an apparent state of contentment. One would think 
that simply being told Earth’s history was “a false start” is insufficient to upset his belief in 
Maleldil’s providence. One possible reason why “the enemy's talk” (218) has such an effect 
on him is because his general view of the cosmos is lacking, having dealt thus far mostly in 
particulars -  i.e. the histories of Malacandra and Thulcandra, and the recently-made history of 
which he has a part on Perelandra. At this point in the trilogy, perhaps he cannot see beyond 
the stage’s lighting and a few of its more familiar areas; he cannot see any movements of the 
Dance taking place, or does not yet know how to.
Ransom declares that when “we think we see [a plan] it melts away into nothing” 
(218); the fact that “the centre” might become “the rim” (218), that “[Ransom’s] world and 
[his] race” might be thrust into a “remote corner,” undermines his intuitive understanding of 
the concept of importance. Important things, after all, are by definition not peripheral -  to 
suggest otherwise seems absurd. He is close to “doubt[ing] if any shape or plan or pattern 
was ever more than a trick of our own eyes”: implying, in other words, that scepticism is the 
only reasonable response to a universe “with no centre at all” (218). He finally asks: “[t]o 
what is all driving? What is the morning you speak of? What is it the beginning of?” (218). 
And with this, Ransom is told about the beginning (although ‘told’ is a poor word to describe 
what happens to him) “of the Great Game, of the Great Dance” (219). Beginning first with a 
discussion of the main paradoxes23 inherent in the Dance, I then examine two choreographic 
tendencies by which one can characterise its movements -  movements toward diversity, and 
movements toward unity.
The Cosmic Paradoxes
Insofar as there is a ‘central’ paradox, it is that the periphery is at the centre: therefore, the 
apparently accidental is always designed. Ransom’s accusation that “all is without plan or
23 I distinguish between paradoxes, apparent contradictions, and actual contradictions. A paradox is mysterious 
but not logically impossible. An apparent contradiction may be either a paradox or an actual contradiction. An 
actual contradiction is a logical impossibility.
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meaning” is rejected, and the opposite is affirmed: “There seems no plan because it is all 
plan: there seems no centre because it is all centre” (223). This paradox is not necessarily 
absurd, because it is not contradictory. If one investigates the presuppositions that lie behind 
words like ‘periphery’ and ‘centre,’ both require a subjective perspective that prioritises 
certain elements over others. Given that the Great Dance’s choreography originates from 
Maleldil (whom one assumes is omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent), the frame of 
reference for the Great Dance is thus one which is objective, impartial and all-encompassing. 
This is why “each Grain [...] the Dust [...] the Worlds [...] the Beasts [...] the ancient 
peoples [ . ]  the race that sinned [ . ]  Tor and Tinidril”24 and even the “gods” are all equally 
at the centre (222) -  and if one wishes to put it differently, they are equally peripheral. 
Subjective perspectives, and any useful talk of the centre or periphery, break down when seen 
from Maleldil’s perspective, sub specie aeternitatis. And thus an equal unity is achieved from 
an unequal diversity -  or as Lewis puts it, each movement of the Great Dance “is equally at 
the centre and none are there by being equals” (222).
The next major paradox is that creatures of Deep Heaven both need everything and 
nothing at all. It is claimed that there is “need beyond measure of all that He has made,” 
which is then countered by the fact that we have “no need of anything that is made” (223). If 
the above discussion about the nature of Maleldil’s being holds any weight, it can also be 
applied in this case: because He is uncreated, it implies that He, at least, would still be needed 
-  He is neither “everything” nor “anything.” He is the ground of being, an Atlas supporting 
and enabling creation -  the divine Logos which frames all physical and spiritual matter. Why 
then the need for “all that He has made”? Perhaps the key is found in a slight qualification:
‘all that He has made’ does not mean ‘all that has been marred.’ If all that exists is essentially 
good, then being-as-goodness is the very thing to nourish one’s aesthetic, moral and religious 
existence. In Sartrean terms, everything Maleldil has made constitutes the facticity which 
both defines one’s identity and ability to transce nd; it is at once the springboard and ceiling of 
all creative effort.
The final paradox, that we are both “infinitely necessary” for the well-being of others 
and “infinitely superfluous” to their well-being, is clearly related to the previous one: the 
former focuses on the Other’s relation to us, whereas this focuses on our relation to the Other. 
The paradox is couched as a dual imperative:
24 The real names of the King and the Green Lady.
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Love me, my brothers, for I am infinitely necessary to you and for your 
delight I was made [ . ]  Love me, my brothers, for I am infinitely 
superfluous, and your love shall be like His, born neither of your need nor 
of my deserving, but a plain bounty. (223)
Lewis’s use of the qualifier ‘infinitely’ may seem hyperbolic, but it is not. Maleldil’s hnau 
may be finite creatures, but they will endure for eternity in one form or another. Furthermore, 
being a conscious, rational hnau entails the ability -  and necessity -  of encountering the 
Other as a Thou: one can only be a person through encounter with other people, which is to 
say, society. But this does not solve the difficulty of the paradox. ‘Love’ is the key: it is not a 
necessary feature of existence; beings could be indifferent towards each other and the 
universe could plausibly be devoid of any sort of loving relationships -  but for an existence in 
which there is “delight,” it is necessary. Superfluity, which represents anything unnecessary 
or unneeded, literally means ‘flowing above.’ Abundance only has meaning in a universe of 
love. For in a cosmos defined only by pragmatic relations, the superfluous would be ignored 
or discarded, or somehow made useful. But with the loves ‘born neither of need nor 
deserving,’ the superfluous may also be a “delight.”
Unifying and Diversifying Movements
With regard to the Great Dance, Rossi observes how “each individual and each group 
becomes meaningful in terms of its relationships to the complete set of groups and elements” 
(43). These relationships develop through distinctive movements toward, firstly, diversity 
and, secondly, unity; the former are exemplified by the differentiation (i.e. separation) of 
personality, the generation of novelty, ontological hierarchy, and superfluity as mentioned 
above. In contrast to this ‘diversification,’ the movements toward unity -  ‘unification’ -  are 
exemplified by the reduction of complexity to simplicity, the ubiquity of ‘centrality,’ and 
unifying the antipathies of appearance/reality and endings/beginnings.
Differentiation of personality is foreshadowed in a description of the Green Lady’s 
temptation. It is “part of the Divine plan that this happy creature should mature, should 
become more and more a creature of free choice [ . ]  distinct from God and from her husband 
in order thereby to be at one with them in a richer fashion” (Per 134). Indeed, this is the 
essence of the central spiritual conflict of Perelandra: that the Green Lady becomes herself 
freely, becoming less and less a creature who clings to her Creator like a dependent child.
This amounts to becoming a creature able to love in a greater and more significant capacity. 
Such a movement toward distinction is what enables a greater “delight” (that for which all
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creatures were made) insofar as it coincides with novelty.25 But the deepest reason why there 
is a move towards diversity of personality is that it enables being “at one” with others in a 
“richer fashion” (134). It is certainly a movement towards complexity, but the fact of 
complexity (or simplicity, for that matter) holds no necessary moral or aesthetic value.26 
One’s identity is sharpened through relationships with other strong identities: the conflict 
which diversity produces is, in “happy climes” (OSP 29), an extremely fortunate kind of 
conflict -  the kind which provokes prosperity, depth and beauty, much like the hnakra-hunt 
of the hrossa.
The second major example is concerned with how separate entities relate to each 
other in the Great Dance. I have already discussed the natural hierarchy which governs the 
interactions between the Green Lady and her adoring animals-cum-companions: an example 
of “the unions of a kneeling with a sceptred love” (222) and the “perfectly graded hierarchy 
in which small and great [are] equally at home” (Ward 28).27 Such a hierarchy, in which the 
animals are subservient to or dependent on the Green Lady, the Green Lady to the King, and 
so on, is a basic axiom of the Great Dance; for it to be ‘Great,’ or a ‘Dance,’ some elements 
cannot be equal to others. There must be a real diversification of figures and movements -  
apparent diversity, in which each entity or phenomenon turns out to be essentially the same, 
will not do. This, indeed, is the basis of harmony in music: if a choir were to sing the same 
note at the same pitch, their song would be very loud, but would not produce the deep, 
complementary beauty found in the simultaneous sounding of different pitches.
Perhaps the strongest example of “the ceremonious interchange of unequal courtesies” 
(PPL 79) is found between the Green Lady and her King. She by nature defers to him in 
matters of truth, and so in this area (but not necessarily all areas), she is his inferior. For 
many (post)moderns, this would be a jarring state of affairs. The terms ‘inferior’ and 
‘superior’ have suffered sufficient word-death such that they are almost exclusively used in 
negative, dismissive senses; many in our time would understand Lewis’s adherence to 
classical hierarchical conceptions of reality to be regressive. Yet if one properly appreciates 
the translunary, idealistic view of rationality and ontological relations that Lewis presents in 
the trilogy -  which are not premised on power relations -  then it would be a mistake to judge
25And even, perhaps, when it does not -  a copy is still itself, and can delight even if  unoriginal. See overleaf.
26 Ockham and his lex parsimoniae might disagree.
27 See p. 45-46.
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the hierarchism according to the sublunary necessities of the Silent Planet.28 At core, Lewis 
derives his hierarchism (both within the texts, and without) from a certain theistic 
presupposition that necessarily entails hierarchy: there is a Creator on the one hand, and there 
is creation on the other. Yet this does not mean that, within creation, the hierarchy is 
necessarily fixed. Perelandra’s Oyarsa abdicates her superiority to the King and Green Lady, 
who receive it together. Hilder explains that “Lewis’s ideal or transformed vision of hierarchy 
is defined by a fluidity in which every other aspect of creation is at the centre because 
Maleldil, also identified as the Morning Star, is the centre” (80). Lewis gives one final image 
to illustrate this. All figures of the Great Dance become “the master-figure” (Per 224) or a 
means of explaining all the rest -  but this mastery endures only as long as they are in “focus.” 
For once one looks at the “marginal decorations,” soon those peripheral figures claim “the 
same hegemony” (224). In this ‘microdance’ of a shifting perspective and shifting centre, 
each figure finds “in its new subordination a significance greater than that which it had 
abdicated” (224). This is principally Lewis’s defence of the hierarchic element of the Cosmic 
Trilogy.
The next theme with which I deal is the emphasis on variety and novelty. It is a sign 
of immaturity to have a monolithic imagination, one which is mundane (in the literal sense) -  
for the Green Lady says that when she “was young [she] could imagine no beauty but this of 
our own world” (58). Maleldil, however, “can think of all, and all different” (58). She later 
claims that “all is new” (60).29 Juxtaposed against “all different,” one sees that Maleldil qua 
Creator tends towards increasing diversity, difference, newness and novelty. His creation 
evolves and does not remain in stasis. The reader is told that “[t]he new world of Perelandra 
was not a mere repetition of the old world Tellus. Maleldil never repeated Himself’ (145). 
Perhaps the best textual example of this creative movement is encapsulated in the following 
passage:
Never did He make two things the same; never did He utter one word 
twice. After earths, not better earths but beasts; after beasts, not better 
beasts but spirits. After a falling, not recovery but a new creation. Out of 
the new creation, not a third but the mode of change itself is changed for 
ever. (219-220)
28Downing notes, “[t]his is a highly idealized version of hierarchy, one that could succeed only in unfallen 
worlds” (72).
29 See Rev. 21:5 (KJV): “Behold, I make all things new.”
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The final assertion -  that the “mode of change itself’ would be “changed forever” (220) -  is a 
crucial nuance buffering this cosmic dynamism from objections of banality or eventual 
tedium. The Great Dance, of which the events in OSP, Perelandra and THS are just “the 
beginning,” will never consist in the repetition of old themes ad infinitum, or come to 
provoke boredom and nausea. For once a medium, genre, type, kind or genus is exhausted 
and perfected, a new one will arise. Thereafter, even the medium of media, the genre of 
genres, the type of types (etc) will alter and become something new. As spectators and 
participants, one’s apprehension and experience of the Great Dance will never cease to 
prompt wonder -  for all eternity, as the magnitude of infinite creativity and infinite 
expressions of love work themselves out from the very depths of the Creator God. Compare 
this soaring cosmic vision to the Un-man’s vile repetitions; his temptation of the Green Lady; 
his repeated killing (and method of killing) the Perelandrian frogs; finally, his ‘Ransom / 
Nothing’ irritations. While Maleldil tends towards novel perfections, the Un-man -  and his 
diabolic kin -  tend towards imitations, mere repetition, and “Nothing.”
The next major unifying movement is phenomenological in nature. The reader is told 
that appearances are not ‘false’ -  perceptual experience, even if it does not communicate the 
ultimate essence of beings, is nonetheless “true” (206). With respect to the Oyeresu’s 
‘physical’ forms, Ransom is told that “[y]ou see only an appearance [...] You have never seen 
more than an appearance of anything” -  for example, “Arbol” (the solar system), “a stone,” 
or Ransom’s “own body” (206). In other words, appearances are all we have qua finite, 
physical beings. The Oyarsa of Malacandra tells Ransom that “his [the Oyarsa's] appearance 
is as true as what you see of those” (206). If this is the case, the dichotomy between 
appearance and reality collapses -  reality impinges upon appearance and vice-versa. All is 
perceived through the senses and faculties available to one; the eldila perceive according to 
their kind, just as the hnau do. There is something freeing in this fact, for it prompts an 
epistemic humility. One can never take the nature of ‘the inside’ as a known fact; one can 
only develop a reasonable faith as to its contents -  a reasonableness derived from the sum- 
total of appearance available to one, which one must assume reflects, at least partially, 
ultimate reality. This amounts to a restatement of the phenomenological dialectic that 
Ransom employs on Malacandra. If one rejects this intuitive presupposition -  that the outside 
suggests the inside (i.e. laughter suggests joy, or a grimace suffering) -  then scepticism is the 
only other response; conscious rational creatures might just be brains in a vat or plugged into 
the Matrix.
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Related to the appearance-reality dichotomy is the relationship between ‘original’ and 
‘copy.’ Ransom is transfixed by the sight of the King -  or as he calls him, “the Father” (211), 
whom he immediately understands to be a copy or picture of Maleldil. Ransom’s reflections 
lead him to conclude that copies are not worth less (or worthless) because they are unoriginal. 
Rather, “the very beauty of [the object] lay in the certainty that it was a copy, like and not the 
same, an echo, a rhyme, an exquisite reverberation of the uncreated music prolonged in a 
created medium” (211). The original-copy dichotomy, which hinges on the counterfeit or 
non-unique nature of the copy, loses its force. Thus even though the Dance inculcates a 
tendency towards novelty, this cannot be taken too narrowly: for novelty can come from 
copies too, when seen as a “reverberation” (211) of the original’s glory. Being a copy in the 
Great Dance holds no negative connotations. It is interesting to note that Lewis equivocates 
when describing the King as “a copy” (211).30
The final general movement of the Great Dance that I examine is the way in which 
endings and beginnings collapse into one another while not losing their historical meaning or 
importance. One first encounters this idea from the Green Lady. With the hnau of 
Malacandra in mind, she asserts as self-evident the fact that “they are their own part of 
history and not another. We are on this side of the wave and they on the far side” (60).31 The 
ending of a particular historical event does not entail that it is thereafter “rubbish” or to be 
“swept away” like cosmic dirt (60). Rather, all contingent phenomena which appear in the 
Great Dance will conform to Solomon’s principle in Ecclesiastes that there is a time for 
everything: “[a] time to weep, and a time to laugh; a time to mourn, and a time to dance”.32 
Endings are appropriate if there is to be a new beginning: death brings new life. It is revealed 
that even “the fields of Arbol will fade and the days of Deep Heaven itself are numbered” 
(220). The Great Dance, in other words, will eventually transcend its current stage and find 
itself in a new milieu altogether.
Looking at the hrossa of Malacandra, there is a similarity between their concept of 
death and the view of human mortality stated in Tolkien’s The Silmarillion and The Lord of 
the Rings. Before the shadow of evil warps humanity’s view of mortality into being the
30In Chapter Eleven he collapses the distinction altogether. In the context of the Thulcandrian temptation and the 
corresponding Perelandrian equivalent, the reader is told that “nothing was a copy or model of anything else” 
(145), an idea which follows if  indeed “all is new” (60).
31One should note that elsewhere in this passage, the Green Lady uses a definite article when referring to 
history: “the history” (60, my italics). By doing so, she implies the objectivity of history; there cannot be many 
‘histories’: there can be only one -  Maleldil’s. The corollary is that there are right and wrong ways of 
apprehending this history’s meaning, origins and ends.
32 Eccl. 3:4 (KJV).
65
“Doom of Men,” it was meant to be the “gift” of their creator (The Silmarillion 265) -  a 
means by which the characteristic Sehnsucht of the human spirit might be quenched. Unlike 
the Elven race who are immortal and bound to the world while it still exists, the race of men 
(and those who choose human fate, like Arwen Half-elven) “are not bound for ever to the 
circles of the world, and beyond them is more than memory” (The Lord o f the Rings 1100). 
Death is the threshold of something utterly new and transcendent. In Lewis’s Deep Heaven, 
Hyoi affirms this, and I suspect even the Green Lady apprehends something of this truth. For 
when she asks the Un-man if he has come “to teach us deaths ”  (Per 65), she recognises 
death’s ambiguity. One form of death entails a deep ontological loss and movement towards 
“Nothing,” whereas the other indicates a transition from one mode of life to another. Lewis 
also illustrates this sanctified version of death in The Last Battle (which Ward aligns with the 
sphere of Saturn33) where the reader is told that the Pevensie children’s adventures in Narnia, 
now concluded through the world’s destruction, had only been “the cover and the title page” 
(LB 165) of the story that was to come. Ward calls this idea “a paradox which nicely 
expresses the good fortune that InfortunaMajor [Saturn] may bring to those who respond 
positively to his influence, finding their beginning in their end” (207).
Lewis leaves perhaps the most beautiful movement of the Great Dance for the end: a 
fitting conclusion to a beautiful cosmic vision. As the movements of the Dance multiply and 
magnify in Ransom’s overwhelmed consciousness, it is written that
at the very zenith of complexity, complexity was eaten up and faded, as a 
thin white cloud fades into the hard blue burning of the sky, and a 
simplicity beyond all comprehension, ancient and young as spring, 
illimitable, pellucid, drew him with cords of infinite desire into its own 
stillness. (Per 224)
In true form, Lewis offers a final paradox to undermine the paradoxical nature of everything 
else he has sketched up until this point. Each new movement, each new paradox of the Dance 
complicates it further -  yet in the end, it is reduced it to “a simplicity beyond all 
comprehension” (224). Many inexperienced dancers might think the movements of a dance 
initially complex. Yet once they have been mastered, apprehended, digested, there is nothing 
simpler than spinning away in joyful, harmonious freedom.
33 See Planet Narnia 97.
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Chapter 4
Conflict, Love and Harmony in That Hideous Strength
One wonders if Lewis did not think twice about writing a third science fiction novel, 
especially after the crescendo of the Great Dance; the passage is the kind of soaring diversion 
which writers can only get away with at the very end of a story: the reader is already 
committed, and will endure a good deal of pseudo-philosophical meandering to reach the 
final page. At least, an unsympathetic reader might think so. After such a trip into the 
beautiful, paradoxical ether of cosmic history and eschatology, a return to more conventional, 
chronological quest-based storylines -  like OSP and most of Perelandra -  is arguably out of 
place. If there had been three journeys to three different planets of Deep Heaven, then such a 
passage, situated right at the end of book three, would be an ideal concluding vision: the 
meaning of each novel’s storyline, each as a movement -  peripheral and yet central -  to the 
overarching cosmic dance of history. But this vision comes at the end of the book two, not 
book three. How does one then understand THS in relation to OSP and Perelandra? 
Regardless of whether Lewis felt the same about the conclusive atmosphere of the Great 
Dance or not, he did write a vastly different kind of novel in THS. For one thing, he returns to 
Earth, or “Thulcandra.” This is perhaps an unexpected move for the reader, if s/he judges by 
the previous two novels. Perhaps one reason is because, as Lewis explains in DI (139), Dante 
gives ‘Fortune’ to Earth as its presiding intelligence and writes in Inferno that “[Fortune] 
turns her sphere and rejoices in her bliss”; she “equitably distributes light” (qtd. in DI 139) 
and does not illuminate any one place to the exclusio n of others. The nature of Fortune’s 
wheel is to turn. With this in mind, THS is a story of Fortune’s wheel restoring light to those 
areas where darkness has become too prevalent -  in this case, Britain/Logres. There is 
another reason, however, why Earth is the best location to write a story about Deep Heaven 
as a whole. This is because “[t]here is no Oyarsa in Heaven who has not got his 
representative on Earth” (THS 351). Thus, by returning to the “Silent Planet,” Lewis is able to 
restate (in earthly terms), the two planetary principles introduced in the first two novels -  
whether understood as the Martial and the Venereal, Conflict and Love, or the Masculine and 
the Feminine.
The novel is focalised through the perspective of Mark and Jane Studdock, a married 
couple whose relationship “turns out to be the mundane expression of mighty cosmic forces” 
(Ward 49). Mark, a name derived from Mars, is immediately aligned with conflict and with
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the masculine gender. Jane, whose name is a female derivation of ‘John,’ does not possess 
any explicit, denominative link to Venus. Perhaps Lewis remembered that Jesus’s disciple, 
John, is described in the New Testament as being the disciple “whom Jesus loved.”1 
Etymologically, the name has the meaning of “God is gracious” or “Graced by Jehovah,”2 
which would fit thematically given the grace Jane receives during the course of the narrative. 
Jane’s name, however, is of peripheral importance, for as a character, it is clear that she is 
aligned with Venus and the feminine gender3 45throughout the novel.
My reading of the text centres on this couple, their respective journeys either ‘out of 
or ‘into’ new spiritual and material circumstances, and perhaps most important ly, the 
symbolical “[m]atrimony” (THS 1) which frames the beginning and end of the novel.
Gibson’s claim, that “we can hardly say that [Mark and Jane’s marriage] is a motivating force 
in the unfolding of most of the conflicts of the narrative” (70-1), is incorrect. I agree rather 
with Hilder, who states “the novel may be read on one level as the story of a troubled 
marriage [...]” (84). Mark and Jane’s conflicts are the result of a spiritual divorce that has 
taken place in their own souls, and this manifests itself in their troubled marriage. The 
motivating force of the narrative is how their inner conflicts are overcome and how this 
enables their own marital reconciliation.
Lewis gives the Great Dance material and spiritual expression in the microcosm of the 
Studdocks’ lives -  their ‘false starts’ are transformed so that the beginning of their own 
participation in the macrocosmic Great Dance may begin. Mark and Jane approximate 
Ransom’s own cosmic pilgrimages and thereby learn (or begin to learn) the competencies 
needed to be creatures, both individually and communally, who are oriented towards love and 
the Divine Logos. For the reader, they briefly become the centre of the Great Dance. They are 
like two streams of movement, initially at odds, moving towards a consonance and a 
cleaving. The suggested harmonious outcome is a child, heir to Ransom as Pendragon of 
Logres, “by whom the enemies [would be] put out of Logres for a thousand years” (THS 306­
7). Lewis thereby suggests his proposed synthesis: Harmony, known in Greek myth as 
Harmonia -  who is the love-child of Mars and Venus.4 5
1 John 20:2 (KJV).
2 According to the Online Etymology Dictionary (“John”).
3 I do not mean this in the linguistic sense, as will become clear in later discussion. See p. 71 in particular.
4 I credit Michael Ward for making the link between Mars, Venus and Harmonia. See p. 94.
5 As I explore these themes, I use the original, unabridged version of THS as my source. It has greater 
philosophical depth and is the version Lewis preferred: “I myself prefer the more leisurely pace [of the 
unabridged version]” -  Lewis in the Preface to That Hideous Strength (abridged version).
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The Plot of That Hideous Strength
As noted above, That Hideous Strength is the story of an unhappily married couple, Jane and 
Mark Studdock. Mark is a fellow and aspiring member of the ‘Progressive Element’ at 
Bracton, a college attached to the fictional University of Edgestow. An organisation by the 
name of the “National Institute for Co-ordinated Experiments”, or N.I.C.E., manoeuvre their 
way onto Bracton’s land. Their land adjoins Bragdon Wood, where a sleeping Merlin is said 
to have been entombed. Mark is employed by the N.I.C.E., and soon moves to their newly- 
built headquarters (at a place called Belbury). This is due to the influence of Dick Devine, a 
financial backer of the N.I.C.E.; since the events of OSP, he has obtained a peerage and is 
now called Lord Feverstone. At the N.I.C.E., Mark quickly moves up the ranks into the 
organisation’s ‘inner circle,’ losing his moral bearings in the process. While Mark focuses on 
his position at the N.I.C.E., Jane is notionally working on a doctorate on Donne’s 
“triumphant vindication of the body” (2) -  and begins to have nightmares about beheadings 
and a man with pince-nez spectacles. Because of her mental and spiritual disquiet, Jane 
decides to visit a doctor. She goes to Grace Ironwood, who is the physician at St. Anne’s-on- 
the-Hill -  the community which acts as a foil to the N.I.C.E.. After initially doubting the 
community at St. Anne’s, Jane finds a secure-yet-challenging refuge there. She meets the 
community’s Director, Mr Fisher-King (as Elwin Ransom is now known), and is prompted to 
work through her desire for spiritual and marital independence. Jane eventually acquiesces to 
Ransom and the other members’ spiritual direction, embracing their faith and the spiritual 
heroism of obedience. In the meantime, Mark comes to realise that the N.I.C.E. is far worse 
than its acronym suggests; after meeting the disembodied Head of the organization and being 
forced to repudiate the aesthetic and moral sensibility that remains to him, he rebels and is 
imprisoned. In the culminating sequence of the plot, both the N.I.C.E. and St. Anne’s 
compete to find Merlin (who was said to be buried beneath Bragdon Wood). St. Anne’s, 
instead of finding him, are found by him, and for a brief time he becomes part of their 
community. He then catalyses a nightmarish apocalypse within the N.I.C.E. headquarters, 
acting as the medium through which the Jovial, Mercurial, Venereal, Martial and Saturnine 
powers of Deep Heaven destroy the N.I.C.E.’s evil animus. Mark escapes the carnage at 
Belbury and travels towards St. Anne’s; the novel concludes as Mark and Jane are about to 
reunite in nuptial embrace.
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Conflict in THS
Jane’s Psychomachia
The conflict in Jane’s soul derives from her conviction that “[she] must keep up [her] own 
life” and avoid “being invaded and entangled” -  she holds “[s]ome resentment against love 
itself, and therefore against Mark, for thus invading her life” (71). Rossi notes that there is a 
“vital ethical problem or tension” which affects Jane: her “self-assertion leads to anarchy and 
solipsism” (37). She has also been described as “a strongly ‘masculine’ classical hero: proud, 
independent, hostile to humility” (Hilder 106). Because she is afraid of being absorbed “into 
the domestic role of faculty wife” and thus “struggles to preserve a shred of personal 
autonomy” (Schwartz 100), she tends towards solipsism and anarchy -  in the sense that she 
opposes authority and hierarchy, especially in marriage. She sees herself as a vessel, which, if 
breached too extensively, would sink into the ocean of the Other; her individuality, 
autonomy, her very life, would be lost if she were to suffer the waters’ entrance. Hence, she 
has an ever-ready supply of bitumen and tar to patch up the holes and prevent further damage 
to her hull’s integrity.
Connected to this is her fear of “being treated as a thing, an object of barter and desire 
and possession” (352). She wants to be viewed as a subject, one axiologically equal with 
other subjects. In pursuing this goal, she denies her objectivity and the danger-ridden, yet 
integral, sphere of interpersonal reciprocity -  which relies upon the giving of oneself, 
objectively, in one form or another. Jane must grasp the paradox that openness to the Other -  
a quality natural to the Green Lady, and one which Ransom is able to develop -  will enable 
her to receive the materials for building a different, spiritual sort of vessel, an unbreakable 
identity consisting in a deeper agency and distinction of personality than the one to which she 
clings so desperately: an identity impervious to irruptive reefs, rocks or ice.
There is furthermore Jane’s conflicted understanding of femininity and being a 
woman. Jane does not encounter the sanctified version of Venus; rather, the “history of [her ] 
life” is characterised by her rejection of such a Venus; she thus encounters the Pagan version 
who is “raw,” “untransformed,” and “demoniac” instead of ripe, transformed, and angelic 
(THS 348). Ransom tells Jane that her specific vice is “Daungief ’ (350), the kind of pride 
which makes her aloof and disdainful of the Masculine. In PPL, Lewis describes that there is 
something about Eve “which compels deference, the possibility of Daungier. The angel hails 
her more ceremoniously than Adam” (121). The unfallen Eve, however, does not demand
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deference: this is the difference between them. Stemming from both her worldview and her 
distasteful experiences with Mark, Jane experiences the Masculine as an imposition -  and any 
submission to its “irruptive, possessive” (THS 350) nature is always a deigning to something 
lesser -  merely tolerated, never appreciated for its quiddity. The “old Woman” (the earthly 
wraith of Venus) who would embrace without shame or hesitance such a masculinity 
exemplifies, to Jane, a vulgarisation of femininity, a “[p]agan” expression of “Freudian 
repressions” and abandonment of all appropriate inhibitions (349). We are told that even “in 
the very teeth of instinct” Jane recoils from the “invasion of her own being in marriage”
(349). Jane is not merely afraid of external invasions -  but there are parts of her own nature 
which she also repudiates. She presumably deems her “instinct” to be animal and uncivilised, 
something which in the throes of passion would eclipse and mock her desire for autonomy.
Lewis and Gender
Before going any further, I must deal with the issue of Lewis and gender. Like the ancients 
and medievals before him, he embraced the idea of gender essentialism. In The Gender 
Dance, a critical text which specifically deals with gender in the Cosmic Trilogy, Hilder 
makes the claim that Lewis’s “belief in universal ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’ principles” 
becomes “an easy target for the critics who resist essentialism of any kind, as well as for the 
critics who read him as an ‘either/or’ thinker” (159). She goes on to say that the tendencies to 
read the trilogy’s gender imagery and metaphor literally cause one “to miss the point” of 
what Lewis is seeking to do (147). This is because Lewis does not equivocate sex and 
gender: gender is a relational reality, an element of “spiritual adventure,” if you will; sex is a 
biological or physiological reality. Because of this, he makes a “fluid application of gender 
metaphor” (147) in which a man may become feminine, and a woman masculine. Thus 
Dimble and MacPhee, although they are men, are spiritually feminine in relation to Ransom. 
Ransom himself could be called feminine in relation to the Oyeresu; and all creatures, 
including Ransom and the eldila, are categorically feminine in relation to their creator, 
Maleldil. This is exemplified, for instance, when Ransom exp lains that “[w]hat is above and 
beyond all things is so masculine that we are all feminine in relation to it” (THS 350) -  
creatures, whether male and female, or neither, are feminine in relation to the Divine.
Relating this directly back to Jane, Hilder states that
Jane’s fear of invasion applies to her resistance to involvement with the 
community of St. Anne’s, and, ultimately, to God. This “feminine” fear of 
invasion, one that Mark and Merlin share, is a metaphor for humanity’s
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classical heroic resistance to enacting a “feminine” relation to the 
“masculine” divine. (109)
It should be apparent that, although he essentialises gender, Lewis undermines any view of 
masculinity and femininity which reduces their dynamic to one of domination and power 
differentials. He does this by emphasizing their reciprocity, as in a dance:
The partner who bows to Man in one movement of the dance receives 
Man's reverences in another. To be high or central means to abdicate 
continually: to be low means to be raised: all good masters are servants:
God washes the feet of men. The concepts we usually bring to the 
consideration of such matters are miserably political and prosaic. We 
think of flat repetitive equality and arbitrary privilege as the only two 
alternatives: thus missing all the overtones, the counterpoint, the vibrant 
sensitiveness, the inter-inanimations of reality. (Miracles 201)
With this in mind -  if one is to grant Lewis’s idealistic, agape--tinged vision of hierarchy -  his 
characterisation of Jane no longer needs to be seen in purely misogynistic or sexist terms, as 
some critics suggest.6 Downing, for instance, states that “[i]f Jane is intended by Lewis as the 
model for all women, then Lewis's views are certainly sexist” (149). In a discussion about 
Lewis’s descriptions of the masculine and feminine roles of Malacandra and Perelandra 
respectively, Lee Rossi asserts
it would not be overharsh to label this position sexist. These stereotypes, 
which label men aggressive and domineering and women passive and 
receptive, are obviously only rationalisations of a social system which 
privileges men and oppresses women. (44)
Rossi’s errors are, firstly, to judge Lewis’s representation of gender without taking into 
account the hierarchical metaphysic and ontology of the trilogy -  very different from 
contemporary, deconstructionist anti-metaphysics. Secondly, to suggest that Lewis employs 
gender stereotypes in which men are “aggressive and domineering and women passive and 
receptive” is to grossly misrepresent the nuances of Lewis’s treatment of gender. If anything, 
the best example of a “passive and receptive” character is Ransom as encountered in THS. He 
now presents the confusing mixture of being kingly and bearded, while at the same time 
exhibiting humble obedience and measured passivity in the face of his enemies at Belbury. 
Certainly, Mark displays elements of domination in relation to his wife, as the reader 
discovers early on in THS. Yet the authorial voice neither approves nor condones this
6 Ward observes that “[t]he extraordinary thing about Lewis, in Rowan Williams’s opinion, is the degree to 
which he successfully manages ‘to relativize his own prejudices’” (209).
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behaviour. Once Mark has discovered the truth of the N.I.C.E.’s diabolism and his own moral 
bankruptcy, he does not become more chauvinistic or assertive of his privileged masculinity. 
On the contrary, he repents of his aggressiveness and disregard for Jane’s subjectivity, and 
decides not to dominate, but to love her instead.
Marriage, Obedience and Inequality
With the above in mind, the conflict in Jane with regard to her marriage to Mark becomes 
less clouded. Jane tells Ransom that her marriage “was just a mistake” (THS 156) -  at least, 
according to her view at the time. On the one hand, Jane thinks that a loving marriage means 
“equality [...] and free companionship” (156). One presumes that she deems herself and 
Mark to have failed to achieve both qualities. On the other hand, however, is Ransom’s view, 
which is presumably also Lewis’s. He defines marriage negatively: claiming that, for 
marriage, “[e]quality is not the deepest thing” (156), and that free companionship does not 
properly describe the nature of a marriage relationship (157). In other words, thinking that 
marriage is constituted by equality and free companionship is a recipe for disaster. Ransom 
defines “free companionship” as a relationship that is underpinned by philia love:7 it amounts 
to a friendship in which companions “enjoy something together” or “suffer something 
together” (157). In other words, such a relationship is characterised by its int entionality -  but 
the object is never the other person. “Friendship would be ashamed” (157) if it were. Of 
course, friendship might exist within a marriage, but according to this view, it can never be 
the basis of a marriage relationship.
Jane and Ransom’s discussion moves on to the role of obedience in a marriage and its 
relationship to love. Contrary to the idea of Jane and Mark’s marriage being an egalitarian 
friendship, Ransom declares that she has missed the essence of erotic love altogether, having 
replaced it in her thoughts and actions with something minimally invasive. Ransom speaks 
under the authority of his “Masters” (155) and explains to Jane that she has “lost love because 
[she] never attempted obedience” (156). Ransom later adds that “obedience -  humility -  is an 
erotic necessity. You are putting equality just where it ought not to be” (157). He is not 
merely speaking in terms of sexual intercourse, where human physiology requires 
complementarity rather than equality between a man and woman. Rather, the fabric of a 
marriage, both a spiritual and physical reality, consists of a constant “kneeling with a sceptred 
love” (Per 222) -  and learning to kneel is the “erotic necessity” she must learn to implement.
7 See his section on philia love in The Four Loves.
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This kneeling, however does not define her role as wife. In light of Lewis’s fluid application 
of gender, it should not surprise the reader when Ransom says that, “between man and 
woman [ . ]  the roles are always changing” (THS 158). As becomes apparent, Mark also must 
learn “the necessary humility required of lovers” (425).
“Putting equality just where it ought not to be” is Lewis’s particular bugbear. Seldom 
is the word inequality understood on Earth without negative connotations; Lewis therefore 
has a difficult task to sidestep the word’s unpleasantness. This is largely because 
contemporary views of justice and fairness are predicated on ideas (much like Jane’s) of the 
autonomy of the self and a social contract that levels the playing field.8 The hypothetical- 
pragmatic nature of the social contract stands over against the metaphysical-intrinsic nature 
of the Cosmic Trilogy’s worldview, and it is difficult to reconcile the two. Lewis says 
elsewhere that the “justice or injustice of any given instance of rule depends wholly on the 
nature of the parties, not in the least on any social contract” (PPL 74). Ransom’s demurral 
should thus not be a surprise. The reader has already encountered Lewis’s hierarchism in 
Perelandra; a (qualified) structural inequality is revealed as essential to the Great Dance. In 
PPL Lewis explains how “[e]very being is a conductor of superior love or agape to the being 
below it, and of inferior love or eros to the being above” (75).
Ransom tries to persuade Jane of this through analogy. He invokes obvious, 
undeniable relational inequalities, e.g. “[c]ourtship knows nothing of [equality]; nor does 
fruition” (THS 157). Lewis, however, does admit that equality is often necessary in the 
sublunary realm. For understood correctly, equality is meant to “guard life” and does not 
“make it”; it is “medicine, not food” (157). Equality is necessary when something goes awry 
with the natural hierarchy -  for example, a husband might require the medicine of equality to 
learn that the higher should serve the lower -  and not the other way around. Experiences of 
equality should prompt reform and repentance in lapsed souls who have abused their 
authority, so that they can self-sacrificially use it to serve others once again.
8 Here I draw on “the veil of ignorance”, an idea of John Rawls which states that, behind the veil, no-one knows 
any contingent facts about who they will be -  i.e. their race, sexuality, class and so on. Thus social laws are 
agreed upon which presuppose a radical ontological equality of all who enter into society. These laws (and thus 
norms), in a qualified sense, avoid unequal configurations of any sort. Rawls maintains “that the persons in the 
initial situation would choose two rather different principles: the first requires equality in the assignment of 
basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of 
wealth and authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the 
least advantaged members of society” (Rawls 13).
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Finally, the reader is told that, contra Jane’s understanding, “the last place where 
[people] are equal” is “in their souls” (157). If Ransom is right in implying that souls can be 
unequal, the corollary follows that some souls are greater than others. In their greatness, 
certain souls should command a greater measure of respect and authority. Ransom’s soul, for 
instance, has become something majestic and superior, and all who encounter him, including 
animals, recognize this.9 In the process of his spiritual maturation, he has become a kingly 
representative of Jupiter and the other planetary influences. Similarly, Jane becomes 
spiritually superior to her husband, as I shall argue -  and thus a measure of authority is 
granted to her over her husband. With this comes responsibility: like the Green Lady, she is 
now expected to guide Mark to “perfection” and “[strengthen the feebler” (Per 211).
Mark’s Psychomachia
The war in Mark’s soul takes place in the context of his descent into, and ascent out of, ‘the 
Inner Ring’ of the N.I.C.E. at Belbury. He is “anxious to be admired” (THS 90) and assumes 
that the N.I.C.E. would be the ideal milieu in which to obtain such admiration, and to an 
extent, he receives there what he seeks. Mark’s descent into the N.I.C.E., and his admission 
to what Lewis elsewhere called the “Inner Ring”10 of the Institute’s hierarchical structure, is 
enabled by the lens through which he views other people. His brand of sociology (his 
vocation) tends to objectify and reduce people’s polychromatic humanness into something 
grimly abstract; the reader is told that “he had a great reluctance, in his work, ever to use such 
words as ‘man’ or ‘woman’” preferring the abstracted forms of “‘vocational groups’, 
‘elements’, ‘classes’ and ‘populations’” in their stead (87). By virtue of these abstractions and 
desire for admiration, he is willing to move “from the merely vulgar to the unethical and then 
to the criminal” (Downing 57) in his service of the Institute. Although he clearly knows that 
his fraudulent newspaper reports are “criminal,” his moral compass is scrambled by “the 
intimate laughter between fellow professionals” which allows him to “do very bad things” 
(THS 136).
Unlike Jane, Mark is not primarily concerned with subjectivity, whether others’, or 
his own -  he is thus very good at treating himself and others (like Jane) badly. Exemplifying 
a stereotypical masculine stereotype, he is initially concerned with the realm of objectivity.
9 If Jane’s initial response to his presence is anything to go by.
10 This essay is found in Screwtape Proposes a Toast and in other select anthologies of Lewis’s essays. It 
describes in more straightforward terms the process and phenomenon exemplified by Mark’s involvement in the 
N.I.C.E..
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Lewis thus sets Mark on a journey in which he must grapple with views of objectivity in a 
variety of forms: the nature of Man, Reality, and perhaps most importantly for Mark, his 
wife. His travail through the realm of objectivity is the only way in which he is able to 
reclaim his own wraith-like subjectivity which he has plastered over with an “illusion of 
independence” (Schwartz 100).
Lewis as omniscient narrator calls Mark “a man of straw, a glib examinee in subjects 
that require no exact knowledge” (THS 199). Despite this, he does display an openness, albeit 
slight, to the subjective world he associates with his wife. The reader is told that Mark feels 
“rather sorry for old Jewel” and that the “unnecessary brutality of Feverstone’s behaviour to 
the old man had disgusted him” (27). Furthermore, at the Two Bells pub in Cure Hardy, Mark 
displays a modicum of aesthetic sensibility -  one is told that “Jane and his love for Jane had 
already awakened [in] him a little [sensitivity to beauty]” (86). Thus when Cosser, his 
colleague, reduces beer to “a stimulant,” something which needs administering “in a more 
hygienic way,” Mark responds that he does not “know that the stimulant is quite the whole 
point” (88). Similarly, Mark is able to perceive how “Jane in the middle of Belbury” would 
expose all that which is “metallic” and “unreal”, turning “the whole of Belbury into a vast 
vulgarity, flashy and yet furtive” (182). Mark may have these thoughts, but he becomes 
deeply committed to the “vast vulgarity.” He cannot extricate himself physically from the 
N.I.C.E. -  that is left to authorial providence -  but in his “training in objectivity” (328), 
which I examine next, he is still free to choose a way out.
Once Mark apprehends the full import of the N.I.C.E.’s view of objectivity, which the 
authorial voice ironically reduces to a “despair of objective truth” (219), his descent halts, 
and there is a fierce conflict in his soul. Frost, Wither, Filostrato and the others think that 
being objective is to see the world without imputation of value: that there be an “indifference 
to it” (219). All objects must be devoid of attachment, thus the need for Mark’s “systematic 
training in objectivity” (328) which requires him to not merely ignore, but categorically 
repudiate ideas of moral decorum and aesthetic value which he has hitherto accepted. His 
training occurs in a room which is “ill-proportioned, not grotesquely so, but sufficiently to 
produce dislike” (328). He is made to perform meaningless repetitions of meaningless actions 
and execute obscene acts of desecration against the holy, with an aim to stifle “all deep-set 
repugnances” residing in Mark’s consciousness. This would free him to act without 
hesitation, freeing him for “concentration upon mere power” (219). Gibson observes that this 
training also entails “a denial of the significance of human relationships” (92), something that
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Mark cannot quite bring himself to accept -  unlike Lord Feverstone and others of the Inner 
Circle, he is not wholly motivated by a will to power (although it has brought him far). 
Mark’s descent is not irrevocable, and indeed, he is called to ascend out of the self-chosen 
Hell he has made his spiritual home.
The N.I.C.E.’s Philosophy of Life
The N.I.C.E. embodies the final ‘diabolical’ philosophy of life found in the trilogy. In many 
ways it is the intellectual offspring of those philosophies which Weston introduces in OSP 
and Perelandra -  it combines aspects of a J.B.S. Haldane-inspired scientism, a Henri 
Bergson-inspired emergent evolution, and the grotesque nihilism of Pseudo-Weston. The 
acronym ‘N.I.C.E.’ is deliberately evocative of ‘nice’: a word subject to considerable 
etymological upheaval. Originally derived from Latin nescire, ‘to not know / be ignorant’, 
later used to mean ‘subtle’ in the context of a distinction, it now acts as a marginally-positive 
adjectival place-holder. The word easily becomes ironic (‘Well wasn’t that nice?’), meaning 
its opposite. The expanded name, “National Institute for Co-ordinated Experiments” is 
equally vacuous; a title that arguably says “Nothing.” Given Lewis’s opinion and 
characterisation of the N.I.C.E., its name is appropriate: a summation of the “diabolical” 
philosophy that Lewis sees as the enemy of true human progress.
The N.I.C.E. are represented by a Zeus-like “muscular male nude grasping a 
thunderbolt” (THS 233). The heroic, mythological symbolism invoked by such an emblem 
provides insight into the institute’s worldview and aims. Firstly, there are almost no women 
involved whatsoever, and the one woman who is close to the Inner Circle, Miss Hardcastle, is 
possibly the most stereotypically ‘masculine’ character in the entire novel. Hilder helpfully 
clarifies that “[h]er surname suggests the way in which Lewis points to gender metaphor: she 
is a ‘hard castle,’ an ego fortified against the divine, impenetrable, a ‘masculinity’ that will 
not submit to the divine” (100). It is thus an unholy masculinity, characterised by a desire to 
dominate, which motivates the entire N.I.C.E. operation -  to make everything feminine in 
relation to it. Active words like “take,” “make,” and “control” (THS 34) are often used by 
those on the inside. The fact of muscularity underpins the organisational strength, and in 
conjunction with the thunderbolt, suggests the willingness of the N.I.C.E. to use it.
On the surface, the N.I.C.E.’s manifesto appears benevolent. It promises to alleviate, 
indeed eradicate, all social problems while promising a nice-sounding future goal:
77
We expect a solution of the unemployment problem, the cancer problem, 
the housing problem, the problems of currency, of war, of education. We 
expect from it a brighter, cleaner and fuller life for our children, in which 
we and they can march ever onward and onward and develop to the full 
urge of life which God has given each one of us [...]. (140)
The “solution” referred to is more a deletion or annihilation than anything else. In the same 
way -  every word used in the above manifesto is an example of Orwellian double-speak. 
When talking of a “cleaner” life for children, they mean a sterile life: ‘clean’ to the point of 
denying the organic world altogether, replete with its bacteria, microbes, blood and sweat. 
Lord Feverstone dispenses with the benevolent fa9ade. He tells Mark that it will all amount to 
the “sterilization of the unfit, liquidation of backward races (we don’t want any dead 
weights), selective breeding [...] biochemical conditioning” (36).
The N.I.C.E. is an institution, like the “Progressive Element” at Bracton College, 
which is “prepared to scrap” (8) any and all traditions -  aesthetic, ethical, religious or 
otherwise -  in service of its goals. Progress is understood to be the end in itself; anything 
which stands in its way must be cleared away -  for example, “sentiment” or “beauty” (13). In 
service of this end, the organisation relies on “[elasticity” (125), an attitude amounting to 
compliant obedience to the whims of those in power. Mark’s initial struggle is to decipher his 
place in the N.I.C.E.’s operations; he does not know “what [he is] supposed to be doing” 
(125). This only clarifies once he has embraced elasticity and fitted in the governing principle 
of the organization.
The N.I.C.E.’s aims are remarkably similar to Weston’s philosophy of “Spirit,” with 
one qualification. It too is committed to developing Spirit. However, at the N.I.C.E., Spirit is 
more narrowly defined; it is strictly moving towards the purity of eldilic, spiritual being. The 
dualistic material-spiritual combination, which characterises human being, is soon to be 
transcended in favour of the dialectical progression towards Spirit alone -  towards pure mind 
and reason, a spiritualised version of Nietzsche’s Ubermensch. As Ransom tells the company 
at St. Anne’s, “[t]he Belbury people seek ‘a way of making themselves immortal” by creating 
“a new species -  the Chosen Heads who never die” (THS 212). This represents “the next step 
in evolution” (212). Although the N.I.C.E. might wax eloquent about Progress, Evolution and 
a new kind of Man, as Mark realises when he finally meets Alcasan’s disembodied Head, the 
unofficial scientific program is itself a front for something much deeper: the attainment and 
increase of power. The reader is told that “the N.I.C.E. [...] was not concerned solely with 
modern or materialistic forms of power” but also “eldilic energy and knowledge” and “dark
78
powers” (217). Lewis elsewhere explains that he understands “devil worship” to be “the 
adoration of the powerful -  predicated upon a philosophy in which might makes right” (“A 
Reply” 107). Power is thus the God and goal of Miss Hardcastle, Frost, Wither, Filostrato and 
Feverstone (and all the others). Prioritising one’s will to power leads directly to the 
domination of others, pitilessness, cruelty and hatred of the Other -  all things which are seen 
within the N.I.C.E.’s inner circle. Furthermore, the institute “is a totalitarian organization that 
demands full conformity” (Hilder 128) for those within -  and this obedience to conformity, 
as Gibson observes, “moves one closer to a vortex, a whirlpool which assimilates and 
destroys individual characteristics” (96). The N.I.C.E.’s desire for power has the effect of 
dissolving the Other into itself -  it makes absolute the Other’s objectivity (whether through 
Mark’s sociological manipulations or through Miss Hardcastle’s physical torture) and thereby 
forces it into submission to the collective will to power. Lewis notes that another tendency of 
“devil worship” is “the growing exaltation of the collective and the growing indifference to 
persons” (“A Reply” 108), a fact that almost costs Mark his life.
The N.I.C.E. and the New Man
The N.I.C.E.’s agenda is to remake Man into something wholly objective, immortal, and 
preternatural in its power over nature. The fact that this entails the gradual destruction of Man 
as he is currently known is an unfortunate, but necessary, step towards the future of “Man as 
God” (THS 219). The New Man will be a mixture of technology and spirit -  like “the Head” 
who is animated by eldilic forces and kept biologically alive through technological means. 
Stated in different terms, the institute’s agenda amounts to “the worship of Man by Man” 
(PPL 133) and “the rebellion of ‘civilization’ against civility” (135). One prerequisite of the 
N.I.C.E.’s project is the viewing of Man as an abstraction, an idea, or a goal. Mark represents 
the institute as a whole when the reader is told that, as far as he perceived reality,
“[statistics” are “the substance” while “any real [...] farmer’s boy [is] the shadow” (THS 
87). This conveniently denies individual men or women any substantial importance.
In Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, his prophet declares that “[t]he earth has 
become small, and on it hops the last man, who makes everything small” (46). At one point, 
Mark invokes the spectre of these “last men” when he uses a similar concept of “the small 
man” (THS 69). He tells Hingest that he thinks he does “understand the sentiment that still 
attaches to the small man” (69). But as he understands “reality,” he believes that he cannot 
condone such sentiments, for Progress cannot be bound by sentimentality. Although
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Nietzsche might take issue with the N.I.C.E.’s idiosyncratic view of the New Man or 
Ubermensch,11 he would probably agree with their loyalty to immoralism (in the sense of 
amoralism). Contra both Mark and Nietzsche, Hingest replies that “[one] can’t study men; 
[one] can only get to know them, which is quite a different thing” (69). Here Hingest is 
exemplifying a favourite Lewisian distinction between connaitre and savoir knowledge.12 
The anthropology of the company at St. Anne’s takes this into account. Ivy Maggs, for 
instance, is given back her humanity and not reduced to someone of the lower class -  
precisely what Jane does to Ivy in the early stages of the novel.
In Mark’s sociological abstraction of Man, he has nevertheless paid it a compliment 
of sorts, by accepting that it is there is a homogeneity amongst men, an essential nature which 
unites them. Filostrato flatly denies this, however. In his view, “[t]here is no such thing as 
Man -  it is a word. There are only men.” (191). Primafacie he would seem to agree with 
Hingest, who tells Mark that “[one] can’t study men; [one] can only get to know them” (69). 
But the meaning of Filostrato’s claim is poles apart from Hengist’s. Certainly there are only 
“men” -  but this does not mean Man does not exist. Filostrato does not merely reject the 
abstract concept of Man, but rips from humanity the very quiddity that makes talking about 
human society useful to begin with -  he reduces men to individual animals with a will to 
power. Ideas of Man and the idealism which goes along with it are sacrificed to the brute, 
factual simplicity of might makes right. Filostrato is at least straightforward about this fact, 
and does not attempt to couch it in metaphorical terms like Straik.
Turning now to the proffered conception of the N.I.C.E.’s ‘New Man,’ a central 
feature is that it will be built from the necessary disenfranchisement of the common, ‘vulgar’ 
Man. People are “[instruments,” a means to evolution’s goal. As Straik exclaims: “Does clay 
co-operate with the potter?” (78). Despite Straik’s broad claim, some men are lucky enough 
to be the instruments by which all the rest are instrumentalised. Feverstone makes it clear that 
“Man has got to take charge of Man,” and that it is better to be one of “the people who do the 
taking charge” (35) rather than one of the unfortunates forced to obey.13 It is revealed that 
Feverstone and the N.I.C.E. are, like the community at St. Anne’s, also committed to a form 
of hierarchy. Their internal structure and proposed societal structure is based primarily on
11 At the very least because N.I.C.E. is contra biological life and anti-aesthetic. There are probably many more 
reasons he would write a vitriolic polemic against the Institute.
12 For an example, see DI 109.13Cf. “Man’s conquest of Nature, if  the dreams of some scientific planners are realized, 
means the rule of a few hundreds of men over billions upon billions of men” (AM  58).
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power differentials, a principle consistent with their “devil worship” as Lewis calls it. 
Furthermore, the New Man will be post-sexual. Sexuality is seen as a free radical which 
precludes the possibility of “peace and order and discipline” (186), and therefore dangerous 
to any eugenic program. The N.I.C.E. aim to restrict and eventually destroy sexuality, 
biological difference, and thus biological procreation. They believe that neutering Man will 
make him New and truly dignified; after all, as Filostrato explains, “the things that most 
offend the dignity of man [are] Birth and breeding and death” (187). And with the defeat of 
death, the New Man will be immortal, will have overcome Nature -  in other words, the 
organic world. The complex character of Man’s existence -  the synthesis of spirit [Geist] and 
body, is to be destroyed. Organic life is viewed as a “cocoon” which shelters the “babyhood 
of mind” -  simply a means to an end: “the artificial man, free from Nature” (189).
“[F]ree from Nature” -  but free for what? Straik gives his own metaphysical vision, 
namely the emergence of “Man Immortal and Man Ubiquitous [...] Man on the throne of the 
universe” (191). Later, this is simplified merely to “Man as God” (219). The aim is 
omnipotence, omniscience, even possibly omnipresence. Other qualities, like 
omnibenevolence, would be lacking -  and herein lies the problem. It is not for goodness or 
love that the N.I.C.E. pursue such a divine vision of Man -  it is for cosmic power and 
domination. The title -  That Hideous Strength -  alludes to the N.I.C.E.’s overall project. 
Lewis derives it from “Ane Dialog” by the Scottish poet Sir David Lyndsay, who uses it to 
refer to the Tower of Babel. Like its mythical forerunner, the N.I.C.E. receives the same 
penalty for attempting to enthrone “Man as God,” and thus the title takes on a partial irony -  
for the N.I.C.E.’s strength -  hideous or not -  is unable to withstand the apparent weakness of 
St. Anne’s and the realm of Logres which they defend. The conflict is surprisingly one-sided. 
It is not just at the institutional level that there is a reckoning to be had, but also at the 
individual level that each member of the N.I.C.E.’s inner circle receives his or her just deserts 
for self-deification. In some ways, the dissolution of the N.I.C.E. is an inevitable fact -  the 
natural consequence of the philosophy of life and anthropology that it holds.
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Love in THS
St. Anne’s Philosophy of Life
St. Anne’s means, literally, ‘holy favour/grace’ (from Latin sanctus, Hebrew Hannah ‘He has 
favoured me’).14 Hilder (112) and Schwartz (95) both observe that in church tradition, St. 
Anne is the mother of Mary, who in turn becomes the theotokos, the God-bearer. Thus, in 
choosing the company’s name, Lewis emphasises its auspicious receptivity and welcoming 
femininity. While the strife-ridden N.I.C.E. at Belbury is defined by its sublunary 
apprehension of InfortunaMinor and associated images of aggressive masculinity, St. Anne’s 
-  “a kind of family, a small ‘household,’ ‘company,’ or ‘society’” (Hilder 113) which is 
under Ransom’s charitable leadership -  is an expression of FortunaMinor. It is built upon 
copper-rich soil (the metal associated with Venus) and during the course of the novel it 
becomes Jane’s home, is visited by the earthly wraith of Venus, and is later visited by Venus 
herself, the Oyarsa of Perelandra. Schwartz echoes this fact when he states that, by “virtue of 
its ties to the celestial presence of Venus”, St. Anne’s is identified “with the divine love that 
is the source of the affections, sympathies, and charity that sustain a n organic community” 
(95).
Love, then, is a central theme of St. Anne’s and is expressed through the community’s 
way of life. Hilder characterises the community particularly well: they are “alive to 
immediate experience and practical matters; thoughtfully respectful of tradition and awake to 
the present; appreciative of common humanity; working for the common good; and 
passionately loving nature” (112). Furthermore, she says that St. Anne’s “celebrates 
individuality in community” and “honours the sacredness of individuality and freedom of 
choice” (128). In stark contrast to Mark’s experience at the N.I.C.E., St. Anne’s “does not 
coerce people to become members” (113). This is especially apparent with Jane, who is given 
a real choice to join the company, to take a “leap in the dark” (THS 120) as Arthur Denniston 
puts it.
St. Anne’s is not “predicated upon a philosophy in which might makes right” (“A 
Reply” 107) which leads to tyranny. On the contrary, St. Anne’s is more akin to a spiritual 
meritocracy. Following Lewis’s critique of equality being medicine (and not food), in a 
healthy, harmonious social organism like St. Anne’s, one might expect to find inequality to 
be prominent, and it is: but only in the spiritual sense. As Schwartz observes, “Jane finds it
14According to the Online Etymology Dictionary (“Anne”).
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difficult to square the social equality of the house with the less acceptable notions of spiritual 
hierarchy to which its occupants assent” (115). At the top of the “spiritual hierarchy” is 
Ransom, the “spiritual elder of St. Anne’s” (Hilder 121), whose surname (“Fisher-King”) 
makes his monarchic status explicit. Beyond Ransom, who is prevented from participating in 
the practical life of St. Anne’s due to his injured heel, there is a “social equality” amongst the 
company: men and women share tasks, such as cooking and cleaning; class differences are 
ignored, for example the working-class Ivy Maggs is just as much a member as Jane. Jane, as 
a woman, is not excluded from the dangerous hunt for Merlin. In practice, social roles, 
whether gendered, class-derived, or otherwise, are shared amongst all, according to the merits 
of each and with a mind to harmony and efficiency.
Perhaps the best way to describe St. Anne’s social life is to invoke the Pauline 
analogy of membership within a body.15 Ransom, as Director, is clearly the head. Grace 
Ironwood, his physician, may be viewed as the ‘chief whip’ or discipline of St. Anne’s: she is 
the spine and skeletal structure (which helps connect to head to the rest of the body).
MacPhee is a healthy measure of rationality and scepticism -  the left brain, one might say. 
Dimble is the creative intellect -  the right brain. His wife, the motherly Mrs Dimble, is the 
heart. Ivy Maggs acts as a strong-willed, loyal servant -  an arm or hand. Jane becomes the 
company seer through her dreaming -  she provides eyesight. Merlin is the muscle: the motive 
force and weapon against Belbury. Mark, if he were to join (and I believe one can assume 
that he does at the end), would quite possibly act as the mouth. Although it is something of a 
stretch to assign each member to a certain body part, it nevertheless exemplifies the ways in 
which the various members are seen to complement and fulfil certain roles within the 
company of St. Anne’s. There is no pressure on any of the members to be something they are 
not; the company body takes each member as they are and uses them according to their 
strengths and capabilities. St. Anne’s exemplifies what Confucius called “harmony without 
uniformity,”16 and this results in a relational milieu that tends towards peacefulness and rest. 
Despite the imminent danger of the N.I.C.E.’s schemes, throughout the novel St. Anne’s 
maintains a “merry, holiday love” (THS 161).17
15 I strongly suspect that Lewis wrote the passages at St. Anne’s with I Corinthians, chapter 12, verses 12 to 26 
in mind, in which Paul uses the metaphor of a body to describe the relationship between the different members 
of the church, also called the body of Christ.
16f P M ^ ^  (qtd. in Berthrong).
17 Although this is used to describe Jane’s experience after her first meeting with Ransom, it seems an 
appropriate summation of the juxtaposition of reverent holiness and jollity that is found in the scenes at St. 
Anne’s.
83
The Animals
Perhaps one of the most striking, specific examples of love at St. Anne’s is revealed through 
its relationship to animals. They are not seen as mere dumb beasts or pets by those in the 
company, least of all by the Director, who formed the company such that both man and beast 
flourish side by side. This is due to “the way [the Director] has with animals” (175), and, of 
course, the way he has with other people. Under Ransom’s directorship, animals are 
understood as “jesters, servants and playfellows” (423) -  complements to their human 
cohabitants. The best example of this is when Jane first meets the Director, Ransom. After 
eating his Eucharist-like meal, he calls in the mice: for “[h]umans want crumbs removed; 
mice are anxious to remove them” (158). Ransom emphasises here the complementarity of 
the human will and that of the mice; suggesting at a broader level there is a way for humans 
and beasts to live together in such a way that intersecting interests need not be “a cause of 
war” (158) between the two. Lewis uses the mice incident analogically, explaining via the 
Director that “obedience and rule are more like a dance than a drill -  specially between man 
and woman where the roles are always changing” (158). It saying this, Lewis explicitly 
alludes to a concrete instance of the Great Dance. A sanctioned relational inequality, 
foundational to the metaphysic of the trilogy, enables both different species (mice and men) 
and genders (men and women) to fulfil their intrinsic, yet fluid, roles. The question of 
inferiority or superiority is meaningful only in a milieu of identity confusion. If one 
understands the bounds of one’s rights and responsibilities in whichever capacity one is 
acting (whether as a human or animal, husband or wife, director or member), then the 
constraints of one’s given role clearly make a power struggle towards equality or domination 
(towards individual autonomy) patently inappropriate and rather puerile.
Mr Bultitude represents the most concrete example of an animal recipient of love at 
St. Anne’s. Given that “the Director had brought back with him from Venus some shadow of 
man’s lost prerogative to ennoble beasts” (340), Mr Bultitude is certainly ennobled during his 
stay at St. Anne’s-on-the-Hill. Lewis explains that “[i]n [Ransom’s] presence Mr Bultitude 
trembled on the very borders of personality, thought the unthinkable and did the impossible, 
was troubled and enraptured with gleams from beyond his own woolly world” (340). Lewis 
echoes Buber when the reader is told that the bear is brought almost to the point of knowing 
“everything that is represented by the words I  and Me and Thou” (339) -  but stops short of 
self-consciousness.
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Ransom as Director and New Man
Ransom, as Director of St. Anne’s, is arguably the best example of loving behaviour in the 
novel. His voyage to Venus has changed him irrevocably, and when juxtaposed against 
“ordinary earth people [who] appear pale and sick,” Ransom’s “vigour” (Purtill 90) is 
striking. He has certainly received “[t]he splendour, the love, and the strength” (Per 227) 
which the King wishes upon him before his return to Earth. I have already noted Ransom’s 
relationship to animals; he is no different with regard to his human companions, excepting of 
course that he respects them equally as hnau. Although he has been given charge of the 
company at St. Anne’s, he nevertheless “embodies the ‘feminine’ heroic of receptivity to the 
divine” (Hilder 121) and is thus defined by his obedience and respect for his “Masters” (the 
Oyeresu), as well as their master, Maleldil. Thus, in his capacity as Director, he does not 
force the members of St. Anne’s to follow his orders as a stereotypical view of his 
masculinity might expect; his followers act out of receptivity to and respect for his 
recognisable spiritual authority. This is seen particularly in his approach to Jane and her 
psychomachia, as discussed above. Ransom is sincere and firm in his analysis about the 
nature of marriage and Jane’s relationship to Mark, but he does not force her to accept his 
perspective. He rather allows her the necessary time and reflection to arrive at agreement (or 
conceivably, disagreement). In choosing this approach, he reveals a measure of what could be 
called ‘passivity.’ Ransom is content to let things take their course. This quality is
the fulfilment of his spiritual journey in which he has learned receptivity.
Unlike the classical hero who seeks personal glory through self-reliant
activity, Ransom is the spiritual hero whose obedient openness to the
divine brings about victory. (Hilder 119)
When Ransom declares that he has “become a bridge” (THS 321), this is an example of the 
receptivity which Hilder ascribes to him. The idea of a man being a bridge is reminiscent of 
the imagery employed in TSZ. Nietzsche’s prophet declares that “[w]hat is great in man is 
that he is a bridge and not a goal; what can be loved in man is that he is a going-across and a 
down-going’ (44). At the literal level, there is an obvious correlation; at a figurative level, the 
link is not so strong. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note the ways in which Nietzsche and 
Lewis’s proffered conception of Man-as-bridge converge and/or diverge. As a bridge, 
Ransom enables the planetary powers descent to earth. He also bridges translunary Deep 
Heaven and the sublunary Silent Planet, and, by virtue of his interplanetary journeys to
85
Malacandra and Perelandra, has become nearly perfect,18 having attained a physicality and 
spiritual character alien to the vast majority of the “half hnau” (OSP 83) upon Earth. Ransom 
“has become a bridge” between his fellow earthlings and the person of Maleldil (this is 
certainly true for Jane). In other words, he is a type of the archetypical New Man, the nature 
of which was first revealed in the incarnated Maleldil. Ransom is therefore a bridge on 
multiple levels: firstly, to the Oyeresu, the representatives of Maleldil, secondly to Deep 
Heaven, and thirdly, to the first New Man: Maleldil.
As I parse Nietzsche’s usage, he is emphasising the essential unity of (his ideal) man. 
His oft-cited example, the sentence “lightning strikes,” expresses this well. He calls it a 
“seduction of language” to dichotomise ‘lightning’ as a subject and ‘strikes’ as a verb or 
action. This, he claims, “misconceives all effects as conditioned by something that causes 
effects” (GM 481). Thus, to separate a subject from its verb is to make it responsible, to 
introduce the possibility of morality, and thus guilt, reactivity and ressentiment. Nietzsche’s 
Ubermensch is thus a bridge bent into a circular shape: an eternal “going-across,” essentially 
dynamic and recursive, eternally overcoming itself as action redefines subjectivity.
These two kinds of Man-as-bridge stand over against each other. The foundational 
difference is in the teleology of each. For Nietzsche, the process and product, the means and 
end, are consubstantial. His ideal man is essentially and eternally self-concerned, always 
striving to overcome his limitations in order to flourish. In Lewis’s case, however, Ransom is 
a bridge for the Other: a vicar, if you will. Ransom does not attempt to overcome his 
limitations merely in order to flourish; he willingly accepts who he is because he recognises 
himself as a work-in-progress: one being moulded and perfected by Maleldil into the man he 
is meant to be.19 I must stress that this telos (‘the man Ransom was made to be’) is dynamic 
in nature, but not dynamic in a Nietzschean sense of perpetual self-creation. The dynamism 
comes rather from being a figure who participates in the Great Dance with recognition of 
one’s created nature. In Hilder’s terms, this amounts to embodying “a feminine ethos” (119) 
vis-a-vis the masculine Divine. The Nietzschean alternative would be to capitalise on what 
one’s ‘thrownness’20 and act as if one were thrown into the world free from constraining 
facticity -  a stereotypically masculine ethos. Ransom is a bridge for others, and thus for
18 I mean this in the sense of the German vollkommen ( ‘come to fullness’). Beyond the wound on his heel, 
Ransom has actualised the fullness of his potential with regard to beauty, goodness and truth.
19 For this reason, he refuses Merlin’s offer to heal his wound using druidic magic, recognising it as an 
illegitimate means to a desired end.
20 See p. 42.
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himself -  he is attuned to his own selfhood through his receptive encounter with the Other.
On the contrary, Nietzsche’s Ubermensch is a bridge turned inward, and though this would 
not exclude encountering the Other, the encounter would invariably lead to the Other’s 
objectification in an effort to maximise self-flourishing. Nietzsche’s Man-as-bridge, as I have 
characterised it, looks surprisingly similar to the N.I.C.E.’s vision for the New Man. Lewis, 
however, proposes another sort of New Man in the person of Ransom, and challenges the 
idea that real human flourishing could ever come from the kind of self-interest and power- 
mongering displayed at Belbury.
A Voyage to Sanctified Venus: Jane’s Journey
Jane’s journey to encountering a sanctified, unselfish version of Venus begins when she 
meets Ransom, who exhibits a form of personality utterly New. The reader is told that, upon 
meeting him, “her world was unmade: anything might happen now” (THS 151). Jane’s 
response to him is mediated through her senses, which for Jane (contra Mark) are the means 
to a world of beauty and aesthetic pleasure. Early on in the novel, the reader notes that she is 
open to the aesthetic realm, if not reliant upon it. She senses, for instance, the “indoor 
daylight falling on panels, and a whiff of the smell of fresh bread” (9). Mark notes that Jane 
“could enjoy things for their own sake” (270) and “cared for old buildings and that sort of 
thing” (89). After Jane’s run-in with “Fairy” Hardcastle, the reader is told that “she wanted to 
be with Nice people, not Nasty people -  that nursery distinction seeming [...] more important 
than any later categories of Good and Bad or Friend or Enemy” (144). Because Ransom and 
those at St. Anne’s are the real “Nice” people, the “Nasty” people from the N.I.C.E. are 
ironically rejected. The categories of ‘nice’ and ‘nasty,’ which I would argue are aesthetic in 
nature, are then revealed to be markers of good and bad -  derived from what Mark calls “the 
Normal” (331). Jane becomes nicer and better and more beautiful as the uncharacteristic air 
of St. Anne’s exerts its influence upon her. On her trip home (after seeing Ransom for the 
first time), she perceives “the outlined beams of sunlight” through the train windows, exhibits 
a “merry, holiday love,” and encounters her own beauty afresh (161) -  a far-cry from her 
initial train journey, in which fog obscures the sunlight and her mind is subjected to doubts 
(144-5).
One of the crucial moments in Jane’s journey towards love is when she comes to 
understand the nature of her identity, which one might see as a necessary condition of the
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love of others.21 Jane’s squeamish femininity, her response to the masculine, her 
unwillingness to obey or submit -  these are all symptoms of what has hitherto been a life in 
which she has rendered absolute the need to “keep up one’s own life” (71). Hitherto she has 
viewed herself as thrown (geworfen) into existence without anchoring values or necessary 
factical relations;22 she has thus been within her rights to evaluate and determine them for 
herself. She is like (as Lewis puts it) “[t]he Existentialist” who believes “that man’s nature 
(and therefore his relation to all things) has to be created or invented, without guidance, at 
each moment of decision” (qtd. in Purtill 98). Jane’s modern outlook has rendered her 
ignorant of the other possible basis for living, namely discerning one’s engirdledness:23 an 
apprehension which forms a different path to and realisation of “one’s true self’ (THS 352).
In her encounter with St. Anne’s and the philosophy of life it’s members exemplify, Jane is 
brought to the point of wondering whether she is “a thing after all -  a thing designed and 
invented by Someone Else and valued for qualities quite different from what [she] had 
decided to regard as [her] true self?” (3 52).24 On the next page, the reader is told that, in 
reference to Jane, “[t]he name me was the name of a being whose existence she had never 
suspected, a being that did not yet fully exist but which was demanded. It was a person (not 
the person she had thought), yet also a thing, a made thing [...]” (353). Lewis’s usage of me as 
opposed to I (which would have sounded better) is quite intentional. ‘Me’ is grammatically 
an object, never a subject. The associations which could be made are numerous: it is thus 
ontologically secondary, never primary. It is acted upon rather than an actor. It is primarily 
objective before being subjective. Jane, with her insistence thus far on the absolute ‘I’ (i.e. 
her preoccupation with achieving an autonomous self), has denied all this.
Jane is faced with an exclusive disjunction: either, she is absolutely free to define her 
own subjectivity, and may legitimately decide what personal, gender and sexual qualities are 
to be valued, invented or designed; or, she concedes the reality that she is not free in an 
absolute sense, being “a thing, a made thing”, and that there is an authority above her who 
acts as supreme evaluator, designer and inventor. This would entail that the value and nature 
of her personality must be revealed and/or discovered. If the former is true, her daungerous25
21 See Mark 12:31 (KJV): “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.”
22 See p. 42.
23 Something which Heidegger, if  he were amicable to the idea, might call Umgebenheit.
24 This echoes Lewis in PPL where he claims that “to be valued is an experience which involves a curious kind 
of self-consciousness. The subject is suddenly compelled to remember that it is also an object” (123).
25This is the adjectival form of Daungier.
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attitude towards men and masculinity is unproblematic. If the latter obtains -  this is of course 
the author’s contention -  then her attitude is problematic, and needs alteration.
Earlier on, Arthur Denniston reveals the final requirement for Jane’s conversion 
towards love. In the context of inviting Jane to join St. Anne’s, he comments to his wife that 
he is “asking [Jane] to take a leap in the dark” and adds that is like “getting married, or going 
into the Navy as a boy, or becoming a monk... You can’t know what it’s like until you take 
the plunge” (120). For love to become a possibility -  for example within a community like St. 
Anne’s -  there is a necessary leap to overcome the risk of the unknown, the Other, which 
may or may not respect one’s own subjectivity. There is an element of faith and submission 
required. Prompted by her Author, she decides to accept her engirdled, created nature. It is a 
step towards love, for love operates only when one can make a gift out of oneself. Given her 
acceptance that she is a “made thing” -  and thus can no longer hold on to her solipsism or 
anarchy -  Jane takes a leap of faith “into a world, or into a Person, or into the presence of a 
Person” (353) -  a courageous act which, like Ransom’s melee with the Un-man, results in a 
state of contentment (Per 197).26
In brief, Jane’s openness to beauty enables her to develop an openness to the Other; 
her spiritual transformation is occasioned by her aesthetic receptivity. Encountering someone 
like Ransom after a season of dreariness and nightmare, she employs the phenomenological 
dialectic and perceives the uncomfortable kernel of truth in his views on love, marriage and 
equality. Ransom is, as I have already mentioned, a “bridge.” After she takes a leap into the 
dark and decides to join St. Anne’s, healing love is brought into her hitherto rather choked 
love-life. As the novel progresses, Jane learns to obey and submit to those -  like Ransom -  
who are rightfully her superior in the cosmic hierarchy. Her fortunes therefore change -  the 
sublunary influence wanes while the translunary influence waxes in her life. By the end of the 
novel, nurtured in the womb of St. Anne’s, she is prepared to be “the theotokos, the ‘God- 
bearer,’ to Mark” (Howard 141).
26On a related but side note, I am struck how the trilateral Semitic root s(h)-l-m, as seen in the words Islam, 
Muslim, Salaam (Arabic) and Shalom (Hebrew), contain both the idea of peace as well as submission: to be a 
Muslim, to be one who submits -  is to be experience Salaam or Shalom.
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Out of that Hideous Strength: Mark’s Journey
As Mark’s involvement in the N.I.C.E.’s “Inner Ring” increases towards the end of the novel, 
his anxious need for admiration is overwhelmed by his “longing for wellbeing in harmony 
with Jane” (Hilder 151). Gradually the scales fall from his eyes, and he is able to see. Mark 
leaves his “public self’ behind, developing an interiority that conflicts with the “scientific’ 
outlook” (THS 269) which has hitherto defined him. He is confronted with himself as an 
object, a thing formed by a life-time of decision. He begins to understand that “it was he 
himself -  nothing else in the whole universe -  that had chosen the dust and broken bottles, 
the heap of old tin cans, the dry and choking places” (269-70) -  images of his barren 
philosophy of life. When Richard Purtill comments on Eustace’s transformation into a dragon 
in The Voyage o f the Dawn Treader, his analysis also applies to Mark: “[t]he objectification 
of his inner repulsiveness [ . ]  accomplishes a change in his character” (93). In this moment 
of self-knowledge, he begins the process of taking ownership for his mistaken direction.
The conclusive moment in Mark’s self-conflict is when, submitting to Frost’s 
“training in objectivity”, he finds
[t]he philosophy which Frost was expounding was by no means 
unfamiliar to him. He recognised it at once as the logical conclusion of 
thoughts which he had always hitherto accepted and which at this moment 
he found himself irrevocably rejecting. The knowledge that his own 
assumptions led to Frost’s position combined with what he saw in Frost’s 
face and what he had experienced in this very cell, effected a complete 
conversion. All the philosophers and evangelists in the world might not 
have done the job so neatly. (THS 327)
In conjunction with his conversion from the N.I.C.E.’s philosophy of life, the extreme 
psychological and spiritual tension of his “training in objectivity” results in his apprehension 
of the objective “Normal” (331), which is presented in masculine, Martial terms: it “towered 
up above him -  something which obviously existed quite independently of himself and had 
hard rock surfaces which would not give, surfaces he could cling to” (344).27 Mark, who has 
been bent out of shape by his conformance to the required “[elasticity” (125) of the N.I.C.E., 
finds something straight and firm -  and it gives him courage, because he can “cling” to it. His 
perception of reality receives “the clearness of Mars” (362). After accepting the “Normal,”
27In AM, Lewis speaks of “the Tao” in the same terms as Mark’s “Normal”: it “is the doctrine of objective value, 
the belief that certain attitudes are really true, and others really false, [it describes] the kind of thing the universe 
is and the kind of things we are” (18).
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Mark measures himself by this new objective standard, and discovers the extent of his 
spiritual poverty. Downing notes that “when Mark gradually comes to see the emptiness and 
squalor of his life, he feels that somehow he has violated his wife, made her the object of his 
lust, not his companion in love” (95). Furthermore, Mark desires the secret of how “people 
like Denniston or Dimble” are able to live “with all their muscles relaxed and a careless eye 
roving the horizon, bubbling over with fancy and humour, sensitive to beauty, not continually 
on their guard and not needing to be” (THS 402). He wants the contentment that his wife 
finds -  the “jovial liberty to enjoy life in all its fullness” (Hilder 130).
Lewis earlier compares Mark’s life to a web which has grown from his infancy, 
consisting of strands and threads -  decisions he has made -  which solidify and constrain the 
overall web’s structure. Mark’s life, then, is a construction: organic, but taking a certain 
design or form. Depending on the type of spider a person is (to continue the analogy), one’s 
web will be either a tangled cobweb or an ordered weaving. Mark’s is the former. As a result 
of his “moment of martyrdom” (Ward 86) when he refuses Frost’s instruction to trample 
upon a crucifix, Mark expects, and accepts, that he will soon die. He reveals a modicum of 
translunary “Charity,” which is “ready to kill, ready to die” (THS 359). Schwartz notes how 
this “existential encounter with death” shocks Mark “into self-awareness” (120) and the 
“clearness of Mars” (362). This correlates with “the first courageous thing he has ever done 
in his life” (Downing 57). Thus with Mark’s anticipated execution for his disobedience, he 
acknowledges that “there was no harm in ripping up the web” (THS 269) and beginning again 
-  a process completed by “irrevocably rejecting” his previous philosophy, a so called 
“complete conversion” (327). Lewis makes the suggestion, however, that there is a “bill to be 
paid” if one wishes to remake one’s life-web with “truth” in mind: and this would take the 
form of “arduous decision and reconstruction” (269). To quote Frost out of context (and 
rather ironically), “[a]n explicit action in the reverse direction is there fore a necessary step 
towards complete objectivity” (372). I am here reminded of Nietzsche, who says that
The essential thing ‘in heaven and earth’ is [ . ]  that there should be long
obedience in the same direction; there thereby results, and has always
resulted in the long run, something which has made life worth living.
(BGE 93, my italics)
Mark’s problem is that his original obedience to the governing directive of the “Normal” is 
short lived and sporadic. Likewise, his submission to the tyranny of N.I.C.E. increases, but 
does not persevere. Nietzsche’s formulation of a “life worth living” does not take into
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account the content or direction of one’s obedience: only the form (‘long’ and ‘same’); as 
such, it can only be seen as a measure of a life’s authenticity, but not necessarily its goodness. 
Lewis says as much himself: “Progress means movement in a desired direction, and we do 
not all desire the same things for our species” (“A Response” 311). For all their odiousness 
and despicability, Frost and Wither’s consistency is to be seen in their favour. They follow 
their “desired direction” to the end: their webs are structured towards a goal, however 
diabolical it may be. If one acknowledges Lewis’s moral presuppositions, however, one 
would need to reform the Nietzschean phrase: it is ‘a long obedience in the right direction’ 
which makes “life worth living” or leads to Progress, which Lewis defines similarly as 
“increasing goodness and happiness of individual lives” (“Progress” 311). Mark’s task now, 
having changed direction, is to make his obedience “long” -  “a real philosophy believed with 
blood and heart” (THS 269).
By becoming receptive to a fortunate Martial influence, Mark eventually triumphs 
against the spiritual tyranny of the N.I.C.E.’s “objectivity” and returns to the “Normal,” 
which in his mind is the world in which his wife lives (182). He finds a way out of the 
sublunary version of Infortuna Minor, a way out of cultivating a New Man in “that hideous 
strength” of Belbury (an unfortunate Mars Silvanus), out of subduing the “little men” through 
his fraudulent newspaper missiles (Mars Gradivus)2  He finds the courage to repudiate all 
this, and finds that the conflict in his mind -  between the N.I.C.E.’s view of Progress, and the 
conservative28 9 “Normal” -  has been resolved. It is indeed true that “once Mark has recovered 
himself and realised how weary, flat, stale, and unprofitable all his ambitions have been, he 
discovers also that he really does love his estranged wife” (Downing 81). After escaping the 
Babel-like meltdown at Belbury, he knows he must return to her. Jane prepares the “marriage 
chamber” (THS 424) for him, where a new chapter in their life together is to be inaugurated: 
it will no longer be contractual, but sacramental. All is ready for a true matrimony in which 
“the mutual society, help, and comfort that the one ought to have of the other” (1) is 
expressed: a loving state which hitherto has been missed in their conflicted relationship.
28The epithet Silvanus relates to the pastoral, generative aspect of Martial influence, while Gradivus relates to 
the pugnacious aspect of Martial influence. See p. 14.
29 I do not mean this in the political sense, but in the sense of ‘conserving. ’
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Harmony in THS
Producing harmony between Mars and Venus -  and consequently, the masculine and the 
feminine principles -  is a central concern of the “whole work of healing Tellus” (414). The 
goal towards which the entire novel drives is the marital and sexual (re)union of Mark and 
Jane.30 31As a frame for this final section of the chapter, Ward observes that “in myth, Mars and 
Venus had a child, Harmonia: in That Hideous Strength, the story ends with Mark and Jane 
about to become parents, helping bring harmony to planet Earth in the form of that child who 
will be the new Pendragon” (87).
Reconciling Matrimony
Seth Wright seems to think that only once “Malacandra descends and meets with Perelandra” 
(99) is harmony engendered. Without this matrimonial meeting, if I understand Wright 
correctly, receiving the influence of only Mars or Venus would not produce the radically 
changed Ransom seen in THS; both influences are needed. He observes that “Ransom learns 
courage in Malacandra” while “he learns war in Perelandra” (102). Both courage and war are 
associated with the Martial; war, however, is courage put into practise -  courage that has an 
object. Given the doubts Ransom experiences after his return to Earth from Malacandra 
(whether his journey was not perhaps a hallucination), it is clear that his sojourn in Mars 
merely enabled his courage but did not fortify it. Both are fortunate in the translunary realm -  
but together, they overcome sublunary immaturity characterised by fear, doubt, 
misperception, and egocentrism. Instead, they produce an Other-focused milieu in which all 
act courageously to love the Other as they love themselves.
With this in mind, Hilder says that “the rebirth of the marriage of Jane and Mark 
Studdock is a microcosmic view of gender harmony,” and this harmony is one characterised 
by a mutual humility (156). Both Jane and Mark come to terms with their own respective 
“illusion[s] of independence” (Schwartz 100), which they then relinquish. Jane relinquishes 
hers completely, becoming dependent upon Maleldil instead. Her “meeting with the 
masculine God allows a healed relationship with the masculine Mark” (Wright 100). Mark is 
half way, one might say; through his wife’s tutelage, he must still become fully receptive -  to
30 Rather than having more dreams, Jane is told by the Director to “[h]ave children instead” (THS 424).
31 The reader is told that Ransom “found himself in considerable doubt as to whether what he remembered had 
really occurred” (OSP 158).
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his wife, who will no longer give herself to him daungerously, or to his Creator, who will 
expect him “to discover the true meaning of the word ‘lady’” (Ward 87). Together in their 
small corner of the “grand cosmic romance” (Hilder 161), they are now able to exemplify -  
like the King and Queen of Perelandra -  “the resolution of discords, the bridge that spans 
what would else be a chasm in creation (Per 212).
Harmonia as Pendragon
With Lewis in particular, “[p]olarities yield trinities” (Zogby 36). When the two poles -  Mars 
and Venus, the Masculine and the Feminine -  are reconciled to each other according to 
cosmic design, Harmonia is the result. This reconciliation is a kind of structured, healthy 
tension, curiously analogous to how the yin (feminine principle) and yang (masculine 
principle) of Taoist philosophy combine to symbolise the harmonious Tao.32 As types of the 
aforementioned archetypes, Jane and Mark’s re-union is, I believe, a necessary and sufficient 
condition for Ransom’s successor, the next Pendragon; this child will follow in Ransom’s 
footsteps, and work to overcome the silence (and dissonance) of the Silent Planet.
Critics occupy varying positions regarding whether Jane and Mark’s sexual reunion 
does actually result in the next Pendragon. Ward is quite certain of it. He states that their 
child “will be the next Pendragon, Ransom’s successor” because the Jovial, “monarchal 
presence presiding over Mark and Jane’s bed will bring to life that eightieth Pendragon” (53). 
As he notes, Jane’s maiden name was “Tudor” and Lewis elsewhere traces the Tudors’ 
(mythological) heritage back to Arthur and Jupiter (53). Hilder seems uncertain (131), much 
like Wright. The latter claims that due to the sublunary air of Earth, there is no certain way to 
know whether they do indeed become parents of the next Pendragon: “one can only assume 
that this miraculous child will be conceived in the immediate future -  but it is only 
assumption, never knowledge” (101). He adds that “there are two other potential successors, 
the significantly named Arthur Denniston, and his and Camilla’s unborn child” (101). Ward’s 
view seems to be most probable, despite Merlin’s assertion that their use of contraception has 
made this impossible for certain astrological reasons (THS 307). Ransom, who (given his 
history) is a far more reliable astrologer than Merlin, responds that “[t]he child may yet be 
born” (ibid). Holding this in mind, if one also considers the structural movements contained 
in the narrative of THS as well as the trilogy as a whole, there seems to be a strong suggestion 
that Jane and Mark’s marital harmony (into which they most certainly enter) is reified by
32 See p. 90 n27.
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becoming parents of the eightieth Pendragon. Inheriting the spiritual office of Uther 
Pendragon and his son Arthur of legend,33 the Studdocks’ child is to be aligned with the 
renaissance of Logres and the motive force behind a Britain that sings harmoniously with the 
“hauntings” of other countries like France or China (414), which are spread over the rest of 
Thulcandra. Venus, FortunaMinor, sounds the final note of the novel as Jane and Mark’s 
harmony is engendered. She has overcome a narrative largely dominated by conflict and the 
misfortunes of the sublunary Martial wraith. Or, as Ransom puts it, she “comes more near the 
Earth than she was wont to -  to make Earth sane” (423).
Conclusion
In the Politics o f Fantasy, Lee Rossi claims that THS “fails to solve the thematic concerns 
developing in the first two novels” and that “the novel falls into two basically unrelated 
actions” (48). I hope to have shown that this view is false. On multiple levels, THS is a 
dialectic which moves from apparent oppositions which resolve in synthesis. It reformulates 
the themes of Ransom’s journeys to Malacandra and Perelandra in earthly terms, transposing 
the “spiritual adventures” he has on these planets onto the drought-ridden souls of the 
Studdocks. Lewis thereby explores the ways in which Conflict and Love relate, and how 
Harmony is the Major result of two Minor planetary spirits when properly received.
33Significant here as the unifier of Britain, who brought peace and prosperity to an island of warring tribes by 
virtue of his martial strength and vitality.
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Chapter 5
The Cosmic Philosophy of Life
All human life is carried out in the tension between self-centeredness and openness
to the world.
Wolfhart Pannenberg, What is Man?1
I now look to what my exploration of the texts has yielded in terms of a philosophy of life. I 
have focused upon instances and characterisations of Love and Conflict in the trilogy, as well 
as the Great Dance and Harmony in Chapters Three and Four, both of which suggest the ideal 
way Unity and Diversity might be related. Referring back to my initial definition of a 
philosophy of life, I characterised it as a worldview (Weltanschauung) with an emphasis on 
its practical, concrete outworking. It is something that seeks to offer a “unified solution [to] 
all the problems of our existence,” producing definite answers to life’s questions and taking 
into account “everything in which we are interested” (Freud “Lecture XXXV”).
There are two elements to the philosophy of life as seen in the Cosmic Trilogy. It is a 
“way of life” in two senses. Firstly, there is the ‘journey of life’ which describes a gradual 
apprehension of the philosophy, a pilgrimage as it were. At each stage certain truths or 
lessons are learned; these build upon each other until the traveller has reached the third stage, 
which is a reconciliation of the first two. Here, the way (‘manner’) of life may be understood 
as the philosophy of life in its quotidian expression. Embarking on the journey does not 
produce the “unified solution” described by Freud; it is only once one has reached one’s 
destination that one “feels secure in life, one knows what one ought to strive after, and how 
one ought to organise one’s emotions and interests to the best purpose.” In the following 
sections, I examine firstly the ‘journey’ in the form of the Cosmic Dialectic, and then the 
‘way’ in the form of the Cosmic Manifesto.
The “Stages in Life’s Way”: Lewis’s Cosmic Dialectic
I briefly mentioned in my introductory chapter Kierkegaard’s idea of “the three stages or 
spheres of existence -  life viewed aesthetically, ethically, and religiously” (Evans 52). This 
triad is a particularly useful explanatory framework and means of ordering the
1 What is Man? 56.
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phenomenology of human existence. Holmer indirectly (but intentionally) links Lewis and 
Kierkegaard’s triads when he says that “Lewis [...] can give now credence to the idea of the 
expert in areas like religion, morals, and [a]esthetics” (25). This, I believe, is especially 
apparent in the Cosmic Trilogy, which is “like a lived dialogue or a lived dialectic” (17) that 
incorporates each Kierkegaardian sphere of existence into Ransom’s journey, as well as the 
journeys of both Jane and Mark in THS.
The location of each story suggests this dialectic or triadic pattern: Mars, Venus, then 
the planet (Earth) in which types of the Martial and Venereal are enabled to produce 
Harmony. Whether by Lewis’s intention or not, the fact that the trilogy remained a trilogy 
(and not a tetralogy) is suggestive of his consciousness of its dialectical structure. If one 
accepts Michael Ward’s hypothesis (as I do) that The Chronicles o f Narnia consists of seven 
books because each conforms structurally to one of the seven planetary spheres of the 
Ptolemaic universe, then it means that Lewis did not always choose to divide his fictional 
texts up merely according to convenience, whim or productivity. Ransom’s theosis and 
imminent return to Venus at the end of THS conclude his character arc -  the trilogy is often 
called the Ransom Trilogy for this reason.2
Lewis does not have the view that being human entails full-fledged selfhood to begin 
with. On the contrary, “he would have us remember that [...] it is to be so constituted that we 
make ourselves into subjects” (Holmer 7). In a similar vein to Kierkegaard, who thought that 
“to be a self is to be assigned a task” (Evans 51), Lewis reveals a developmental view of the 
self in Ransom, Jane and Mark -  one which was shared by his literary forebears like Spenser 
and Bunyan, both of whom had a profound influence on Lewis’s own thought .3 All four 
would agree that it is hard work to become a humane self, and often requires “arduous 
decision and reconstruction” (THS 269) for the subject on his/her journey. It also relies on 
idealism about “life as it was intended to be lived” (Evans 59) and selves “becoming what 
they are intended to be” (Pannenberg 54) -  there is an objective telos, a final goal in view -  in 
other words, a destination. This journey to selfhood, furthermore, “cannot be achieved simply 
through knowing propositions” -  the propositions must be known in concrete fashion for
2 The Dark Tower fragment, which still divides critical opinion about its chronology and relation to the trilogy, 
does feature Ransom -  but he is marginal, and it does not serve his character arc in any obvious way. The fact 
that Lewis abandoned the story, whatever its relation might have been to the three books making up the Cosmic 
Trilogy, is telling.
3 I am thinking in particular of Spenser’s The Faerie Queene, to which Lewis devotes much attention in The 
Allegory o f Love, and Bunyan’s classic The Pilgrim’s Progress, which Lewis rewrote using his own 
philosophical journey in the form of The Pilgrim’s Regress.
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“existential growth” to occur (Evans 38). Holmer weighs in on this point too, claiming 
“Lewis does not believe that [ . ]  becoming moral” is a matter of “believing in a theory of the 
good” (32). Rather, in Lewis’s terms, one must come to know existentially (connaitre) what 
one might know theoretically (savoir). This means practising being good and seeing 
goodness practised for oneself (as Hyoi does for Ransom). There must be lived encounter and 
habituation for it to take root in the human soul. Another integral point is Lewis’s view of 
human nature. Although he would assert that, at core, it is essentially good, he would 
nevertheless affirm that “there is an inherent tendency in the [human] ego to adhere to one’s 
own purposes, conceptions and customs” (Pannenberg 55). He would agree with Pannenberg 
when he claims that, “left to their own initiative, men by no means live in a constant 
movement beyond themselves in an openness to the world” (55). The phenomenological 
dialectic is absent in those who are focused upon themselves. As Pannenberg states, 
“egocentricity does not stand in an obvious harmony with man’s openness to the world”
(55).4 The egocentric tendency results in “the death of true personhood” (Ware 34) if it 
cannot be overcome.
According to Evans, Kierkegaard thinks “it is natural for human beings to begin as 
children in the aesthetic stage and progress to the ethical and eventually the religious stages” 
(68). This assumes the child is encouraged to develop an “openness to the world,” or what I 
also called ‘openness to the Other.’ I understand the cosmic dialectic in lig ht of this natural 
progression; each stage naturally follows from the last, and their order is not arbitrary. In 
“First and Second Things,” Lewis proposes the idea that “[y]ou can’t get second things by 
putting them first; you can get second things only by putting first things first” (280), and this 
applies to the cosmic dialectic. Ransom, importantly, does not go to Perelandra first, nor do 
we encounter him as Mr Fisher-King immediately after his trip to Mars. Nevertheless, the 
dialectic as outlined below is only symbo lic of the soul’s journey through life, and not an 
exhaustive explanation of the trilogy’s lived dialectic. This is because
Lewis held that, symbolically speaking, ‘in a certain juncture of the 
planets each may play the other’s part’ and that, in any case, ‘all the 
planets are represented in each. ’ Given the interanimation of these seven 
spiritual symbols we should not expect the imagery [ . ]  to be chemically 
pure. (Ward 232)
4 This reminds me of a question in The Imitation o f  Christ: “Who hath a greater combat than he who striveth to 
overcome himself? (a Kempis 10).
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For instance, Schwartz points out that “Jane’s search for Merlin echoes Ransom’s pursuit of 
the hnakra” in OSP and “Mark’s solitary self-examination recalls the silent self-debate on 
Venus” in Perelandra (145). Despite this, the general features of the Mars-Venus-Harmonia 
graduation are quite clear. Another thing to note is that, as Evans says, it is possible for a 
person to become “fixated” on a particular stage and not go any further, even when that 
person is “aware of the higher possibilities he or she is refusing” (68). When this happens, the 
term ‘stage’ becomes inappropriate, for it “really has become an existentially-chosen sphere 
of existence” (68). This fixation is particularly evident among the trilogy’s antagonists.5 Yet 
in the case of Ransom, Mark and Jane, simply because they pass one stage of life does not 
mean that they then leave it behind: “the person who begins to live ethically or religiously 
does not leave the aesthetic behind, because it is a universal dimension of human life” (Evans 
69). Every stage of life becomes an accessible sphere to those who have passed beyond it.
The Journey and the Way
Figure 1: A visual representation of the trilogy’s dialectic. Ransom travels to Mars, then to Venus; and havin g 
breathed from both atmospheres, he is encountered on Earth as having grasped the essence of Harmonia. 
Ransom’s journey on Mars informs Mark’s journey out of the Silent N.I.C.E., into a perception of reality. 
Ransom’s journey on Venus likewise informs Jane’s journey into the fullness of love and the self-sacrifice it 
demands. In their reunion, their collective journeys lead them to a relational Harmonia as well as Harmony in 
their souls (although Mark must still traverse the Venereal stage) and conclude his own psychomachia).
For the immature soul, the psychomachia is inevitable and should be embraced. For human 
beings are parochial creatures, characterised by diverse forms of disunity and fear of the 
Other. The soul must journey beyond itself into the realm of the Other, the Thou, and therein 
encounter itself, the I. Through a kind of humility, it must become more open to the
5 Devine, for instance, has remained within the aesthetic sphere -  he has no conception of the ethical, for ethics 
do not serve his desire for wealth and power. MacPhee seems fixated within the ethical sphere. Weston, 
arguably, goes all the way to the religious, however, he follows the shadow version of the cosmic dialectic -  the 
grotesque dialectic, one might say -  for his ethics lead him to a diabolical faith that ends in his own destruction.
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immediate world of sensation -  an aesthetic commitment -  and less fearful of what it finds. 
The extent of its parochialisms must be discovered, and the soul ought actively to seek clarity 
of perception as it relates itself dialectically to the Other. In this process, the soul gets 
roomier, and individual and relational potentialities arise which were previously impossible. 
At this point, the first major battle of the psychomachia concludes, and it is no longer a child. 
The next stage through which it must pass is puberty, in which the new potentialities must 
become actualised and put into practise. The accompanying doubts must be overcome, for 
now the soul must act courageously. Mere openness to the Other is insufficient; the soul must 
risk itself on behalf of the Other, and begin to love in concrete terms -  an ethical 
commitment. This love is self-sacrificial, and it means freedom from the parochial old self, 
which seeks to make itself the centre of all striving. In overcoming the old self’s doubts 
through action, the soul leaps -  and this leap is towards the third, final stage: faith, the 
psychomachia’s psychosynthesis: the dynamic conclusion of the soul’s journey. It is the stage 
of adulthood, of ever-increasing maturity and wisdom. It is the stage in which love flows 
naturally from one’s being, in which evil is fought against vigorously. It is characterised by 
contentment, peace and receptivity to the Divine Other -  a religious commitment. It places 
one in a harmonious relation to the diversity of creation, and at a deeper level, it unites the 
soul with all that is beautiful, good and true. Here, the cosmic way of life is revealed.
The Aesthetic: Mars, Conflict & Clear Perception
What unifies Kierkegaard’s account of the aesthetic stage or sphere is his preoccupation with 
“the immediate,” (qtd. in Evans 70) which “refer[s] to the natural, spontaneous sensations 
that lie at the heart of conscious human existence” (70). In my reading, this view of the 
aesthetic (which has little, though not nothing, to do with beauty) captures the major focus of 
Ransom and Mark’s journeys under Martial tutelage.
The starting point for understanding this stage of the cosmic dialectic is Lewis’s own 
characterisation of OSP as being “Ransom’s enfance” (qtd. in Downing 104). Ransom has a 
base level of openness to the world; rather than “striv[ing] to assert [himself] and to prevail” 
(Pannenberg 55) over the alien sensations of Malacandra, he exhibits a willingness to apply 
the phenomenological dialectic and thereby submit to the reality of the Otherness he 
encounters. He allows his perception to be corrected, quickly in the case of the environment, 
decently in the case of the hrossa, but rather slowly in the case of the sorns. This corrected 
perception repeats the thematic movement “‘Out of something” (Manlove 28) which typi fies
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the Martial journey. Ransom leaves behind his “own purposes, conceptions and customs” 
(Pannenberg 55) for those of benevolent Malacandra. His perceptions, originally rather 
anthropocentric and geocentric, are revealed to be skewed and he embraces what I have 
called a logocentric view in its stead, one which takes into account the diverse cosmic 
expressions of the Logos and does not embargo any non-anthropic versions thereof. The 
Martial spirit is primarily expressed in the struggle between fear and suspicion of the alien 
Other and “the shy, ineluctable fascination of unlike for unlike” (OSP 58), perhaps the 
supreme example of Ransom’s openness to the world, which quells his fears and habituates 
him in minor expressions of courage, not the least being an affectionate love for the hrossa 
and appreciation of Martian beauty. Schwartz captures exactly what Lewis does with Ransom 
on Malacandra: he is “grooming the unsure Ransom for future warfare” (143). The central 
example of battle on Malacandra is one expression of this grooming; Ransom’s part in it is 
that of an honoured guest, a “spectator” rather than a “witness”6 (Per 106); he is made to 
perceive the nature of true courage, true commitment, and in Hyoi’s death, true love and 
forgiveness. Having received the perceptual “clearness of Mars” (THS 360) and encountered 
the fortunate Martial spirit in concrete, existential terms, he is given the instruction to “Be 
courageous” (OSP 148) -  and he now has the capacity, the “roominess” (Holmer 20), to put 
such an instruction into practise.
Like Ransom’s, Mark’s journey is also one which is ‘out o f something. In his case, 
however, he has descended into the lowest depths of the Silent Planet, and his openness to the 
world and to the Other is well-nigh extinct. His conflict is likewise one of perception, of his 
inability to appreciate the Other -  whether it be his wife, or the men and women whose 
humanity he obscures through abstractions like “vocational groups,” “elements,” “classes” 
and the like (THS 87). Yet he is not wholly incapacitated: though he does not perceive beauty 
as his wife does, he has some sensitivity to it, insofar as it is something recognisably part of 
her world. He is thus not entirely fixated in his misperception, and thus there is sufficient 
room in his soul for “the Normal” to mount its defence against the onslaught of the N.I.C.E.’s 
so-called “objectivity” (372). The aesthetic apprehension of the Normal enables him to stand 
straight against the bending elasticity of the N.I.C.E. and risk execution; he reveals the 
beginnings of courage and a willingness to accept martyrdom, rejecting the “Crooked” in 
favour of the “Straight” (375). Following this, he becomes aware of his wife’s goodness and
6 ‘Witness’ is etymologically related to ‘martyr’ -  which is exactly what Hyoi becomes in his death at the hands 
of Weston and Devine.
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purity: he has developed sufficient roominess in his soul to feel chastened at his previous 
dismissal of her subjectivity in favour of his ‘masculine’ objectivity. He thus sub mits to the 
inversion, willing to beg her forgiveness. Recognising his misperception and the moral 
failings to which it has led, he finds a newfound capacity for Other-love, and therefore, 
courage in the face of his own vulnerability and lack of independence. This reveals how he 
becomes fully open to the world. Mark escapes the N.I.C.E.’s clutches and, like Ransom, has 
apprehended both “the clearness of Mars” (360) as well as the beginnings of courage and 
willingness to die for, rather than alter, what he believes in. He is ready for the next journey, 
which, although it does not take place in THS, is suggested by virtue of his reunion with Jane 
who acts as the bearer of the Venereal influence upon his life.
The Aesthetic stage is thus defined by a kind of conflict that is the precondition for 
the next stages of the dialectic. Descartes’ cogito ergo sum reveals a certain approach to how 
one may understand selfhood. Descartes’ formulation takes for granted ‘I.’ 
Phenomenologically, this makes sense; humanity is defined by self-consciousness rather than 
Other-consciousness. However, this means that the realm of objects (the aesthetic realm), 
which one perceives or senses as being beyond one’s own subjectivity, is 
phenomenologically distanced, and does not appear to be the foundation of the ‘I.’ In other 
words, the self appears to be prior to the outside world. The psychomachia begins with the 
question of how one should navigate the outer world, given the inner world’s apparent 
priority (and priorities). The navigator has two possibilities. He can chart a course through the 
outer world that either presupposes the priority of the self, and thus will choose the safest, 
most self-serving route, or chart a course lacking such a presupposition. The former leads 
increasingly to selfishness and egocentricity, and thus alienation of the Other. The latter (the 
way that exhibits an “openness to the world”) may lead to the discovery of the Other in all its 
beauty, goodness and truth. But this way requires vulnerability, a willingness to risk the one 
certain thing -  one’s self -  and submit to the future demands of clear perception.
The Ethical: Venus, Love and Right Action
Evans notes that “what all the forms of the ethical life have in common is what I would call 
the quest for identity” (90). And the “ethical task as Climacus [one of Kierkegaard’s 
pseudonyms] describes it is therefore the task of becoming the person God created one to be” 
(114). As a result of this, “[t]he person who exists ethically has a kind of self-confidence [...] 
she sees herself as someone who can achieve the ethical task assigned to her” (116).
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On Perelandra -  the conflict is less to do with perception, but more to do with the will 
and right action, that is, love -  at least as far as Ransom is concerned. Having developed the 
capacity to love, Ransom is tested by being given a responsibility to love the Other, rather 
than love himself. This test manifests itself in the need for an act of courage rather than the 
stayed hand of self-preservation. Ransom tells Merlin in THS that “[i]n the sphere of Venus I 
learned war” (THS 301).7 This is because the Martial influence, which gives courage (an 
ambiguous thing, susceptible to both good and evil applications), is only fully realised when 
it comes into contact with the Venereal influence; one must have something to be courageous 
about -  an object, as it were, for the Martial spirit to protect. By apprehending the fullness of 
the Martial influence, Ransom is “eased of all fickleness and protestings” (360) and goes to 
war against the Un-man, exhibiting the “Christic self-surrender” (Schwartz 148) which is the 
hallmark of agape love and the basis of an Other-centred ethic. Ransom's piebald skin (Per 
113) reflects the continuation of his psychomachia begun on Mars;8 no longer is the conflict 
about clear perception, but rather whether he will undertake what Schwartz calls “the arduous 
course of right action” or not (148). Once he does, and vanquishes the Un-man in the caves, 
his piebald nature disappears and he reaches a wholesome state of peace. His split identity is 
rendered whole, and after the conclusion of the novel, the fruits of his obedient victory over 
egocentric doubts produce in him a transcendent “self-confidence,” as he becomes the person 
he was created to be -  a type of the archetypal New Man, Maleldil.9
In THS, Jane’s conflict is likewise less to do with perception, but more to do with the 
dichotomy between self- and Other-love. Like Ransom in Perelandra, Jane already has 
developed a capacity to love -  she has the required “roominess” (especially apparent through 
her aesthetic awareness).10 The temptation she faces is whether to avoid at all costs “being 
invaded and entangled” (71) or not, and thus, she is full of doubts about the wisdom of 
graciously, rather than daungerously, embracing either Mark’s or Maleldil’s advances. 
Although she does need to perceive (with the help of those at St. Anne’s) the necessities of 
love, marital or otherwise, she primarily needs to decide to accept what I have called her 
engirdledness, her objectivity and receptivity: this is the precondition for her ability to
7 See p. 14.
8 See p. 53-4.
9 Ransom, throughout his various adventures, has been a Christ-figure, which is what Maleldil has been called 
on Thulcandra: a scapegoat or ransom for others (OSP), who dies, descends into hell and defeats the devil (Per), 
and then is raised into new life and receives a crown of glory (THS).
10Given the fact that Ransom’s “legs presented an odd spectacle, for one was brownish-red (like the flanks of a 
Titian satyr) and the other was white -  by comparison almost a leprous white” (Per 55), one might say that Jane 
is Mark’s spiritual superior, being in a spiritually piebald state rather than being a spiritual leper like him.
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sacrifice herself on behalf of the other, both erotically (eros) and spiritually (agape). Similar 
to Ransom on Perelandra, she must courageously ‘take the plunge’ and make war against her 
self-centredness. By doing so -  joining St. Anne’s, accepting her creaturely objectivity and 
thus embarking on the humility of spiritual, ‘feminine’ heroism -  she acts rightly, ethically, 
and begins loving her husband, her Creator, and thus herself. Entering into a stage of peace 
and self-confidence, Jane can thus journey from Venus towards the stage of Harmonia.
The ethical stage, best exemplified in loving action, is secondary in the cosmic 
dialectic. Given the primary nature of conflict, love need never occur, other than in the form 
of egoism and egocentricity (which is paradoxically self-hatred, for it closes off human 
potentiality). Kallistos Ware clarifies this well:
Love cannot exist in isolation, but presupposes the other. Self-love is the 
negation of love. As Charles Williams shows [...] in his novel Descent 
into Hell, self-love is hell; for, carried to its ultimate conclusion, self-love 
signifies the end of all joy and all meaning. Hell is not other people; hell 
is myself, cut off from others in self-centredness. (35)
But if this second stage of the psychomachia manifests in action for the sake of the Other -  
selflessness -  then this is the highest form of love, what the Greeks called agape. This, then, 
is the realm of the ethical. The Martial manifests itself fully in the form of the Venereal. The 
negative relation of conflict (being against something), transforms into a positive relation 
(beingfor something). Love is the relation of being ‘for’ rather than ‘against.’ It is a 
movement towards rather than a movement away, towards a diverse unity rather than a 
disunited diversity. Martial capacity for courage and clear, incisive perception finds its object 
and completion upon encountering the receptive, loving Venereal; in their conjunction, they 
give birth to Harmonia.
The Religious: Harmonia, Unity in Diversity, and True Faith
The final stage is unlike the two before it. It has less definite content and is rather a 
hypostasised reconciliation or resolution of the previous two stages than anything else. 
Phenomenologically speaking, however, its sojourners are markedly different from those 
inhabiting the ethical stage, who are still visibly fallible human beings, albeit loving, ethical 
ones. Those who travel the religious stage are no longer quite open to the world; they are 
partially beyond this world, and will remain so. The religious stage is thus “marked by a 
quest for ethical character and eternal life, and [Kierkegaard] sees those goals as intertwined”
104
(Evans 123). To progress within this stage “requires a person to recognize the limits imposed 
by their creatureliness, to understand what is within a person’s power and what must be 
accepted as something one cannot control [...] the religious task is to learn that ‘without God 
a person can do nothing’” (129).
Ransom’s obedience to the phenomenological dialectic, to the logocentric 
perspective, to the “Voice” telling him to attack incarnate Evil -  all these contribute to the 
Ransom portrayed in THS, where his psychomachia has visibly concluded in a 
psychosynthesis. After the events of Perelandra, he has entered into sanctus otium11-  a state 
of harmony with himself, others, and the cosmos at large. As director of the company at St. 
Anne’s, he is no longer a knight-protector for the virtuous Green Lady. Rather, he is the 
Jovial, king-like bridging agent of the Oyeresu as Ward observes (50). Hilder understands 
“Ransom’s passivity” in THS to be “the fulfillment of his spiritual journey in which he has 
learned receptivity [...] Ransom is the spiritual hero whose obedient openness to the divine 
brings about victory (119, my italics). Through this openness, he becomes who he was meant 
to be (Pannenberg 54). No longer striving to overcome his timidity or self-centredness, 
Ransom is in a state of self-knowledge, certain of both what is within his power and what he 
cannot control (Evans 129). Particularly after his initiation into the Great Dance, Ransom’s 
faith becomes true; his “quest for certainty” (qtd. in Evans 56) concludes. This is what brings 
about his psychosynthesis and new identity as a bridge. In his capacity as a “bridge” (THS 
321), he successfully links the temporal and eternal, the spiritual and the material, the natural 
and the supernatural -  he is the “bridge that spans what would else be a chasm in creation” 
(Per 212). In Fear and Trembling,12 Alistair Hannay’s translation of Kierkegaard’s Danish is 
particularly apt: “to express the sublime in the pedestrian absolutely -  that is something only 
the knight of faith can do -  and it is the one and only marvel” (70). Ransom the “Pedestrian” 
(OSP 1) now expresses the sublime, a marvel to the reader who has seen his spiritual enfance. 
He has become an alien to the reader, as if his home were no longer amongst the men and 
women of Thulcandra. He is no longer ‘of Thulcandra,’ having no share in the silence of his 
birth-planet. Ransom’s new home is Perelandra, where he will join the other Pendragons of 
Logres.
By the end of THS, neither Mark nor Jane approximate the extent of existential 
harmony exhibited in Ransom’s character. At the narrative level, one might say that this is
11 Holy peace or leisure.
12 The title is derived from Philippians 2:12 [KJV] “[...] work out your own salvation with fear and trembling.”
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because they are not given an interplanetary journey to Perelandra, to breathe in that blissful 
air. However, such a view is to reduce the Venereal to the material -  and more than anything 
else, the planets are “spiritual symbols” (“The Alliterative Metre” 24). The main reason is 
that neither of them are near to Ransom’s level of obedient submission to his Masters and 
Maleldil. In Jane’s case, her journey of faith has just begun. Mark’s, however, has not really 
started. Yet both have cast off their “illusion[s] of independence” (Schwartz 100) as I 
mention in the previous chapter: under Jane’s tutelage, the suggestion is that Mark will be 
receptive to Maleldil just as he has been receptive to “the Normal” (THS 331). The Harmonia 
in which their “connubial reunion” (Ward 87) results is not, primarily, the kind of harmony 
which puts each’s psychomachia to rest. The Studdocks’ Harmonia is found, rather, in the 
reconciliation of their collective journeys and in their suggested future as progenitors of the 
eightieth Pendragon. Between the two of them, they have -  as ‘one flesh,’ a united diversity -  
traversed both the Aesthetic and Ethical stages of existence, and are both ready to embody 
“the necessary humility required of lovers” (THS 425) as they enter into the Religious stage 
as a unit. Both of them “understand what is within a person’s power and what must be 
accepted as something one cannot control” (Evans 129). In Hilder’s terms, “cosmic 
masculinity and femininity unite in receptivity, becoming dancers in the grand cosmic 
romance” (Hilder 161). While Ransom exhibits the harmony of an individual soul, the 
Studdocks instantiate the harmony of “unity-in-difference” (166), a social unity which will be 
expressed at higher levels as Logres and its allies work to mend Britain’s ills.
The Cosmic Philosophy of Life
I have now discussed the central argumentative movement of the trilogy’s philosophy of life. 
Each text may be seen as a “stage in life’s way” or alternatively as a “sphere of existence.” 
Within each stage, more of the trilogy’s proffered Weltanschauung is revealed. Right at the 
end of THS, Dimble makes a useful distinction:
[I]f one is thinking simply of goodness in the abstract, one soon reaches 
the fatal idea of something standardised -  some common kind of life to 
which all nations ought to progress. Of course, there are universal rules to 
which all goodness must conform, but that’s only the grammar of virtue.
It’s not there that the sap is. [Maleldil] doesn’t make two blades of grass 
the same: how much less two saints, two nations, two angels. The whole 
work of healing Tellus depends on nursing that little spark, on incarnating 
that ghost, which is still alive in every real people, and different in each.
(414)
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I have attempted to show this in the cosmic dialectic -  the way in which the spiritual 
adventures of Ransom, Jane and Mark “incarnate that ghost” in their lives. Havin g concluded 
this, in the following appendix I relate elements of Dr Dimble’s “grammar of virtue”: the 
propositional distillation of my exploration into the trilogy’s philosophy of life. As will 
become apparent, the cosmic philosophy of life incorporates many traditional responses to a 
world in which selfishness holds sway: the development of regard for the Other; an openness 
and acceptance of the Other; humility and love; an appreciation for beauty and pleasure. 
Otherness is seen as an antidote to selfishness, and this open way of life is neither ascetic nor 
Dionysian. Yet, to balance these qualities, the trilogy’s philosophy of life cannot affirm 
relativism, whether epistemological, ontological, ethical or otherwise; a view which is 
characteristic of Weston’s various philosophies. Relativism is, however, also fundamental to 
the postmodern worldview of much of the West, which embraces relativist views of truth. In 
contrast, the cosmic philosophy of life is predicated upon an objective view of reality. It does 
not rely on a metaphysic in which human beings find themselves devoid of ontological and 
epistemological support, but it relies on one in which human beings are engirdled, in which 
values are discoverable and in which there are sure guidelines for what qualifies as 
“diabolical” or not. The acceptance of a transcendent, divine reality beyond oneself underlies 
this metaphysical vision, for it is this divine reality that possesses the requisite authority to 
define human objectivity and yet give to it the gift of subjectivity. This undermines human 
pretentions of autonomy and radical freedom, and any socio-political systems that proceed 
from such assumptions. The cosmic philosophy of life means that all is gift and nothing is 
deserved -  therefore, that nothing can be demanded, and humility is the only appropriate way 
to approach living one’s life.
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Appendix
The Cosmic Manifesto of Unity and Diversity, Love and Conflict
The following points may be seen as a series of ‘rules’ (in the sense of a monastic rule of life) 
distilled from my reading of the text, all of which relate categorically to the triads discussed 
in the concluding chapter. Each subsequent triad of headings relates to the three dialectical 
categories (nine headings in total). Though highly subjective in nature, I have attempted to 
capture something of the transformative wisdom manifest in the Cosmic Trilogy.
1. Clear Perception
❖  Conceive of the cosmos infused with life rather than indifference and death.
❖  Accept that reality, and thus truth, is something discovered, not constructed. It is 
found through common sense, through experience, through encounter. It is inspired, 
revealed, given.
❖  Everything is important, no matter how peripheral it might appear from a subjective 
perspective.
❖  Metaphysics, and thus physics, are contingent. Take it that miracles are possible.
❖  Recognise that ‘what is’ and ‘what should be’ are distinct and cannot be conflated.
❖  Realise that inferiority and superiority need not be expressions of power; learn from 
the superior, teach the inferior.
❖  Remember that there is no exact science of ‘human being.’ Humanity can neither be 
reduced to Man in the abstract nor the identity-erasing collective of men. “One can’t 
study men; one can only get to know them” (THS 69).
❖  Celebrate gender as a metaphysical reality, an expression of the Creator-creation 
dichotomy; it is not to be relativised or seen in narrowly biological terms.
❖  Embrace the organic, animal nature of human being. “Birth and breeding and death” 
(THS 187) are not to be ignored, glossed over as embarrassing or evil, nor sterilised in 
society -  but are to be accepted and celebrated.
2. Selfhood as a Task
❖  Know thyself. Self-knowledge begins with humility.
❖  Remain open to the psychomachia; it takes courage and self-mastery to progress 
through the dialectic of life.
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❖  Embrace the Green Lady as a model: develop patience and kindness, trust, 
perseverance and hope; leave behind envy, pride, self-centredness, grudge-holding 
and Schadenfreude. Rejoice rather in the truth, as she does.
❖  Diminish any “dramatic conception of the self’; accept who you are. Embrace Being, 
rather than Seeming.
❖  Enter into your freedom -  not as ‘terror with delight in it’ but rather as “delight with 
terror in it!” (Per 67).
❖  You have not been thrown into an indifferent universe. Recognise your engirdledness. 
You are part of the cosmic Great Dance.
❖  Embrace an identity founded upon something outside of yourself; this is the key to 
realising your own selfhood.
❖  Do not fear the Other, for this leads to the stagnation of the Self and to self-alienation.
❖  Become a bridge for the sake of the Other, and observe how you become beautiful, 
confident, and wise.
3. Epistemic Virtue
❖  Embrace epistemic dependence instead of asserting its opposite; cultivate epistemic 
humility, recognising the limits of human knowledge and accepting the freedom that 
such limitation brings. This humility will preserve the subjectivity of the Other.
❖  Do not entertain that epistemic pride which results in objectification.
❖  Recognise and celebrate both your objectivity and subjectivity.
❖  Leave behind anthropocentric, anthropomorphic rationality.
4. Pleasure
❖  Pleasure is to be enjoyed and appreciated; it is a gift, never something to be taken for 
granted -  “the fruit we are eating is always the best fruit of all” (Per 80).
❖  Do not fall into comparison. Embrace the given good, whether it maps on the 
expected good or not.
❖  Practise appreciative restraint: do not arrest or repeat experiences of pleasure 
inappropriately. Follow rather the middle way.
5. Right Action
❖  Remember that right action produces contentment, just as Ransom’s actions to protect 
the Green Lady result in an eased conscience.
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❖  Support the innocent; there is a moral harm in passively allowing corruption to 
succeed.
❖  Approach the animals as kindred, as fellow creatures and potential subjectivities; 
repudiate the idea that they are objects that can be used and dominated.
❖  The will to power must be resisted, for it leads to the subjugation of the Other and of 
yourself.
❖  Do not desire equality as an end in itself, but desire it as a medicinal remedy which 
helps restore appropriate hierarchy, as a measure to “guard life” but not “make it” 
(THS 157).
❖  Cultivate flexibility rather than elasticity; fit ‘alongside’ rather than fit ‘in.’
❖  Respect and obey leaders like Ransom in THS. True leaders should persuade 
followers, respecting their Otherness -  never forcing or using them as if they were 
objects.
6. The Grammar of Love
❖  Understand that love requires obedience: there is a ‘rule of love’ that cannot be 
ignored.
❖  Communicate your love not in your own words -  but learn the language of the Other.
❖  In your openness, love the Other: as Ransom loves the Green Lady.
❖  In your openness, forgive the Other: as Hyoi forgives Ransom.
❖  Retain openness to the Bent Ones: love your enemies despite their evil.
❖  Express your love firstly in commitment and secondly in emotion. A love that does 
not persevere is no love at all.
❖  Like the hrossa of Malacandra, be guided by instinct, but do not replace love with lust 
-  it will lead only to unnecessary conflict.
❖  As a hnau, treat non-hnau in a way that maximises their flourishing. “Guide all 
natures to perfection. Strengthen the feebler, lighten the darker, love all” (Per 211).
❖  Recognise that delight is to be found in loving the Other. Let your love be like 
Maleldil’s -  “born neither of your need nor of my deserving, but a plain bounty” (Per 
223).
7. Vocations
❖  Believe, with Ransom, that you have been called “not for nothing” (Per 147).
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❖  Become a xenologist; develop an existential orientation towards the Other in all its 
manifestations. Cultivate openness to the Other, recognise it, and encounter its beauty.
❖  See that membership in a body is the highest calling of social life: to live out a 
vocation, to contribute with one's talents, to complement other members with the gift 
of one’s life.
❖  Create. The Great Dance’s movements are predicated upon new creation. Creativity 
must be accepted, encouraged, and even expected: it is a cosmic reality. Creativity 
will not be exhausted -  thus be open to an eternity of creative striving, and do not 
settle for less.
8. The Unity in Diversity
❖  Desire ‘harmony without uniformity’ as the greatest interpersonal configuration of 
society.
❖  Embrace both the diversity and unity of being, as well as the movements which 
produce each. Plurality and singularity are not to be understood as enemies.
❖  Recognise social complementarity and diversity as opposed to a difference- 
obliterating equality and unity.
❖  Pursue the ultimate unity in diversity; you must “take the plunge” or a “leap in the 
dark” (THS 120) to find it. For membership means the acceptance of your 
vulnerability and the willingness to risk your life.
9. True Faith
❖  Know that true religion is concrete, expressed in intentional actions and reactions: it is 
not abstract or ephemeral.
❖  Live a life worth living: practise ‘a long obedience in the right direction.’
❖  Do not despise paradox. For life is complex, profoundly complex, while 
simultaneously being of the greatest simplicity.
❖  Know that harmony is based on mutual, but unequal, submission. Embrace true 
hierarchy and authority: “To be high or central means to abdicate continually: to be 
low means to be raised” (Miracles 201).
❖  Know that everything participates in the divine nature by virtue of its connectedness 
and dependence upon “[w]hat is above and beyond all things” (THS 350).
* * *
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